Tuesday, January 10, 2017
State of Ohio v. Joseph L. Thomas, Case no. 2012-2026
Lake County Common Pleas Court
Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association v. Kenneth Ronald Donchatz, Case no. 2016-0859
Cuyahoga County
City of Dayton v. State of Ohio, Case no. 2015-1549
Second District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
Death Penalty
State of Ohio v. Joseph L. Thomas, Case no. 2012-2026
Lake County Common Pleas Court
Joseph Thomas is appealing his convictions and death sentence for the murder of Ann McSween, a bartender in Mentor-on-the-Lake who was found dead the day after Thanksgiving 2010 in the woods behind the bar where she worked.
Patrons Gather at Neighborhood Bar on Thanksgiving
Mario’s Lakeway Lounge, owned by Mario Cacic, opened at 3 p.m. on Thanksgiving 2010. McSween worked as the bartender that night and was responsible for closing the bar. Last call was about 2 a.m. on Friday, Nov. 26. Cacic said he drove a few customers home from the bar, then returned. He encouraged McSween to go home because it was her birthday, but he said she wanted to stock the coolers for the next day. Cacic reported that he left the bar about 2:35 a.m.
Witness accounts vary as to who was in the bar after 2 a.m. and who was the last customer to leave. The crowd included Margaret Huelsman, who also was a Mario’s bartender but wasn’t working that night, and Brian Williams. Huelsman said she and Williams left the bar about 2 a.m. and went through the Mario’s back parking lot to a house right behind the bar on Park Street where she lived. Cacic owned the house and rented it to Huelsman and another bartender. Matt Miller, Joseph Thomas, and Kevin Bonnay also were at Mario’s at 2 a.m. Bonnay said he sat at the bar doing a crossword puzzle that evening. Miller and Thomas played pool together but didn’t know each other.
Huelsman later told police that she fell asleep while she and Williams were watching a movie in her living room. She woke up at the end of the movie. Soon after, she heard a thud on the outside of the house and then the front door handle jiggled. Huelsman said she pushed the door shut and locked it. A few minutes later, Williams went outside to look around but said he couldn’t see anything.
Bartender Found Dead in Woods Near Bar
Cacic returned to the bar sometime around 8 a.m. to check on the place, as he indicated he often did. He noticed that tires on vehicles in the bar’s parking lot had been slashed. He walked through the back lot to the Park Street house to talk to Huelsman. As he neared the house, he saw a large amount of blood on the outside of the house, the windows, and in front of the door.
After he spoke with Huelsman, Williams, and the other bartender living there, Cacic called the police, who were dispatched at 8:41 a.m. A nearby business owner had contacted police about an hour earlier to report that covers on two boats he was storing had been cut. The business owner also found a pair of women’s underwear and a shoe. In Mario’s parking lot, McSween’s eyeglasses, a necklace, and a shoe jammed into her car’s wheel well were also found. McSween’s body, naked except for socks, was discovered in a wooded area near the bar and the Park Street house.
The medical examiner determined that McSween had been severely beaten and strangled, had suffered stab wounds to the neck, was raped or experienced rough consensual sex, was stabbed multiple times after her death, and had injuries indicating she had been dragged across a rough surface.
Police Interview Bar Patrons
Police began identifying and talking to the people who were at the bar on Thanksgiving night and into the next morning. On Dec. 18, police issued a press release describing one bar patron that they had been unable to identify – a man with a “gap tooth” who played pool with Miller that night. Two days later, the people Thomas lived with on Marine Parkway, a few blocks from the bar, informed police that Thomas matched the description of the missing patron. Police went to the Marine Parkway home, and Thomas returned to the police station for questioning.
Thomas told police he arrived at Mario’s about 10 or 11 p.m., drank a few beers and part of a shot, played pool with other customers, watched some women dance, and left about 2 a.m. He walked home and said he stayed up until 5 a.m. playing on computers with the 7-year-old boy who lived in the same house. Thomas indicated he did not see his girlfriend on Thanksgiving because she was with her family. He provided a written statement and a cheek swab for DNA testing.
McSween’s Clothing and Other Belongings Found in Burn Barrel
In January 2011, police questioned Thomas again. Three months later, in April 2011, police received a tip and talked with Robert Jenkins, who lived next door to the Marine Parkway residence. Jenkins told police he woke up in the early morning hours on Nov. 26, 2010, the day of the murder, and from a second-floor window saw a fire burning in a barrel in the neighbor’s backyard and a man standing in front of it with his back to Jenkins. On April 20, police seized the burn barrel and other personal items in the house belonging to Thomas, who had been living elsewhere for about a month.
