Wednesday, Oct. 14, 2015
State of Ohio v. Michael D. Baker, Case no. 2014-1295
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Ashtabula County)
Christian Voice of Central Ohio v. Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio, et al., Case no. 2014-1626
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
Patrick Williams v. State of Ohio, Case no. 2014-1884
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Daren A. Messer and Angela Messer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, Case no. 2014-2036
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio
Did State’s Failure to Refrigerate Blood Sample Before Mailing It to Lab Violate Law?
State of Ohio v. Michael D. Baker, Case no. 2014-1295
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Ashtabula County)
ISSUES:
- Did the state violate Ohio Administrative Code 3701-53-05 when a blood sample remained unrefrigerated for more than four hours prior to mailing?
- Is the state required to put forth evidence at a suppression hearing that the lack of compliance with the Administrative Code did not affect the reliability of the blood test results?
BACKGROUND:
On March 6, 2011, Michael D. Baker was the driver of a vehicle involved in a fatal crash on U.S Route 6 in Ashtabula County. Trooper Charles Emery of the Ohio State Highway Patrol responded to a call about a pedestrian walking in the street. Upon arriving on the scene, Emery detected a strong odor of alcohol and asked Baker if he had been drinking. Baker admitted to having six or seven beers at a friend’s house before driving.
Baker was transported to Saint Joseph Hospital in Andover, where he consented to have his blood drawn. Baker gave blood at 1:50 a.m. Afterward, Emery placed the blood vials in his patrol car cup holder unrefrigerated until he mailed them for testing to Columbus at 6 a.m. The result showed 0.095 grams of alcohol per hundred milliliters in Baker’s blood. State law prohibits alcohol levels of .08 or higher.
On June 22, 2011, a traffic complaint was filed in Ashtabula County Court, Eastern Division, charging Baker with one count of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. Before trial, Baker asked the court to suppress the evidence, and the trial court agreed, holding the state failed to comply with statutory and administrative requirements for the analysis of bodily fluid.
The state appealed. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The state filed a notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the case.
State’s Position
Attorneys from the Ashtabula County Prosecutor’s Office argue a blood sample left unrefrigerated for more than four hours substantially complies with the Ohio Administrative Code regulation. The state’s argument is based on an Eleventh District Court of Appeals’ decision that stated failing to refrigerate a blood sample for six hours fell within the range of substantial compliance. The attorneys also cite to the Ohio Supreme Court decision in State v. Mayl (2005),which held that “failure to refrigerate a sample for as much as five hours has been determined to substantially comply with Ohio Administrative Code.”
They argue there are two approaches used in determining substantial compliance, both of which require judicial determinations. The first method considers whether the noncompliance rendered the test results unreliable. Under this approach the state has substantially complied if the alleged deviation didn’t affect the reliability of the results. The other approach looks at whether the alleged deviation prejudiced the defendant by producing an erroneous test result. The state contends that Baker is unable to demonstrate he was prejudiced by the delay because the failure to refrigerate a sample would have resulted in a lower alcohol level test result.
They also challenge the Eleventh District Court of Appeals’ previous decision in this case, which held “[a]s a result of the state’s noncompliance, [the state] was required to establish a proper foundation for the admissibility of the result.” They argue this ruling misinterprets established law. Based on case law, the state cannot remedy a failure to substantially comply with the Ohio Administrative Code by using expert testimony to show that the lack of compliance didn’t affect the reliability of the results. They write in the brief to the Court, “Ohio law does not allow for the state to cure a defect in substantial compliance through expert testimony.”
Baker’s Argument
Baker’s attorneys maintain the state didn’t substantially comply with Ohio Administrative Code 3701-53-05 because Baker’s blood was left unrefrigerated for four hours before it was mailed. Based on the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Burnside (2003), “only de minimis errors easily recognizable as such are excusable under the standard of substantial compliance with regulations on blood alcohol testing of drivers.”
