When an offender is convicted of two or more firearm specifications related to the same felony, the trial judge, not the prosecution, decides which specification to impose, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court affirmed an Eighth District Court of Appeals decision, which upheld a trial judge’s choice to impose a one-year firearm specification rather than an also-applicable three-year specification.  

A Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court jury found Harry Holliman Jr. guilty of a single count of discharging a firearm on or near a prohibited premises. It also convicted him of a one-year and three-year firearm specification related to that same offense. At sentencing, the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office argued it should be the one to select which specification is added to Holliman’s sentence and requested that he receive the three-year term. Defense counsel argued that the trial judge retained discretion to choose between the applicable specifications and asked for the one-year term. The trial judge agreed and chose to impose the lesser, one-year firearm specification.

Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice R. Patrick DeWine explained that state law permits only one firearm specification to be imposed for a single felony offense, and the statute's language provides that the trial court is the one to decide which specification applies.

“The authority to impose a sentence for a specification is granted solely to the trial court,” he wrote. “Nothing in the statutory language imposes any limits on the trial court’s authority to choose among different specifications.”

Specification Selected by Trial Court
Holliman confronted a former friend outside the friend’s house. The two argued, and Holliman became angry and fired three shots from his revolver, two into the air and one into the house. Holliman’s case went to trial, and a jury found him guilty of the firearm discharge offense, which is a third-degree felony.

The jury also found him guilty of two firearm specifications related to that single offense. The first specification was for possessing a firearm during the commission of an offense and carried a one-year mandatory prison term. The second specification was for using a firearm to facilitate the offense and carried a three-year mandatory prison term.

Under R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a), the trial court could impose only one specification. The parties addressed the issue of which sentence to impose at Holliman’s sentencing, and his lawyer asked the court to impose the one-year specification.

The prosecutor’s office countered that it was entitled to choose which specification to impose and insisted on the three-year specification. The office argued that it should be able to choose between the specifications at sentencing just as it chooses between offenses when an offender is convicted of two allied offenses. In those instances, an offender can be tried for both crimes, but sentenced for only one, and the prosecutor selects which offense to pursue at sentencing.

The trial court considered the arguments and opted for the one-year specification. Holliman was sentenced to nine months in prison for the firearm discharge, with the specification extending his sentence to 21 months.

The prosecutor appealed to the Eighth District, which affirmed the trial court’s decision. The prosecutor then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Analyzed Gun Use Sentencing Laws
When a felony involves a firearm, a prosecutor may charge an offender with a variety of firearm specifications alongside the felony. An offender may be found guilty of more than one gun specification for a single felony offense, but state law makes clear that only one specification can be imposed, Justice DeWine explained.

R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a) states that “the court shall impose one of the prison terms prescribed for an applicable firearms specification.” Other portions of R.C. Chapter 2941.141 also discuss this one-specification per felony limitation. For instance, the Court noted that R.C. 2941.145(B) states that the imposition of a three-year mandatory prison term “is precluded if a court imposes a one-year, eighteen-month, six-year, fifty-four-month, or nine-year mandatory prison term” relative to the same felony. It also goes the other way: R.C. 2929.145(B) prohibits the imposition of a one-year specification where a three-year specification has already been imposed for the same felony.

The statute’s “the court shall impose” language strongly suggests that it is the trial court that decides which specification to add to the sentence. Nothing in the law provides any role for the prosecutor in selecting which specification is imposed, the Court stated.

The opinion rejected the prosecutor’s argument that the specifications should operate the same as allied offenses when it comes to sentencing. The Court noted that the allied-offense statute, R.C. 2941.25(A), does not contain any language about who selects the charge for which the offender will be sentenced. In contrast, the firearm specification law states the trial court is the one who imposes the specification.

The Court also cited to its previous decisions that held that allied offenses are criminal offenses, and firearm specifications are not. Specifications are penalty enhancements for criminal offenses, the opinion stated. The Court wrote that choosing an appropriate penalty among a range of sanctions prescribed by the General Assembly has long been understood to be a judicial function.

“The trial court in this case properly exercised its discretion when it imposed the one-year firearm specification provided for by R.C. 2929.141(A),” the Court concluded.

2025-0670. State v. Holliman, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4232.

View oral argument video of this case.

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