In the barrel officers found burnt pieces of clothing, remnants of a purse, melted cosmetics, and jewelry. The clothing was identified as McSween’s, and blood and DNA found on various items were consistent with McSween’s. None of Thomas’ DNA was discovered on the items in the barrel. Police located Thomas the next day and brought him in again for questioning.
State Runs DNA and Shoeprint Tests
The state’s crime lab conducted DNA testing on McSween’s underwear and a vaginal swab. The tests didn’t match Thomas or any of the other male samples provided. The lab sent the items out of state for additional testing using a technique referred to as Y-STR DNA testing, or “touch DNA” testing, which indicated that Thomas couldn’t be excluded as the possible source of male DNA on the items.
A Lake County criminalist analyzed three shoe impressions found next to McSween’s car and concluded that Thomas’ right boot couldn’t be excluded as one of the prints.
Jury Convicts Thomas of Murder
Police arrested Thomas in June 2011. Thomas’ trial was held in September 2012, and the jury found him guilty of aggravated murder with death-penalty specifications, kidnapping, rape, aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence. The jury recommended a death sentence, which the trial court imposed.
Thomas appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which is required to hear all death-penalty appeals.
Thomas’ Assertions
Among the 24 legal arguments Thomas presents in his brief to the Court:
Thomas contends that his lawyers were ineffective because they did not challenge four of the potential jurors, three of whom were chosen to sit on the jury. One possible juror was close friends with the parents of one of the assistant prosecutors; another was the former brother-in-law of a police officer who interrogated Thomas; one was acquainted with McSween’s son, who worked in the same building as the juror; and another expressed distraction because he had been notified he was losing his job. Their biases made them unsuitable for service on a death-penalty case, Thomas maintains.
Videos of Thomas’ four interviews with police, totaling seven hours of footage, were shown to the jury during trial. Thomas argues that officers repeatedly expressed their personal opinions and supposed certainty that he was guilty, that he was lying and being uncooperative, and that they had his DNA. Allowing jurors to watch those interviews denied him due process, infringed on the jury’s role, prevented a fair trial, and violated rules of evidence and his constitutional rights, Thomas asserts. Specifically, he maintains, investigators have an air of authority and legitimacy as law enforcement, their comments about Thomas’ credibility or guilt “served as a Greek chorus” undermining the jury’s responsibility to independently determine the facts, and the officers’ statements were excessive and unduly prejudicial.
During his interviews with police, Thomas repeatedly denied his involvement in the murders. Stressing that the case against him involved only circumstantial evidence, Thomas argues that there is no direct evidence proving he murdered, robbed, kidnapped, or raped McSween. His presence at the bar the morning of the murder wasn’t sufficient to prove that he committed these crimes, he notes. No fingerprints, blood stains, fibers, semen, or hairs link him to the crime scene, he states and adds that none of McSween’s clothing and items in the burn barrel had any of his DNA on them. The jury’s verdicts weren’t based on “substantial and competent evidence” or a reasonable inference from reliable evidence, and his guilt wasn’t proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he maintains.
Thomas also raises questions about when McSween’s clothing and items were burned in the barrel given that the detective smelled accelerant in April 2011 when it was seized, five months after the neighbor said he saw a man using the burn barrel. He disputes whether the boot-print testimony was allowable as scientific evidence and whether the touch DNA testing could be used as evidence of his guilt.
State’s Positions
The prosecutor asserts that Thomas overstated the questionable relationships of three potential jurors. The jurors each explained that their relationship with a person connected to the trial was limited, and told the court they could set aside the relationships, consider all the evidence, and follow the law. The fourth challenged juror indicated he could give his full attention to the case despite his impending job loss, the prosecutor notes. Pointing out that the Court declines to second-guess a lawyer’s trial strategy, the prosecutor maintains that Thomas didn’t show his lawyers were deficient.
As for the videos of the police interviews, the prosecutor argues that the investigators’ statements were properly admitted because they provided context to Thomas’ comments, they weren’t the type of opinion testimony prohibited by a testifying witness, and the jury understood that the statements weren’t substantive evidence. In the prosecutor’s view, the officers’ questions and comments reflect interrogation techniques designed to elicit a reaction and weren’t presented to prove what happened the night of the murder. The prosecutor notes that the trial court instructed the jury that officer questions and statements weren’t evidence for them to consider. Any potential prejudice to Thomas caused by the videos was resolved by the court’s jury instruction, the prosecutor reasons.