They add that after a defendant challenges the validity of test results in a pretrial motion, the state has the burden to show that the test was administered in substantial compliance with the regulation. Baker’s attorneys go on to argue, and the appeals court agreed, the state didn’t put forth expert testimony at the suppression hearing that the lack of refrigeration failed to affect the reliability of the blood test, therefore the motion to suppress the blood test results should be upheld, they conclude.
Amicus Briefs
The Ohio attorney general filed an amicus curiae brief supporting the Ashtabula County Prosecutor’s Office. It contends that alcohol test results are admissible even if the underlying sample isn’t refrigerated for four hours and ten minutes prior to testing because this short period of non-refrigeration constitutes only a minor violation.
The Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association also filed an amicus brief supporting the prosecutor’s office. It contends, in order to substantially comply with the state law, the state doesn’t need to establish reliability of the blood sample, and non-compliance with the state law may be de minimis and admissible absent a showing of prejudice.
- Maurice Wells
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Ashtabula County Prosecutor’s Office: Shelley Pratt, 440.576.3662
Representing Michael D. Baker: William Bobulsky, 440.998.4214
Does Non-Profit Christian Radio Station Qualify for Public Worship Property-Tax Exemption?
Christian Voice of Central Ohio v. Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner of Ohio, et al., Case no. 2014-1626
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
ISSUES:
- Did the BTA violate the doctrine of collateral estoppel when it ruled that the Christian Voice of Central Ohio’s (CVCO) Gahanna location no longer qualified for the public worship property tax exemption?
- Does CVCO’s use of its property located in Gahanna satisfy the “exclusive use” requirement to qualify for tax exempt status under R.C. 5709.07(A)(2)?
- Is the BTA’s decision to completely deny CVCO’s property tax exemption unreasonable and unlawful because R.C. 5713.04 permits real property to be split into exempt and non-exempt parts?
BACKGROUND:
Since 1964, Christian Voice of Central Ohio (CVCO) has been organized and operated as an Ohio-not-for profit corporation for religious and educational purposes. CVCO operates three Christian radio stations (Gahanna, Newark, and Chillicothe) from its Gahanna location. The Newark and Chillicothe stations are broadcast on 89.3 FM and are non-commercial stations, which means they are completely underwritten by donations and no advertisements are sold to help fund these stations. The Gahanna station broadcasts on 104.9 FM and is a commercial station funded by on-air advertising and listener donations.
Before purchasing its Gahanna location, CVCO owned a New Albany location and operated 104.9 from there. In 1991, the Ohio tax commissioner determined CVCO’s New Albany property was “used for church purposes and was exempt from taxation under R.C. 5709.07, public worship.” In December 2007, the New Albany-Plain Local School District filed a complaint challenging CVCO’s exemption for its New Albany property. In that case, the tax commissioner held only the building and one acre of land qualified for the exemption because the building was used for church facilities.
CVCO purchased the Gahanna property in May 2007 and moved in to the building in October of the same year. In June 2008, CVCO filed an application in which it sought exemption pursuant to R.C. 5709.07. The tax commissioner found that CVCO’s Gahanna property was “used exclusively as a radio station” and “used primarily for broadcasting” and denied CVCO’s exemption request. CVCO appealed, claiming that the Gahanna property should be exempt because its previous property had been exempted. At the Board of Tax Appeals hearing, however, the board affirmed the tax commissioner’s final determination denying the real property exemption and finding that CVCO didn’t operate as a house of public worship on the Gahanna property. CVCO appealed the board’s decision to the Ohio Supreme Court.
CVCO’s Position
CVCO’s attorneys argue the BTA’s determination denying the property tax exemption violated the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the property previously qualified for the exemption and no circumstances have changed since the prior determination. CVCO’s attorneys state in the brief to the Court that “[c]ollateral estoppel is a doctrine capable of being applied so as to avoid undue disparity in the impact of tax liability [because] a taxpayer may secure a judicial determination of a particular tax matter, which may recur without substantial variation for some years thereafter.” CVCO attorneys maintain before purchasing the Gahanna property, CVCO operated its Christian radio station from New Albany and enjoyed tax exempt status as a house of worship. “[T]he BTA should have concluded, by reason of the previous exemption, that the Tax Commissioner considered such use a justification for the exemption,” they write.
