Wednesday, Dec. 6, 2017
In the Matter of the Application of the Dayton Power and Light Company for Approval of Its Electric Security Plan, Case no. 2017-0241
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
State of Ohio v. Gerry L. Moore Sr. aka Gary L. Moore Sr., Case no. 2017-0483
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Erie County)
Disciplinary Counsel v. Andrew Mahlon Engel, Case no. 2017-1087
Montgomery County
Can Power Company Withdraw Rate Plan After Court Requires Modifications?
In the Matter of the Application of the Dayton Power and Light Company for Approval of Its Electric Security Plan, Case no. 2017-0241
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
ISSUES:
- May the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) allow an electric utility provider to withdraw its Electric Security Plan (ESP) after the Ohio Supreme Court has ordered revisions to the plan?
- Does the Court’s 1957 Keco Industries v. Cincinnati and Suburban Telephone Co. decision prevent the return of unlawful charges back to ratepayers, or does the Court have the right to order prospective adjustments to make up for overpayments by ratepayers?
- Does the PUCO’s approval of a provider’s new ESP make the prior plans null and void, and is a legal challenge to the prior plans a moot issue?
BACKGROUND:
The Ohio Office of the Consumers’ Counsel (OCC), and others challenge the PUCO’s decision to allow the Dayton Power and Light Co. (DP&L) to withdraw its second ESP after the Ohio Supreme Court in 2016 ruled that one of the charges passed on to ratepayers was unlawful. The Court issued a one-page opinion finding the plan’s Service Stability Rider was unauthorized. The decision was based on a more extensive opinion the Court delivered in a decision regarding a similar rider imposed by American Electric Power (AEP) that the Court directed the PUCO to modify. (See Court Approves AEP’s 2012 Rate Plan and Charge for Ensuring Reliability of Electricity in Competitive Marketplace).
As part of Ohio’s move away from electric service monopolies to a competitive marketplace, state lawmakers enacted a series of statutes to direct the industry. Under R.C. 4928.141, service providers such as DP&L, had to provide a standard service offer to its customers, who have the option of accepting power generated by the company or receiving power from another provider. Under Ohio’s system, only the generation portion of the electricity industry is competitive. DP&L and other traditional power providers still charge for and provide the distribution and transmission of power to customers in their regional markets. DP&L serves about 520,000 customers in 24 counties. The standard service offer can take one of two forms, a market rate offer, or an ESP. The PUCO authorized DP&L’ first ESP (ESP I) in 2009 and its second, ESP II, in 2013. ESP II was to be in place for 41 months, and the OCC and others challenged the plan, claiming it included unlawful charges including a Service Stability Rider (SSR) that was used to subsidize the cost of operating DP&L’s generation business. The SSR was a “non-bypassable” rider, meaning that it’s paid by customers who receive generation from DP&L and also by those who buy generation service from other competitors.
In 2016, the Court directed the PUCO to address impermissible charges in the SSR based on its precedent in the AEP case. The challengers claim that during the 32 months that ESP II was in operation, DP&L improperly collected $285 million from its customers, and they argue the Court’s ruling allowed the PUCO to adjust the company’s future rates to essentially refund the overcharges. Instead of adjusting the ESP II, the PUCO permitted DP&L to withdraw the plan and revert back to a modified version of ESP I. DP&L at that time was already crafting a new six-year plan, ESP III. The challengers claim that the modified ESP I contained a generation-rider that was similar to the SSR, and claim the PUCO has since allowed DP&L to collect another $76 million in unlawful charges.
The Court has consolidated two appeals brought by DP&L opponents into one case to be heard for oral arguments. It includes a challenge to the right of the PUCO to allow the withdrawal of ESP II rather than modifying it to eliminate the SSR. And it includes a challenge to the PUCO’s right to allow the company to revert to a modified ESP I.