Explaining that a perpetrator’s identity may be determined using circumstantial evidence, the prosecutor points out that the jury’s verdicts show it believed the facts as presented by the state and was more persuaded by the state’s theory of what happened. The amount of circumstantial evidence was overwhelming and other evidence enhanced the case, the prosecutor contends. The state points to different accounts of when Thomas left the bar; the fact that Thomas’ boots couldn’t be ruled out as possibly being the one that left an impression near McSween’s car; text messages and accounts that Thomas was angry on Thanksgiving after a fight with his girlfriend; his delay in talking to police after being told about the police press release; and other alleged inconsistencies in his version of events. The record doesn’t indicate that “the jury lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding [Thomas] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” the prosecutor concludes.
The prosecutor also counters that Thomas’ lawyers accomplished their goal by raising concerns that the burn barrel may have been used subsequent to the day of the murder, possibly by other people, and his counsel wasn’t required to call in an arson expert about this issue. The prosecutor maintains that shoeprint evidence can be offered by a police officer who’s not an expert in the area and that shoeprint evidence is permitted by court rules of evidence. Plus, the state’s remarks about the Y-STR, or touch, DNA tests was fair commentary based on the forensic DNA expert’s testimony and didn’t draw any impermissible inferences, the prosecutor argues.
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Joseph L. Thomas: John Parker, 216.881.0900
Representing the State of Ohio from the Lake County Prosecutor’s Office: Alana Rezaee, 440.350.2626
Attorney Discipline
Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association v. Kenneth Ronald Donchatz, Case no. 2016-0859
Cuyahoga County
The Board of Professional Conduct has recommended that Kenneth R. Donchatz be suspended from the practice of law for two years, with six months stayed on the condition he doesn’t engage in further misconduct.
The charges stem from a complaint related to four client matters in which the Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association alleged that Donchatz violated the rules governing Ohio lawyers. In its recommendation to the Court, the board noted that Donchatz served as an assistant Ohio attorney general employed by the Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel from 1998 to 2001. It also reported that Donchatz “characterizes himself as an expert in ethics” and has used the moniker “the ethics monster.”
Bar Alleges Improper Handling of Unpaid Judgment
Donchatz is facing several allegations of rule violations regarding his reaction to the Davey Tree Expert Company’s attempt to collect an unpaid debt from him. Davey Tree filed a lawsuit against Donchtaz to collect about $2,180 in unpaid invoices.
Donchatz represented himself in the matter, and Davey Tree obtained a default judgment against him in 2010. In 2012, Donchatz filed a notice that the judgment had been paid with the court without properly notifying Davey Tree. The attorney for Davey Tree alerted Donchatz that his action was incorrect and needed to be corrected with the court, and Donchatz allegedly didn’t make the correction. The court agreed to the company’s request to vacate the satisfaction notice and reinstated the judgment, which Donchatz continued not to pay, arguing he wrote a personal check to the company and “wrapped” it in a garnishment notice.
The board reported Donchatz never confirmed the check was received or cashed before filing his satisfaction notice. Donchatz sought to have the court reconsider the default judgment nearly three years after it happened, and Davey Tree resorted to seeking a garnishment order to compel Donchatz to pay. The trial court not only denied his request for reconsideration but awarded sanctions against him to compensate the company for its legal expenses incurred for collecting the payment. The board concluded that Donchatz violated several rules including the prohibition on knowingly making false statements to a court or failing to correct a false statement, disobeying an obligation issued by a court, and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Donchatz Accepts $100,000 Loan from Client
Donchatz became a private practitioner after leaving a law firm that had disbanded, and he accumulated unpaid taxes as a result. One of his clients offered to loan him $100,000, and Donchatz informed the client that he would represent the client for free, without putting the agreement in writing.
The representation began in 2007, but in 2013, Donchatz began to ask the client how the legal fees would be handled. He also accepted and refurbished an antique desk the client gave him. The client reported that Donchatz never informed her of the rules governing transactions between lawyers and their clients, didn’t notify her of a potential conflict of interest from the arrangement, and didn’t suggest she should seek another lawyer’s advice before making the loan.
Donchatz only repaid the client $57,000, returned the antique desk, and admitted to the board that he knew he violated the rules when he accepted the loan.