They also contend the BTA’s decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the building is primarily used for public worship. The controlling statute, R.C. 5709.07(A)(2), states houses used exclusively for public worship are exempt from taxation. They write that “public worship means the open and free celebration or observance of rites and ordinances of a religious organization.” They maintain the building is open, the public is welcome inside, and the employees gather regularly in congregation for religious worship. The only mission of CVCO is to inspire others to know Jesus Christ through contemporary Christian music, and the sale of “on air advertisements is vital to the furtherance of the ministry,” they assert.
CVCO’s attorneys go on to argue that if the Supreme Court doesn’t reverse the entire BTA decision, the court should remand the matter so the BTA can determine which parts of the property should be exempt from real property tax. They state R.C. 5713.04 permits real property to be split into exempt and non-exempt parts. In the brief, they write, “Pastor John’s office, the chapel, and lower level assembly rooms are used for daily prayer services as well as weekly church services and discipleship worship services. These areas are used primarily for public worship.” Therefore, they conclude the BTA’s decision should be modified to take this into consideration.
State’s Argument
Attorneys for the tax commissioner argue that CVCO’s primary use of its Gahanna property doesn’t meet the “exclusively for public worship” requirement under R.C. 5709.07. “To qualify for this exemption the property must be used in a principal, primary, and essential way to facilitate the public worship,” they write in the brief to the Court. They state that CVCO primarily uses its building to operate its contemporary Christian music radio business. They maintain the religious use of CVCO’s building is not principal, primary, or essential to facilitate public worship. The public worship use of the building is minor in comparison to its other uses, they assert. They go on to note, “Everyday activities of an individual which express devotion to his God are insufficient to meet the public worship standard.” They contend the minimal religious usage of the building is limited to the building chapel and the lower level assembly rooms that don’t rise to the level of the primary or exclusive public worship use of the property.
They point out that “[i]n addition to not being used exclusively as a house of public worship, CVCO’s property cannot qualify for the exemption because it is being used with a view to profit.” They cite to a prior Supreme Court case, Lutheran Book Shop v. Bowers (1995), which held a non-profit organization does not qualify for real property exemption when operated with a view to profit. In addition, the use of proceeds to support religious activities doesn’t cure the “view to profit” use of the property, they assert. Attorneys for the tax commissioner maintain to determine the question of tax exemption, the Court should look at the use of the property and not the use of the proceeds.
In response to CVCO’s claim that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was violated when the Gahanna property wasn’t exempted, the tax commissioner’s attorneys contend collateral estoppel doesn’t apply when different tax years and different property are at issue. They state the U.S. Supreme Court and Ohio Supreme Court have consistently held that when different tax years are involved, the doctrine of collateral estoppel doesn’t apply. In Limbach v. Hooven (1984), the U.S. Supreme Court held “an earlier decision of the Board of Tax Appeals involving the same facts, questions, and parties but different tax years, was not conclusive under the collateral-estoppel doctrine.”
Waived Oral Argument
The Gahanna Jefferson City School Board of Education, named as a party in the case, is not permitted to argue the case at oral arguments because it didn’t file a merit brief.
- Maurice Wells
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Christian Voice of Central Ohio: Brian Zets, 614.221.2121
Representing Joseph W. Testa, Tax Commissioner, State of Ohio from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Sophia Hussain, 614.446.5967
Was Good Cause Shown To Allow Appeal To Be Reopened?
Patrick Williams v. State of Ohio, Case no. 2014-1884
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUES:
- In motion to reopen an appeal, did applicant show good cause for late filing because of his young age, absence of legal training, lack of contact with his appellate lawyer, detrimental reliance on his appellate counsel, and the recent hiring of a new attorney?
- Is an accused entitled to effective appellate counsel to raise specific arguments that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to ask for a mistrial, for not making a motion to suppress identification evidence, and for not alleging prosecutorial misconduct?
