A Hamilton County woman who resisted police attempts to carry out an involuntary mental health commitment can be charged with obstruction of official business even if she did not commit an illegal act, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.

In a 6-1 decision, the Supreme Court found that police meet the standard of filing a legally sufficient charge under R.C. 2921.31 when a defendant commits “any unprivileged, voluntary act that obstructed police officers from performing their lawful duties.”

The Court affirmed the First District Court of Appeals decision allowing the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office to charge Kiersten Dowell with obstruction and resisting arrest in 2024 after she struggled with Harrison city police officers for 15 to 20 minutes. Police stopped Dowell after being notified that her doctor authorized a psychiatric hold at a hospital because Dowell had mentioned an earlier suicide attempt.

The First District’s decision reversed a trial court ruling, dismissing the charges against Dowell. She had argued she could legally refuse to go with police officers since she was not under arrest.

Writing for the Court majority, Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy explained that the Court considered whether, in the context of an involuntary civil commitment, a defendant must commit an illegal act to be charged with obstruction of justice. She stated that the law does not specify whether an act must be illegal or legal, but only that it is a voluntary act that the person lacks the legal privilege to perform.

“Consequently, construing the statute as requiring an illegal act would add an element to the offense of obstructing official business that is not required by the General Assembly ,” she wrote.

The chief justice noted that at this stage of the case, the Court did not consider whether Dowell’s actions could be considered “voluntary” and ruled that it was a matter for the trial court to decide. The case was remanded to the Hamilton County Municipal Court for further proceedings.

Justices Patrick F. Fischer, R. Patrick DeWine, Joseph T. Deters, Daniel R. Hawkins, and Megan E. Shanahan joined Chief Justice Kennedy’s opinion.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Jennifer Brunner wrote that a civil law designed to protect Dowell from harm was “noxiously mutated into a convenient and inhumane shortcut to jail instead.” She stated that the ruling allows criminal charges to be filed against those who object to or resist a civil commitment after being told they are not under arrest.

“This is a callous and irrational way to apply the law, and it will lead to absurd and harmful results,” she stated.

Police Restrain Driver Because of Safety Concerns
In April 2024, Dowell saw her doctor, and during the appointment, she mentioned an earlier suicide attempt. After she left, her doctor signed an emergency medical admission form, which notified local police departments that Dowell needed to be taken into custody for a psychiatric hold.

Under Ohio’s civil commitment statute, R.C. 5122.10, police officers can transport a person to a hospital if the person “represents a substantial risk of physical harm to [him- or her]self or others if allowed to remain at liberty.”

While patrolling, Harrison Police Officer Thomas Kinne saw Dowell driving and stopped her. He explained the emergency form her doctor had signed and told her she needed to go with him to the hospital. Dowell refused Kinne’s request to exit her vehicle. Another officer arrived and tried to persuade Dowell.

After about five minutes, Dowell got out of her vehicle and walked with the officers to one of the police cruisers. Kinne explained as they were walking that she was being taken for a psychiatric hold and that she was not under arrest. She refused to go.

Dowell made statements indicating she had firearms readily available to her, and the officers decided to handcuff her for her safety. She refused to put her hands in front of her to be cuffed. The office explained that if she remained noncompliant, they would arrest her for obstruction.

Dowell continued to struggle when the officers attempted to handcuff her. Ultimately, the officers forcefully put her arms behind her back to handcuff her, and she continued to twist to avoid the restraints. After five to ten minutes, she was handcuffed and placed in a police cruiser. The officers arrested her for obstructing official business and resisting arrest.

The municipal court dismissed the charges, and the prosecutor’s office appealed to the First District. The First District ruled that an “affirmative act,” not an illegal one, is all that is necessary to obstruct official business, and Dowell’s attempt to avoid being placed in handcuffs was an affirmative act. Because she struggled with the police officers, probable cause also existed to support the resisting arrest charge, the First District concluded.