Attorney Suggests Donchatz Filed False Statement
Donchatz also is accused of filing a motion in a disciplinary case that contained a false statement and misrepresentations of the opposing attorney. Donchatz assumed representation of attorney Carol Hampton, who was facing her own disciplinary charges.
Hampton and her son were involved in a dispute with a property owner represented by attorney J.T. Holt. During the disciplinary proceedings, the two testified that Holt tape-recorded all three conversations among them, and Hampton alleged that the recording of the third conversation would prove her innocence. Donchatz requested from Karen Osmond, the assistant disciplinary counsel handling the matter, copies of the Holt’s tape-recorded conversations. Osmond provided Donchatz two recordings and told him she didn’t have a recording of the third conversation.
Donchatz made a second request from Osmond for the third tape. Osmond contacted Holt who confirmed there was no third recording and informed Donchatz of that. She also provided him with Holt’s phone number, inviting him to speak directly with Holt to verify the information.
Donchatz allegedly made one phone call to Holt, not using the number from Osmond but rather one provided by his client, which was not answered or returned. He then filed a motion in the case claiming that Osmond was withholding the recording and was “fully aware” that it existed. The motion didn’t mention that Osmond had investigated the missing tape, informed him of its nonexistence, or given him the opportunity to investigate for himself.
Osmond viewed the statements in the motion as false and misleading, and when asked by the disciplinary counsel to clarify his statements, Donchatz simply defended his position. The board concluded he violated the rules, including filing a claim without merit and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Dispute Over Fees Leads to Misleading Filing
In the final complaint against Donchatz, he represented a firm in dispute with Leader Technologies. Donchatz and attorneys for Leader engaged in mediation discussions mediated by a Franklin County magistrate. Donchatz circulated a draft “Stipulated Entry and Consent Judgment,” which he testified was requested by the magistrate. Leader’s attorney testified that the magistrate hadn’t requested a consent judgment, but rather asked Donchatz to put his proposed settlement in writing.
Without the consent of the parties or the direction of the magistrate, Donchatz submitted the entry to the court without indicating it was a draft or that there were unresolved issues still pending. Leader’s attorney informed Donchatz the filing wasn’t proper and requested he withdraw it.
The attorney informed Donchatz that if he didn’t withdraw the entry, he would institute disciplinary action against Donchatz for his dishonesty. Donchatz countered by stating he would file a disciplinary action against the company’s attorney for frivolous conduct and defaming him. The court vacated the entry, and the board found Donchatz violated attorney rules.
Donchatz Responds to Claims
Donchatz objects to the board’s recommendations and argues his behavior merits a lesser penalty. He suggests the conduct in his four cases is less harmful than the conduct of other attorneys who were sanctioned with a two-year suspension.
In the Davey Tree matter, Donchatz notes no client was involved and the tree company was hired after a contractor knocked down a portion of a tree on his property. The contractor reported the incident to his insurer, and Donchatz was under the impression the contractor or the insurer had made arrangements to pay Davey Tree. He admitted his handling of the matter was “sloppy” and that he incorrectly filed the notice that the judgment had been paid. Rather than withdrawing his notice, he allowed the company’s notice to vacate to go unopposed.
In the client loan case, he admitted he improperly took the loan, but contends he didn’t violate a representation agreement with the client. He maintains he agreed to represent the client for free, but that she was responsible for all “hard costs” in the matter, and noted he repaid her $57,000.
Donchatz characterized his statement’s about Osmond withholding evidence in the Hampton disciplinary matter as an “inartful statement of opinion,” Donchatz indicated he learned about the third recording through sworn testimony in which the property owner admitted she had no claims against Hampton. He maintains that Holt predictably denied taping the meeting.
Donchatz argues his statements regarding Osmond are opinion and he can’t be sanctioned for stating his opinion, which is protected by the First Amendment.
In the settlement matter, Donchatz asserts his actions to collect more than $120,000 in legal fees from Leader Technologies and its founder were guided at all times by the magistrate conducting the mediation. He noted he consulted with another attorney to draft the settlement and circulated it by email to the other parties. His brief states he received some arguments from the opposing sides, but the opposing attorney didn’t circulate a draft judgment and neither the opposing party nor the magistrate offered any changes or edits. He submitted the draft to the presiding judge a few weeks later who signed it. Donchatz offered that neither the magistrate nor the judge offered any evidence in his disciplinary case that he did anything wrong.
