Evidence of Witness Intimidation Was Properly Admitted During Trial
Court allows admission of witness intimidation evidence into man’s murder trial.
Court allows admission of witness intimidation evidence into man’s murder trial.
Evidence of a man’s attempts to intimidate a witness was properly admitted into his trial for murder and related charges because it showed a “consciousness of guilt,” the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of James Echols and upheld his sentence of life in prison with eligibility for parole after 25 years. Echols was convicted of aggravated murder and other charges stemming from bursting into a Hamilton County party and firing several shots that killed a person and injured eight others.
Echols sought a new trial, arguing the trial court erred by admitting evidence that he had tried to intimidate witnesses who could testify against him at trial. In Echol’s view, the court should have applied rules of evidence that limit the use of evidence of “any other crime, wrong, or act” (or “other-acts evidence”) to establish that a defendant is guilty because he has a bad character.
Writing for the Court, Justice R. Patrick DeWine explained that evidence of witness intimidation did constitute other-acts evidence and should have been analyzed under the evidentiary rules governing the admission of such evidence. But, the Court found no error in the admission of the evidence. The opinion explained that the evidence of witness intimidation was highly relevant because it showed Echol’s consciousness that he was guilty of the shootings. And, the Court explained, the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial to Echols.
Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy and Justices Patrick F. Fischer, Michael P. Donnelly, Melody Stewart, and Jennifer Brunner joined the opinion. Seventh District Court of Appeals Judge Carol Ann Robb, sitting for Justice Joseph T. Deters, also joined the opinion.
Drug Dealer Hired Shooters to Scare Woman
Roshawn Bishop was a Cincinnati area drug dealer, and needed money to fund his drug operation. He borrowed $10,000 from Cheyanne Willis, with the understanding that he would repay it in 30 days. Rather than repay Willis, Bishop crafted a plan to prevent further attempts to collect the debt.
Through a relative, Bishop hired Echols and Michael Sanon to scare Willis. In the summer of 2017, Willis was hosting a party. Echols and Sanon burst into her crowded living room and opened fire, shooting 13 times. Eight people were injured including two children ages 2 and 3. One partygoer was killed.
Unrelated to the shooting, Bishop was arrested for drug trafficking. He approached police about cooperating in the investigation of the shooting at Willis’ home.
Although his story changed over the course of six police interviews, Bishop ultimately identified Echols and Sanon as the shooters. Investigators were able to corroborate key points of Bishop’s account through cellphone GPS data, text messages, and information from social media. Police learned that after the shooting, Bishop and his drug-dealing partner paid Echols $1,500 and helped burn Echols’ clothes to conceal his role in the crime.
Dealer Claimed Witness Intimidation
Bishop would later testify that he was “nervous and scared” to speak to police. While in jail, he was threatened and assaulted for cooperating with law enforcement. At some point after Echols’ arrest, Bishop and Echols were incarcerated in the same facility.
Bishop saw graffiti on a jailhouse wall that read, “Roshawn Bishop is a rat.” The drawing indicated there was a $30,000 bounty to kill Bishop. The graffiti was signed with Echols’ nickname.
On the same day he saw the graffiti, Bishop said Echols encountered him in the jail and made a “gun gesture” toward him with his fingers. Bishop understood the graffiti and gesture to be threats for him being a cooperating witness against Echols and Sanon.
Investigators also obtained a written letter Echols attempted to send from jail to an acquaintance in Columbus. The letter was returned to the jail marked “return to sender,” and following jail protocol, the mailroom clerk opened it.
The letter asked the acquaintance to get four or five people together and provided detailed instructions about what each should say regarding what they saw Echols doing and wearing the day of the shooting. The letter also noted that Bishop and his wife, Deborah, were supposed to testify against him. The letter stated Deborah has “gotta go ASAP,” and this “might make her husband recant his statement.”
The last page of the letter listed the full names, birthdates, and Social Security numbers of the surviving victims of the shooting and told the intended recipient to “see what you can do with this info.”
Defense Attempted To Limit Use of Intimidation Evidence
At Echols’ trial, the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office attempted to introduce three pieces of evidence regarding witness intimidation. The prosecution wanted to present a photograph of the graffiti, Bishop’s testimony about the gun gesture, and the letter.