As these appeals were pending, the PUCO approved in October 2017, DP&L’s ESP III. The company and the PUCO have claimed the implementation of the new plan, make the issues raised about ESP I and ESP II moot. A week after the implementation the Court ordered the parties in the cases to file supplemental briefs discussing whether the enactment of the new plan makes the issues of the prior plans moot and if they cases should be dismissed. The Industrial Energy Users-Ohio initially brought the complaint to Supreme Court, but asked to be dismissed from the case, which was granted.
PUCO Can Only Modify Order, Not Substitute, Industrial Users Argue
The opponents argue that under R.C. 4928.143(C)(2)(a) the commission isn’t authorized to accept the withdrawal of an ESP after the Supreme Court has ordered a modification. The law requires the power companies to submit an ESP and that the PUCO is allowed to modify and approve it. A power company is allowed to withdraw the plan as modified by the PUCO if it disagrees with the changes and resubmit a new proposal. The plan’s opponents argue that once the Supreme Court ordered the changes, the role of the PUCO becomes ministerial and that it has to apply the findings of the Court. They argue the Court directed the PUCO to eliminate the rider from DP&L’s plan and implement a plan that allows $285 million collected from the ratepayers to be recouped through lower future rates. The opponents argue that the PUCO has no “latitude” or discretion to do anything other than follow the Court’s decision, and that the PUCO had no authority to allow DP&L to withdraw the plan before it ran its 41-month course.
Introduction of New Plan Doesn’t Moot Rate Issues, OCC Maintains
In its supplemental brief, the OCC notes that dismissing the appeal as moot amounts to the PUCO finding a way to disregard orders of the Court. If the PUCO can allow a power company to withdraw a plan once the Court finds a portion unlawful, and substitute it with another plan that lets the power company keeps the unlawfully gained payments, then it’s usurping the power of the Court.
The OCC maintains the implementation of the new EPS doesn’t make moot the appeal for several reasons including that there are issues the Court can address even if the new rate plan takes effect. That includes addressing the Keco decision, which the OCC argues shouldn’t be followed in a new era of utility deregulation. The opponents contend that the Court has the power to order utilities to adjust future rates to compensate ratepayers for past unlawful collections. The OCC also cautions that mooting the issue would be unwise because the same situation is capable of being repeated, yet evading review by the Court. The groups argue that in future cases, utilities who receive Court orders to modify their plans and reduce rates can withdraw them, keep the funds collected, and substitute them with new plans that don’t have the effect of refunding the customers.
Additional appellants in the case include the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association Energy Group, the Ohio Energy Group, and Kroger Co.
Power Company Had Right to Withdraw Plan, PUCO Maintains
The PUCO argues that it followed the Court decision and modified DP&L’s ESP II. At that point DP&L exercised its right under R.C. 4928.143(C)(2)(a) to withdraw its plan. The commission then followed the law by placing its former approved plan, ESP I, in effect until it could assess the company’s ESP III. In October, it approved ESP III, which runs from November 2017 until December 2023.
The PUCO asserts the challengers raise issues with ESP II, which is no more, and are now stale. The commission maintains the case is moot and should be dismissed. It also notes that if opponents are dissatisfied with DP&L’s rate plan, they can appeal the current ESP III.
The PUCO also argues that while the opponents contend the Court gave the commission the right to provide a refund to the ratepayers, Ohio law and Court precedent indicates the commission doesn’t have the authority to order a refund.
“This Court has firmly declared that ‘retroactive ratemaking’ is not permitted under Ohio’s comprehensive statutory scheme,” the PUCO supplemental brief states. “The prohibition against rate refunds dates back to the Keco case decided six decades ago.”
DP&L Argues Case is Moot
The Court permitted DP&L to intervene in the case and speak on its behalf regarding the decisions by the PUCO. The company argues the pending cases are moot because of the implementation of ESP III, which is now in effect. DP&L disagrees with the claim that the issue is capable of repetition while evading review. The company noted an ESP typically last for three to six years. From the time an ESP is proposed until it is fully legally challenged typically takes a year. The company indicates in this situation it was coincidental that the Court ruling on ESP II was issued while approval of ESP III was pending.