BACKGROUND:
Tynell Anderson and Erika Wright walked to a Cleveland supermarket in late December 2006. While at the store, Marteese Williams, who the state describes as Anderson’s ex-girlfriend, and Wright got into a fight. When the fight ended, Anderson and Wright went back to Wright’s mother’s house.
Shortly thereafter, Marteese’s mother showed up at the Wright home. While the mother and Wright were arguing, Wright and other witnesses said Marteese’s brother, Patrick Williams, got out of a car and came up to the house, asking where Anderson was. Williams walked into the house and fired gunshots at Anderson, then returned to the car and drove away. Anderson died after the shooting.
Wright named Patrick Williams as the shooter to police, and identified him in a photograph the police showed her.
Defendant Appeals Guilty Verdict
Williams was indicted in Cuyahoga County for the murder. In November 2007, the jury found him guilty of aggravated murder, murder, and two counts of felonious assault – all with firearm specifications. The trial court sentenced him to 23 years to life in prison.
Williams appealed his case to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which in April 2009 upheld the trial court’s decision. The Eighth District ruling wasn’t appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court.
Application Made to Reopen Appeal
After hiring a new lawyer in May 2014, Williams filed a motion to reopen his appeal based on appellate court rules that allow a criminal defendant to redo an appeal if he or she can show ineffective assistance of counsel at the appellate level.
The Eighth District denied the request, stating that Williams missed the rule’s 90-day deadline for filing his motion by years and didn’t show “good cause” to justify a late application. Williams appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the issue.
Williams: Good Cause Was Shown for Delayed Application
Attorneys for Williams offer multiple reasons as good cause in their view to justify reopening Williams’ appeal. They first note that Williams was 17 when he was arrested and that he had no experience with the criminal justice system.
They also argue that he relied on the attorney representing him in his appeal to guide him. However, they maintain, Williams never met the lawyer and she didn’t talk with him about his case. They contend that the appellate lawyer never gave Williams the briefs filed in his case, didn’t tell him the Eighth District’s decision, and didn’t inform him that he could appeal the ruling to the Ohio Supreme Court.
They ask the Court to adopt a position presented in a 2004 Ohio Supreme Court decision, State v. Gumm. They assert that Justice Paul E. Pfeifer wrote in a concurring opinion that he would suspend the 90-day deadline for filing an application to reopen an appeal until a defendant releases the attorney who is no longer wanted or hires additional counsel. They note that Williams’ current counsel filed his application a few weeks after he was hired, well within 90 days.
They conclude that the actions of Williams’ original appellate lawyer denied him the right to effective counsel.
State: Williams Didn’t Prove Good Cause for Late Filing
Attorneys from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office respond that, as the Supreme Court explained in Gumm, the rule’s deadline must be enforced to protect the state’s interest in the finality of decisions and to make sure that ineffective assistance claims are dealt with promptly.
They point out that the Ohio Supreme Court has also ruled the 90-day deadline applies to “all appellants” and an applicant’s lack of understanding of the legal system doesn’t absolve the person from adhering to the deadline. Williams’ age and lack of legal training don’t qualify as good cause to allow for a late filing to reopen his appeal, they maintain. They also stress that from 2009 to 2014 Williams didn’t check on the status of his case, didn’t ask his then-attorney about the appeal, didn’t inquire with the appeals court or clerk about the matter, and didn’t find new counsel for assistance. They assert in the brief to the Court that this inaction reflects a “lack of initiative and diligence” that cannot support a good-cause argument.
As for Justice Pfeifer’s opinion in Gumm, they note that the justice suggested a “heightened tolerance” about the meaning of good cause only in death-penalty cases. Williams’ appeal, however, involves a life, not a death, sentence, they point out. And, they add, Justice Pfeifer even wrote that the five-year delay in Gumm was a stretch for meeting a reasonable interpretation of the rule.
Williams: Appellate Lawyer Fell Below Accepted Standards
Williams’ attorneys also contend that his appellate counsel should’ve raised specific arguments about his trial attorney’s ineffectiveness for not asking for a mistrial, for failing to claim prosecutorial misconduct, and for not presenting a motion to suppress photo identifications.