Echols’ defense attorney challenged the witness-intimidation evidence at various steps in the proceedings. The defense in pretrial motions attempted to prohibit admission of the graffiti photograph, arguing it was more prejudicial than probative. The trial court agreed to admit the photograph, but only if Bishop testified in the case, which he did.
Also, prior to trial, Echols sought to prohibit the use of the last page of the letter with all the information about the surviving shooting victims. Following a hearing, the trial court allowed the entire letter to be admitted, finding “the relevance outweighs any potential problem” with the information on the last page.
At the trial, Bishop testified about the gun gesture, and Echols did not object to it. Despite raising objections to some of the witness-intimidation evidence, Echols did not request, and the trial judge did not provide, any instructions to the jury explaining the permissible use of the witness-intimidation evidence.
Echols was found guilty of aggravated murder, murder, and several other felonies, all with firearm specifications. He appealed his sentence to the First District Court of Appeals. Among his legal arguments was his challenge to admitting the letter, graffiti, and gun gesture testimony.
He maintained the admission violated the Ohio Rules of Evidence relating to other-acts evidence. Each judge on a three-judge panel issued an opinion with conflicting thoughts on how the witness-intimidation evidence was handled. However, the First District affirmed Echols’ conviction. He appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear his case.
Supreme Court Analyzed Intimidation Evidence
Justice DeWine explained the Supreme Court directed Ohio courts on how to analyze “other acts” evidence in its 2020 State v. Hartman decision. He noted Evidence Rule 404(B)(1) provides that evidence of any “other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with this character.” This type of evidence is commonly referred to as “propensity evidence” because its purpose is to show that the accused’s past behavior demonstrates a proclivity, or tendency, to commit the crime the person is accused of.
While other-acts evidence cannot be used to show a person’s likeliness of committing the crime, it can be used for another purpose. Evid.R. 404(B)(2) states the evidence may be admitted for purposes “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” If the evidence is admitted for such a purpose, then the trial court must perform a balancing test outlined in Evid.R. 403(A), the opinion explained. A trial judge must first determine if the value of the evidence is “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
The prosecutor argued the evidence was admitted because it showed Echols’ consciousness of guilt. The evidence was not other-acts evidence, and the trial court could admit it without having to conduct the balancing test, the prosecutor maintained. Echols argued it was other-acts evidence, and that his trial was unfair because the judge admitted the evidence without properly following the balancing rules.
The Court agreed with Echols that the witness-intimidation evidence was other-acts evidence. The evidence was about another “crime, wrong, or act” that was not shown to prove Echols was the shooter, but rather to inform the jury of Echols’ awareness of his role in the crime and his attempts to thwart his conviction. The opinion noted “consciousness of guilt” is not listed in 404(B)(2) as one of the reasons for allowing admission of evidence. However, the list begins with “such as” and is only intended to provide examples, the Court stated. Prior case law, the Court explained, made clear that witness intimidation evidence was relevant for the purpose of showing a defendant’s consciousness of his guilt.
This opinion stated it clears up decades-long inconsistency on the application of Evid.R. 404(B) to evidence of witness intimidation and other consciousness-of-guilt evidence.
“We have sometimes found such evidence admissible without performing an explicit Evid.R. 404(B) analysis. . . . But in other cases, we have made clear that Evid.R. 404(B) applies to this type of evidence.” Justice DeWine concluded, “[w]e make clear today that witness-intimidation evidence is properly analyzed under Evid.R. 404(B) when it is offered as proof of an ‘other crime, wrong, or act.’”
While the trial court did not analyze the witness intimidation evidence under the rules relating to other-acts evidence, the Supreme Court found it was admissible because it was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. The opinion noted “unfairly prejudicial evidence” has the ability to “lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from the proof specific of the charge.” This typically is evidence that leads a jury to base its decision on evidence about the accused’s character and likelihood of committing a crime, which is not permitted, the opinion noted.
When considering all the evidence presented in the case, the trial court fairly concluded the relevance of the witness-intimidation evidence outweighed its potential to improperly sway the jury’s decision, the Court concluded.
2023-1024. State v. Echols, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-5088.
View oral argument video of this case.
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