The company also notes this is the first time a company has withdrawn an ESP following a Court order, so it doesn’t indicate the issue is likely to come up again. And the company maintains the arguments that the Court could order a refund wasn’t made when the challengers first appealed the ESP in 2014, and they can’t raise the issue now.
- Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Dayton Power and Light Co.: Jeffrey Sharkey, 937.227.3705
Representing Kroger Co.: Angela Whitfield, 614.365.4100
Representing Office of the Consumers’ Counsel, Maureen Willis, 614.466.9567
Representing Ohio Energy Group: Michael Kurtz, 513.421.2255
Representing Ohio Manufacturers’ Association Energy Group: Robert Burdett, 614.224.5111
Representing Public Utilities Commission of Ohio from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Thomas McNamee, 614.466.4397
Is Law that Prohibits Application of Jail-Time Credit to Sentence for Firearm Violation Constitutional?
State of Ohio v. Gerry L. Moore Sr. aka Gary L. Moore Sr., Case no. 2017-0483
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Erie County)
ISSUES:
- Does R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b), which prohibits the reduction of mandatory prison terms imposed for a firearm specification, violate equal protection rights under the U.S. and Ohio constitutions?
- Did the appellate court err when it decided the statute violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection when the parties didn’t challenge the statute’s constitutionality and didn’t brief the issue on appeal?
BACKGROUND:
An Erie County grand jury indicted Gerry L. Moore Sr., also known as Gary L. Moore Sr., for multiple alleged offenses in July 2015. Some of the counts included weapons charges, referred to as firearm specifications.
As part of a plea agreement, Moore pled guilty in April 2016 to felonious assault, kidnapping, failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer, and inducing panic. The felonious assault offense carried a one-year mandatory firearm specification, and the kidnapping offense included a three-year mandatory firearm specification.
Based on a state law, the trial court ordered Moore to serve the four years for the firearm specifications first and consecutive to his sentence for the other offenses of four years, 11 months, for a total prison sentence of eight years, 11 months.
Moore also was entitled to credit for 283 days he served in jail before he was sentenced. The court noted that Moore would be eligible for judicial release in 4 1/2 years.
Appeals Court Overturns Sentence
Moore appealed his sentence to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, arguing that his 283-day credit should be subtracted from his mandatory four-year sentence for the firearm specifications, rather than from his entire sentence of nearly nine years. The court considered Moore’s constitutional rights based on the equal protection clauses in the U.S. and Ohio constitutions. In a split decision reversing Moore’s sentence, the Sixth District ordered the trial court to apply his jail-time credit against the mandatory part of his sentence rather than his entire prison term.
The Erie County Prosecutor's Office filed an appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted the case.
Relevant Statutes
The law in R.C. 2967.191 states that “[t]he department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the stated prison term of a prisoner … by the total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced[.]”
However, R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) provides that a mandatory prison term for a firearm specification “shall not be reduced” for various reasons including for jail-time credit in R.C. 2967.191.
Jail-Time Credit Is Subtracted from Total Prison Term, State Maintains
The prosecutor notes that the equal protection clauses of the U.S. and Ohio constitutions ensure that defendants detained on pending charges because they can’t pay bail must be given credit for the time they’ve been confined if they are convicted and sentenced. According to the prosecutor, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Fugate (2008) determined that equal protection is violated when a defendant is denied this credit and explained that the constitutional right doesn’t allow for “disparate treatment of defendants based solely on their economic status ….”
Noting that the issue in Fugate concerned concurrent sentences, the prosecutor points out that the decision also mentioned the proper calculation of jail-time credit when a defendant receives consecutive sentences. The Court wrote, “The Administrative Code provides a different rule for calculating jail-time credit for offenders serving consecutive terms. In such cases, the code instructs that jail-time credit be applied only once, to the total term.” The prosecutor adds that another provision in R.C. 2929.14 requires mandatory prison terms for firearm specifications to be served consecutively and prior to sentences for underlying offenses.