Dowell appealed the First District’s decision. The appeals court noted its decision conflicted with a ruling from the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court agreed to consider Dowell’s case and the conflict between the appeals courts.

Supreme Court Analyzed Charges
Because the charges against Dowell were dismissed prior to a trial, the Supreme Court analyzed only whether the criminal complaint against her was legally sufficient, Chief Justice Kennedy explained. The Court examined whether there were any defects in the complaint and did not consider whether the charge applied to the defendant’s conduct.

The law against obstructing official business, R.C. 2921.31(A), states that no person, “without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance” by a public official of any authorized act, “shall do any act that hampers or impedes” a public official in performing the official’s lawful duties. A person is guilty of resisting arrest under R.C. 2921.33(D) if a person “recklessly or by force” resists or interferes with a lawful arrest of the person or another.

The Court ruled the complaints were legally sufficient. Dowell was provided with notice of the charges, and the complaints detailed the acts Dowell committed that constituted obstructing official business and resisting arrest.

Dowell argued the phrase “without privilege” in the obstruction law requires an illegal act when considered in the context of police officers taking a person to the hospital as part of the involuntary commitment process.

The term “privilege” in the context of Ohio criminal law means acts that a person, by law, has “an immunity, license, or right” to perform based on the person’s “status, position, office, or relationship, or growing out of necessity,” the opinion stated.

The Court ruled that the civil commitment law does not provide a person being involuntarily committed with any immunity or license to obstruct official business.

Dowell argued that the civil commitment statute must provide a privilege because when a person is in the midst of a mental health crisis, “it drastically weakens any argument that their actions are voluntarily criminal.” When someone is noncooperative during a mental health crisis, their actions are privileged, unless the actions are violent, she asserted.

The Court noted that whether Dowell’s actions were voluntary is an issue for the trial court to decide and does not affect the prosecutor's ability to charge Dowell with obstructing official business. The complaint did not have to allege Dowell committed an illegal act and can be pursued, the Court concluded. Additionally, because the state had sufficiently alleged the facts necessary to establish resisting arrest, the state may proceed with that charge as well.

Charges Cannot Stand, Dissent Maintained 
Justice Brunner stated that she would reverse the First District and that the civil commitment and criminal obstructing official business laws cannot be applied simultaneously to Dowell. If every time a person subject to involuntary treatment does not agree or resists, then that person is obstructing official business and may be charged with a crime “because of the status of his or her mental health,” she stated.  She wrote that the ruling turns having a mental illness into a crime.

Involuntary commitment is a civil law designed to take a person into custody due to the person’s inability to give informed consent or make sound choices, she wrote. The law requires the person to be notified that being taken into custody is not a criminal arrest, and R.C. 5122.10 does not impose a penalty if the person refuses to comply. What Dowell did is not unexpected for someone facing involuntary commitment in the course of human affairs, Justice Brunner noted, having highlighted that there is a statutory definition for mental illness, which is “a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation, or memory that grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to meet the ordinary demands of life.”

Justice Brunner pointed out that, now “a refusal to submit to treatment may be the basis for an obstructing-official-business and a resisting-arrest charge, . . . without specifying any degree of resistance or impediment the person must exert before he or she may be charged with those offenses,” Justice Brunner wrote.

She noted the Court’s certification of 36 mental health court dockets and the many police department crisis intervention teams throughout the state and urged “all those involved in Ohio’s criminal-justice system to consider available alternatives to arrest when a person being taken into custody for involuntary civil commitment refuses to comply with the official or professional doing the custody-taking,”

Justice Brunner noted that at Dowell’s arraignment, the trial court asked whether there was any way to get Dowell to a hospital instead of leaving her in jail and that her status as a criminal defendant now seemed to trump her need for emergency mental-health treatment.

2025-1103 and 2025-1210. State v. Dowell, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4094.

View oral argument video of this case.

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