They maintain Williams had an alibi, but the prosecutor undermined the possibility of that defense during questioning of a detective at trial. They assert that the exchange made it seem that the defense hadn’t notified the state about the alibi and also had devised a false alibi. Trial counsel didn’t ask the court for a mistrial or raise prosecutorial misconduct, and the appellate lawyer didn’t raise the issues on appeal – a failure that is “indefensible” and affected the trial’s outcome for Williams, his current attorneys argue.
They also stress that Williams’ first appellate attorney should have addressed in the appeal questions about the witnesses’ identification of Williams as the suspect. They contend that the photo identifications by witnesses were unreliable, and trial counsel should have asked the court to suppress them as evidence.
These examples demonstrate that Williams’ original appellate attorney was ineffective and that Williams should be allowed to reopen his appeal, they conclude.
State: Claims Are Improperly Raised, Wouldn’t Have Changed Verdict
The state’s attorneys first counter that these substantive arguments were improvidently accepted by the Supreme Court because they weren’t addressed in the Eighth District’s decision declining to reopen the appeal. However, if the Court does review the issues, the state emphasizes that the defense never put forth an alibi for Williams at trial and, regardless, the court gave the jury an instruction to fix any misunderstanding about the brief questioning of the detective about a possible alibi. The prosecution’s actions at trial were not misconduct because they didn’t affect Williams’ substantial rights in a way that changed the outcome of the trial, they argue.
They also note that the concerns about the photo identifications were already rejected by the Eighth District in the first appeal.
Ultimately, Williams hasn’t demonstrated that his appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise these issues or that he would’ve succeeded in his claims had they been brought up, the state concludes.
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Patrick Williams: Gregory Robey, 216.581.8200
Representing the State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Frank Zeleznikar, 216.698.2726
May Improperly Recorded Mortgage be Enforced Against its Holders?
Daren A. Messer and Angela Messer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank NA, Case no. 2014-2036
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio
ISSUES:
- Does R.C. 1301.401 apply to all recorded mortgages in Ohio?
- Does R.C. 1301.401 act to provide constructive notice to the world of a recorded mortgage that was deficiently executed under R.C. 5301.234?
BACKGROUND:
This case was under consideration in U.S. Bankruptcy Court, but that court has indicated that the issues above are unresolved questions of state law. The federal judge has submitted the questions to the Ohio Supreme Court and has stayed the federal court proceeding pending this Court’s decision.
In 2007, Daren and Angela Messer purchased real property in Canal Winchester as joint owners. They received their interest in the property by means of a general warranty deed in that same year, and recorded it with the Franklin County recorder. M/I Financial Corp. granted the Messers a loan, which was secured by a mortgage in favor of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS). The mortgage was signed by the Messers. However, the mortgage was not acknowledged before a notary public, as required by law.
The mortgage was later filed in the Franklin County recorder’s office and then assigned to JP Morgan Chase Bank that was also filed in the Franklin County recorder’s office.
In 2013, the Messers filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 on the U.S. bankruptcy code. Later in that same year, they filed a complaint to determine validity and extent of lien, to avoid the mortgage, and to recover money judgment. The Messers sought to avoid the mortgage by virtue of Chapter 13 trustee’s avoidance powers as a judicial lien creditor under and as bona fide purchaser (person who purchases property without notice of any other party’s claim to the title),under federal law.
The following year JP Morgan filed its motion to dismiss and/or for judgment on the pleadings. A hearing was conducted before the bankruptcy court, which submitted two questions to Ohio Supreme Court to review. The Court decided to accept the case.
Messers’ Argument
The Messers’ attorneys argue R.C. 1301.401 doesn’t apply to mortgages in Ohio. They contend that although the statute mentions mortgages as a type of document that shall be recorded with a county recorder, the statute is contained within Ohio’s Uniform Commercial Code. They write in the brief to the Court, “The general provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, such as those set forth in O.R.C. §§1301.101-310, apply to transactions to the extent that the transaction is governed by chapters 1302 through 1310 of the Ohio Revised Code.”