Board Fails to Consider Mitigating Evidence
Donchatz argues the three-member panel of the board hearing his case failed to consider any of the character evidence he offered. He noted that none of the letters “attesting to his high character and generosity in his more than 20 years of law practice” were mentioned in the panel’s report. He notes he has taught at Ohio State University’s law school for 16 years, coached the moot court team at Denison University for two years, coached the Westerville North High School mock trial team for 20 years, and volunteered as a member of the state’s Clients Security Fund for eight years, including one year as chairman.
He noted several honors and awards he received that were associated with community service and legal-related activities, and maintains there is no precedent that allows the panel to disregard the amount of character evidence he provided.
Bar Association Seeks Harsher Sanction
The Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association objects to both the recommendation of the board and to Donchatz’s claims. The bar association argues Donchatz’s behavior warrant an indefinite suspension.
The association maintains that the board considered and appropriately weighed the relevant mitigating factors presented by Donchatz and that there is no support for his argument that the board panel disregarded his character evidence.
The association also objects to Donchatz’s characterizations of the Hampton and Leader Technologies complaints and maintains that there is ample support in the record to find he violated the rules.
- Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association: Robert Hanna, 216.592.5000
Representing Kenneth R. Donchatz: George Johnson, 513.241.4722
Does State Law Regulating Red-Light Cameras Infringe on City’s Home-Rule Rights?
City of Dayton v. State of Ohio, Case no. 2015-1549
Second District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
ISSUES:
- Are certain provisions in laws passed in 2014 in Senate Bill 342 governing the use of red-light and speeding traffic cameras arbitrary, do they serve no purpose except to limit municipal power, and do they violate the Home Rule Amendment of the Ohio Constitution because they aren’t general laws?
- Although courts are required in a home-rule analysis to consider the legislation as a whole, are they also required to specifically analyze the challenged provisions to determine whether the provisions unconstitutionally limit cities’ home-rule authority?
BACKGROUND:
On June 12, 2002, the city of Dayton implemented an automated traffic camera system to catch drivers who run red lights. The city expanded the program in February 2010 to ticket speeding violations as well. Illegal actions caught by one of the cameras are treated as civil, rather than criminal, offenses, resulting in a fine but no points on a driver’s record. A Dayton police officer reviews each video and the still photos captured by the camera before a citation can be issued. Vehicle owners may appeal through an administrative hearing process.
In 2014, the Ohio General Assembly proposed legislation about the use of automated cameras to capture red-light and speeding violations. The legislature passed Senate Bill 342 and sent it to the governor on Dec. 18, 2014 – the same day the Ohio Supreme Court decided Walker v. Toledo, which upheld the authority of cities to establish an administrative appeals process for the civil enforcement of traffic laws using automated traffic cameras. The governor signed S.B. 342 into law the next day.
The new law, which went into effect on March 23, 2015, includes several provisions at issue in this case. First, it requires a full-time officer to be present at locations where traffic cameras are operating. Second, when considering placement of additional cameras, cities must conduct a study of the previous three years of traffic accidents at the proposed location and make the report available to the public. If a city decides to install a camera to catch red-light and speeding violations, it must notify the public about the new camera through a public information campaign. Third, cities may issue speeding tickets based on photos from the cameras only if the driver exceeds the speed limit by at least 6 mph in a school, park, or recreation area or at least 10 mph in other areas.
City Sues State
Dayton, which stated it has more than three dozen cameras in operation, filed a lawsuit challenging S.B. 342 five days before it went into effect and asking for an injunction to stop the law from being enforced. The city argued the law is unconstitutional because it violates the home-rule authority that municipalities are given in the state’s constitution.
The Montgomery County Common Pleas Court granted summary judgment in part to the city. Although S.B. 342 wasn’t unconstitutional in its entirety, the court found that certain provisions violated home rule because they weren’t general laws and served only to limit the city’s authority to self-govern. The court prohibited the enforcement of the contested provisions. Courts in Summit and Lucas counties issued similar rulings in red-light cases from Akron and Toledo.
The state appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and upheld the contested provisions. The Second District concluded that S.B. 342 is a uniform, comprehensive law created to regulate the use of traffic cameras across the state, that it doesn’t infringe on municipal powers, and that it applies generally to all citizens.
Dayton filed an appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to review the issues. Also pertaining to automated traffic cameras, the Court accepted an appeal from Springfield, one from Toledo, and a case asking the Court to resolve a conflict among appeals court rulings from Dayton, Springfield, and Toledo. The Court has held these three cases until this appeal is decided.
