Cuyahoga County prosecutors presented sufficient evidence for a man to be convicted of a 2010 rape because prosecutors presented evidence that the victim was substantially impaired so that she could not resist or consent and that the man knew or had reason to believe the victim was substantially impaired, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled today.

A Supreme Court majority found the DNA evidence, witness testimony, and the victim’s account that she had no memory of the evening after taking one sip of her vodka drink from a bar was sufficient for a jury to find Robin McClain guilty of substantial impairment rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1).

The decision reversed an Eighth District Court of Appeals 2025 ruling that overturned McClain’s conviction. The appeals court found the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence that McClain had known that the victim, identified in court records as “S.G.,” was unable to consent.

Writing for the Court majority, Justice Joseph T. Deters stated that the Eighth District applied the wrong standard in overturning the conviction and held the prosecution to a higher burden of proof than required.

Because McClain challenged the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him, the appeals court should have considered whether the prosecution produced evidence at trial that, if believed, would convince the average person that each element of substantial impairment rape was met, Justice Deters wrote. The prosecutors met that standard, he stated.

Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy and Justices R. Patrick DeWine, Jennifer Brunner, Daniel R. Hawkins, and Megan E. Shanahan joined Justice Deters’ opinion. Justice Patrick F. Fischer concurred in judgment only.

DNA Evidence Led to Suspect of Unsolved Rape Claim
In March 2010, shortly after midnight after closing two restaurants she managed, S.G. went to a Cleveland West Park bar called the Third Place. She ordered a pizza and a vodka tonic. S.G. said shortly after she got her drink, a man approached her and started to aggressively hit on her. She rebuffed him, and another man approached her from the other side. She recalled taking one sip of her drink while being sandwiched between the two men and having no memory of the evening after that.

The next thing S.G. remembered was waking up in a bank parking lot, her pants unzipped and feeling “clearly violated.” She had bruises on her face and arms, blood on her lips, and “soreness.” A person who awakened her in the parking lot walked her home.

After the incident, S.G. called her friend to tell him what happened, and he suggested she go to the hospital. The friend drove her there, where a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) examined S.G. At trial, the nurse recounted that S.G. had only wanted to know what happened and had not wanted to go to court. And S.G. stated she did not have consensual sex with anyone that night.

After leaving the hospital, S.G. tried to determine what had happened. She went to the Third Place and spoke with a bartender there. The bartender told her there was no video and that the owner was in the process of installing cameras after other girls reported “being roofied” by someone who secretly slipped mind-altering or sedating drugs into their food or drinks.

The SANE nurse submitted S.G.’s rape kit to the Bureau of Criminal Investigation in 2010. The bureau found male DNA evidence from swabs taken from S.G.

S.G. stated she did not hear from the police until 2020. The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office’s cold-case unit received a lead using a commercial forensic genealogist. The company identified two potential suspects, Robin McClain and his brother. DNA obtained from McClain matched the swabs taken from S.G. Investigators had also shown S.G. a photo array of suspects that included McClain’s photograph. She selected a photo of another man, not McClain.

Suspect Denied Encounter
Police interviewed McClain, who stated that he had never been in the Third Place.  McClain also denied having had sex with S.G. or even having seen her before. He also claimed that in 2010, he frequented a coffee shop called Common Grounds but did not go to nearby bars.

In 2020, McClain was indicted on one count of forcible rape and one count of substantial impairment rape.

S.G., her friend, the SANE nurse, and others testified at McClain’s trial. One of the witnesses contradicted McClain’s statement to investigators.

A woman testified that in 2010, McClain was her best friend, and subsequently described herself as McClain’s wife, although the two were not legally married. The woman said on a typical night, she, McClain, and other friends met at Common Grounds, then dispersed to nearby bars. After drinking, the group would return to Common Grounds to sober up. She stated that McClain’s statement that he did not go to bars in 2010 was a lie.

Common Grounds’s parking lot was connected to the bank parking lot where S.G. awakened the morning after the incident.

A jury found McClain not guilty of forcible rape but guilty of substantial impairment rape.

McClain appealed his conviction to the Eighth District, arguing there was not sufficient evidence to support his conviction. He also argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyers failed to object to inadmissible testimony, and that the trial court improperly allowed the introduction of victim impact evidence.

In a 2-1 decision, the Eighth District ruled that the state failed to prove that McClain had knowledge of S.G.’s substantial impairment. It also determined he received ineffective assistance because his lawyers did not object to hearsay testimony that was inadmissible. The appeals court vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the trial court.

The prosecutor’s office appealed the Eighth District’s decision to the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court Examined Evidence Requirements
Based on the Court’s 1991 State v. Jenks decision, when a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of evidence, a reviewing court considers the evidence “in a light most favorable to the prosecution” “to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” the opinion stated.

Justice Deters explained that the Eighth District wrongly interpreted the review standard when it found the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that McClain knew S.G. was substantially impaired. However, on appeal, the prosecution does not have to prove it provided evidence to persuade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of McClain’s guilt, but only whether it produced adequate evidence to prove each element of the crime of substantial impairment rape.

The charge contains three elements, the opinion explained: sexual conduct occurred; the victim could not resist or consent because of a substantial mental or physical impairment; and the offender knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the victim could not consent because of substantial impairment.

DNA evidence from the sexual assault kit provided sufficient evidence of sexual conduct between McClain and S.G., the Court noted.

As to whether S.G. was substantially impaired, McClain argued there was no evidence to support S.G.’s claim that she completely blacked out. He noted there was no toxicology screen performed to determine whether there were drugs or alcohol in her system.

McClain’s argument requires more than is necessary when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court stated. The jury was able to determine whether it believed S.G.’s testimony that she took one sip of her drink at the Third Place and woke up in a parking lot far from the bar the next morning.

The Eighth District questioned the third element, whether McClain knew of S.G.’s impairment. The Court noted the appeals court focused on McClain’s knowledge, but did not address the statute's phrase “or has reasonable cause to believe that the other person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired.”

The Eighth District compared this case to other cases in which the offender’s knowledge of impairment could be gleaned from evidence of the accuser’s demeanor when interacting with others or from evidence of visible signs of the accuser’s impairment, such as failing, slurring, passing out, or vomiting.

“True, testimony from one or more witnesses who stated that they had seen McClain interact with S.G. while at the bar and that S.G. had been behaving in a way that would indicate that she was substantially impaired would be adequate direct evidence of McClain’s knowledge of her impairment,” the Supreme Court opinion stated. “But evidence need not be direct evidence to be sufficient.”

The Court noted that prosecutors can prove their cases through direct or circumstantial evidence. Sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented to show McClain had reasonable cause to believe S.G. was substantially impaired, the opinion stated.

DNA proved the two had sex, and if the jury believed S.G. that she had blacked out, then McClain must have been close enough to her for him to have cause to believe she was unable to consent because she was substantially impaired, the Court concluded.

Evidence also indicated that McClain lied to investigators, claiming he had never seen S.G. before and that he did not go to bars around the time of the 2010 incident. This could be considered consciousness of guilt, which can be considered in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the opinion stated.

The Court concluded that sufficient evidence for the three elements was presented to a jury, which found McClain guilty.

The Court also reviewed McClain’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and rejected it. The Court found McClain failed to prove that had the errors not been made, the trial outcome would have been different.

The Court remanded the case to the Eighth District to consider his third claim, which was whether the trial court allowed improper victim impact evidence that tainted the jury’s decision.

2025-0573. State v. McClain, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3934.

View oral argument video of this case.

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