Man Jailed for Killing Intruder in His Home Not Eligible for Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation
Because prosecutors reserved the right to retry a man whose murder conviction was overturned on appeal, he is not eligible for wrongful imprisonment compensation, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled today.
C.K., whose initials are used because his criminal record is sealed, sued the state seeking compensation for wrongful imprisonment following the reversal of his murder conviction for shooting and killing an intruder in his home. C.K. sought to be declared “a wrongfully imprisoned individual,” but the trial court sided with the state’s argument that he did not meet all the requirements because he could be indicted again or retried for the crime. The Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, finding that a possibility of retrial did not by itself make C.K. ineligible for compensation.
In its ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and reinstated the trial court ruling against C.K. Writing for the majority, Justice Terrence O’Donnell explained that because prosecutors may bring new charges against C.K. at any time and may obtain a conviction in the future, C.K. is ineligible for wrongful imprisonment compensation.
Murder Conviction Overturned and Charges Dismissed
In 2009, Andre Coleman broke into C.K.’s home in Cleveland looking for his girlfriend, Valerie McNaughton, who rented a room from C.K. After Coleman began beating her, C.K. thought Coleman was reaching for a gun, and C.K. shot and killed him.
The state indicted C.K. for murder with firearm specifications, and at trial, C.K. admitted killing Coleman but asserted a defense based on Ohio’s “castle doctrine,” which allows the use of deadly force in self defense within one’s home. The jury convicted C.K. of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to 18 years to life in prison.
C.K. appealed to the Eighth District. The appellate court reversed the conviction because the jury rejected C.K.’s castle doctrine defense, and it remanded the matter for a new trial. On remand, the prosecutor dismissed the indictment without prejudice and indicated that the state could bring new charges in the future.
Suit for Wrongful Imprisonment
C.K. filed a civil case seeking compensation as a wrongfully imprisoned individual, asserting that the reversal of his conviction based on his self-defense claim prevented a future prosecution for murder. The trial court entered summary judgment for the state, finding that “the mere possibility of being re-indicted and retried precludes [C.K.] from being found to have been wrongfully imprisoned pursuant to R.C. 2743.48(A)(4).”
On appeal, the Eighth District reversed, explaining that the law only prevents recovery for wrongful imprisonment when future criminal proceedings are factually supportable and legally permissible. And in C.K.’s case the appellate court concluded the state had not proven that it can and will bring another criminal proceeding against him because it did not show that it had new evidence of guilt or even an active investigation into the killing.
Interpreting the Wrongful Imprisonment Law
Writing for the court, Justice O’Donnell noted that R.C. 2743.48(A)(4) requires a claimant seeking to be declared a wrongfully imprisoned individual to demonstrate that “no criminal proceeding is pending, can be brought, or will be brought” by authorities.
He pointed out that reversal of a conviction as against the manifest weight of the evidence does not prevent the state from bringing the accused to trial on the same charges using the same evidence. Contrary to the Eighth District’s conclusions, the state does not need to discover any new evidence of guilt in order to retry C.K. And because there is no statute of limitations for murder, new charges can be brought against C.K. at any time, and prosecutors have discretion to defer prosecution until stronger evidence disproving the castle doctrine defense comes to light, Justice O’Donnell explained.
Justice O’Donnell acknowledged the passage of time since the dismissal of the charges and the lack of proof that the state is actively investigating the case help C.K., but that alone could not establish that no criminal proceeding “can be brought or will be brought against him for any act associated with that conviction.”
“Rather, because there is no statute of limitations for murder, a new criminal proceeding can be brought at any time, and because the timing of that event is left to the discretion of the prosecutor, C.K. cannot prove that no criminal proceeding can or will be brought against him in the future,” Justice O’Donnell wrote.
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor and Justices Paul E. Pfeifer and Sharon L. Kennedy concurred with the decision.
Separate Concurrence
Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger concurred separately in an opinion joined by Justice Judith L. French. Justice Lanzinger explained that when drafting the wrongful-imprisonment legislation, the General Assembly intended to actively separate those who were wrongfully imprisoned from those who avoided criminal liability. She pointed to cases where compensation was denied even when convictions were overturned by technical error or when a statute was ruled unenforceable. She agreed that those seeking to be compensated must prove all five of the statutory factors by a preponderance of the evidence and that a dismissal without prejudice in a murder case leaves the door open for a new prosecution since there is no statute of limitations.
“It may well be that the General Assembly does not intend to foreclose compensation to one who has been imprisoned under circumstances such as these. If that is so, the statute should be amended to say so,” she wrote.
Justice William M. O’Neill dissented without issuing a written opinion.
2014-0735. C.K. v. State, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-3421.
View oral argument video of this case.
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