City Asserts Law Violates Home-Rule Power
According to the city of Dayton’s brief, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that a state statute takes precedence over a local law only if the local ordinance conflicts with the statute, the ordinance exercises the municipality’s police power rather than local self-government, and the statute is a general law. In Canton v. State (2002), the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that a statute is considered a general law when it meets four criteria:
- It is part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment
- It applies to all parts of the state alike and operates uniformly throughout the state
- It sets forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purporting only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to create such regulations
- It prescribes a rule of conduct on citizens generally
Because S.B. 342’s contested provisions require the presence of a full-time police officer at camera locations, mandate traffic studies and public notification, and allow citations in some areas only at certain speeds greater than the speed limit, the provisions violate the third condition in Canton, Dayton argues. In its view, the provisions restrict the authority of municipalities to enforce red-light and speeding laws using traffic cameras.
“[T]hese requirements exist solely to limit municipal legislative power, waste police resources, create an onerous burden for municipalities, and act as a de facto ban,” the city wrote.
The city also maintains the disputed provisions don’t “prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally,” Canton’s fourth element for a general law, because the provisions instead impose conditions on cities, not citizens, for issuing traffic-camera citations.
Overall, Dayton notes, S.B. 342 “circumvents” Ohio Supreme Court decisions in Walker and in Mendenhall v. Akron (2008), which both acknowledged the right of municipalities to implement automated traffic-camera programs.
In addition, the Court can remove the contested provisions as unconstitutional without negating S.B. 342 as a whole, the city concludes.
State Counters Law Creates Needed Uniformity
On behalf of the state, the attorney general responds that S.B. 342 built a uniform framework for the use of automated traffic cameras statewide and its provisions qualify as general laws, which under Canton then override any conflicting municipal ordinances governing the cameras.
The Court explained in Mendenhall that the traffic-camera programs comprised part of a city’s police powers – a power that municipalities share with the state. The Ohio Constitution gives conditional, not unconditional, police powers to municipalities. The attorney general asserts that Dayton and other cities can regulate citizens through their police powers only as long as their ordinances don’t conflict with general laws enacted at the state level, adding that this position preserves the state’s supremacy in police, sanitary, and similar regulations.
“[T]he Court has repeatedly upheld laws that restricted municipal police powers when those laws were connected to the [s]tate’s exercise of its own police powers,” the attorney general’s brief argued, pointing to cases that upheld statewide laws implementing changes to state speed limits or requiring permits for oversized vehicles traveling on municipal streets. Cities aren’t permitted to obstruct the state’s exercise of its police powers, the attorney general maintains.
“[S]tate-law regulations regarding traffic-control devices or police officers are no different than the Traffic Camera Act’s regulations regarding traffic cameras,” the brief stated. “Just as a local authority may not use blue stop signs or arrest drivers for every minor traffic infraction, so too that local authority may not use traffic cameras in conflict with state standards.”
Having a uniform system for traffic cameras in Ohio serves citizens across the state, the attorney general adds. State traffic laws describe many rules of the road to define appropriate conduct for drivers. The attorney general contends that these rules are in the public’s interest and for everyone’s protection, and the contested provisions relate to their enforcement. As a result, the provisions are general laws under Canton’s fourth requirement.
Because the contested provisions are general laws, they must be upheld as constitutional, the attorney general reasons.Other Cities and Manufacturer File Friend-of-Court Briefs
The Ohio Municipal League, which counts more than 700 Ohio cities and villages as members, and the cities of Akron, East Cleveland, Springfield, and Toledo have submitted amicus curiae briefs supporting Dayton’s position. All view S.B. 342 as an unconstitutional infringement on the home-rule authority of cities and other municipalities and also contend that the law addresses no statewide concerns.
Custom Seal, a manufacturer of custom-made roofing systems, has filed an amicus brief supporting the state. Custom Seal maintains that those with the largest stake in the outcome – motorists and vehicle owners – lack a critical presence in this lawsuit, leading the company to file a brief to be heard. The company stands behind the statewide limits on traffic cameras put in place by S.B. 342 and explains that its drivers have received tickets generated from traffic cameras and alleges the tickets are sometimes received past the deadline, without clear identification of the driver, or with questionable violations – causing the company to incur unfair losses.
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the City of Dayton: John Musto, 937.333.4116
Representing the State of Ohio from the Attorney General’s Office: Eric Murphy, 614.466.8980
These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court's Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews are not part of the case record, and are not considered by the Court during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.