Messers’ attorneys state the scope of Chapter 1301 is set forth in R.C. 1301.02. The official comment to that statute evidences an intention to limit such general provision to transactions governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
They further contend the validity of a mortgage is governed by chapter 5301 of the Ohio Revised Code and that no aspect of a mortgage is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. They state R.C. 1301.401 is inconsistent with other sections of the Ohio Revised Code that govern mortgages, particularly with sections within Chapter 5301. In the brief to the Court, Messers’ attorneys write, “Clearly, if the Ohio legislature wished to create notice for mortgages that were not properly executed as required by R.C 5301.01(A), the legislature would have amended that statute or another statute within chapter 5301 of the Ohio Revised Code.”
Messers’ attorneys also argue that R.C 1301.401 does not act to provide a constructive notice to the world of a recorded mortgage that was deficiently executed under R.C. 5301.01. They maintain mortgages are governed by Chapter 5301 and that R.C. 5301.25(A) provides the effect of recorded mortgages as upon third persons. Based on this statute, a mortgage does not provide constructive notice unless it is properly executed they assert.
They conclude that the Supreme Court should answer the certified questions in the negative because R.C 1301.401 applies only to transactions governed by the Uniform Commercial Code.
JP Morgan’s Contentions
Attorneys for JP Morgan respond that R.C. 1301.401 applies to all recorded documents including instruments that affect real estate. They contend R.C. 1301.401 is one part of the Ohio Asset Management Modernization Act of 2012, which creates constructive notice for any document filed in the public record. In the brief to the Court, JP Morgan attorneys write, “Public record means (1) all documents recorded under R.C. § 317.08; and (2) [a]ny document the filling or recording of which is required or allowed under any provision of chapter 1309 of the revised code.” They maintain that Ohio mortgages are part of Chapter 1309 because R.C. 1309.502 states that a mortgage functions as a financing statement to eliminate the need for separate filings in land and personal property records. They argue that R.C. 1301.102 specifically states the Uniform Commercial Code in Ohio includes Chapter 1309.
They also conclude that “[t]he placement of R.C. 1301.401 in chapter 13 and not chapter 53 of the revised code does not mean the law applies only to personal property.” In addition, the statute specifically identifies land as being within its scope, they assert.
They maintain that the purpose of Ohio’s recording statute is to protect third parties who might acquire a legal interest in property. The attorneys argue, based on the Ohio Supreme court ruling in Williamson v. Carskadden (1881), the rule is a mortgage, voluntarily executed, is valid between the parties involved absent fraud. They further argue, “The recording statutes protect purchasers against unrecorded instruments, secret liens, and provide notice of interest in property so that a purchaser is fully aware of any outstanding liens, encumbrances and claims to property.” In contrast, the notice created by R.C. 1301.401(B) does not alter the purpose for, or application of, the recording statutes to mortgages they contend.
JP Morgan’s attorneys argue that all mortgages are recorded, not just those executed perfectly. They state if a mortgage is recorded there is a presumption that the mortgage is valid. They contend the presumption of validity fails when a competing mortgagee, who is a bona fide purchaser, claims lack of notice. They state R.C. 1301.401 eliminates this conflict by providing that a recorded mortgage provides constructive notice, which defeats claims of bona fide purchasers stating they didn’t have notice.
They further argue that R.C. 1301.401 and R.C. 5301.01 should be read together to resolve the issue with bona fide purchasers who claim a lack of notice, or an individual who purposely records his or her mortgage improperly to forgo responsibility in a bankruptcy proceeding. They write, “If the legislature did not intend all mortgages, including those which are defectively executed, to create constructive notice when filed, there would be no need for R.C. § 1301.401(B) because R.C. § 5301.23(A) and 5301.25(A), if strictly enforced, would prevent the results created when recorded documents are facially defective.”
Additional Brief
An amicus curiae brief supporting JP Morgan Chase Bank’s position has been submitted by the Ohio Title Association.
- Maurice Wells
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Daren A. Messer and Angela Messer: Brett Sheraw, 614.233.6959
Representing JP Morgan Chase Bank NA: Amelia Bower, 614.629.3000
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