In the brief to the Supreme Court, the prosecutor also discusses judicial release procedures described in state law. Quoting the statute, the prosecutor notes that the section relevant to this case states, “‘If the aggregated nonmandatory prison term or terms is at least two years but less than five years, the eligible offender may file the motion [for judicial release] not earlier than one hundred eighty days after the offender is delivered to a state correctional institution or, if the prison term includes a mandatory prison term or terms, not earlier than one hundred eighty days after the expiration of all mandatory prison terms ….’”
The prosecutor argues this law applies equally to wealthy and poor offenders because each must serve the full length of any mandatory sentences before they can apply for judicial release. In Moore’s case, he’ll be allowed to request judicial release 180 days after he finishes his four-year mandatory sentence, the prosecutor notes. The statute also provides that the trial court isn’t required to grant judicial release at that time, but instead “may reduce the eligible offender’s aggregated nonmandatory prison term or terms through a judicial release ….” Moore wasn’t deprived of his 283-day credit for jail time because it was applied to his total prison term, the prosecutor concludes.
Credit for Confinement Can Be Applied to Mandatory Firearm Sentence, Moore Argues
Moore responds that jail-time credit is part of, not separate from, the prison term, citing definitions in the state’s criminal code, R.C. Chapter 2929. “Prison term” includes “a stated prison term” or a prison term shortened by provisions in other statutes. “Stated prison term” is defined as “includ[ing] any credit received by the offender for time spent in jail awaiting trial, sentencing, or transfer to prison for the offense.”
Giving credit for time served in jail – also referred to in the briefs as “confinement credit” or “dead-time credit” – is different from the other reductions in sentences that are prohibited by R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b), Moore argues. The statute bars reductions in prison sentences for judicial release approvals or good-time credit, or when the director of rehabilitation and corrections petitions for release. Moore contends that these prohibitions are distinct from confinement credit because they reduce the prison term while jail-time credit is incorporated as part of the prison term. As a result, the statutes interpreted together indicate that defendants can receive jail-time credit against a mandatory sentence for a firearm specification, Moore states.
However, if the Court determines the statute can’t be read this way, then the law violates equal protection, Moore asserts. In Fugate, the Court ruled that jail-time credit must be applied against each prison term when they run concurrently. The Court stated that not applying the credit across all concurrent sentences would invalidate the credit and violate an offender’s equal protection rights, Moore explains. In Moore’s view, the legislature wrote the jail-time credit statute to protect the equal protection rights of offenders.
“It would violate the Equal Protection Clauses if the legislature were to begin selecting offenses for which defendants could not receive confinement credit,” Moore’s brief states. “Defendants would lose weeks, months, or years of their lives in jail because they could not make bail. Given the legislature’s recognition of the right to confinement credit, the interpretation that denies all confinement credit should be rejected ….”
Not allowing jail-time credit to be subtracted from mandatory sentences for gun specifications is a violation of the constitutional right to equal protection, Moore argues. Because he is eligible for judicial release after he serves four years and six months, Moore contends that, to ensure his constitutional rights, his jail-time credit must instead be credited against his four-year mandatory sentence. Although the prosecutor argues that equal protection guarantees don’t apply to judicial release eligibility, Moore maintains that the Supreme Court explained in a 2004 case (State v. Peoples) that defendants are entitled to equal protection in their judicial release eligibility. When jail-time credit is subtracted from the entire prison term instead of from the mandatory part of the sentence, defendants who can’t pay bail are incarcerated longer than wealthier offenders before becoming eligible for judicial release, Moore concludes.
Parties Dispute Whether Appeals Court Was Permitted to Rule on Constitutional Claim
Procedural rules for appellate courts explain that those courts are only required to decide issues that are assigned and briefed, the prosecutor notes. Although the rules don’t explicitly prohibit an appellate court from reviewing an issue not brought up by either party, the prosecutor argues that the Ohio Supreme Court has held in multiple cases that the court should give parties notice and allow them to submit arguments before making a decision on a new and unbriefed issue. In this case, the prosecutor explains that neither he nor Moore raised equal protection arguments about the statute, but the Sixth District ruled on the issue without giving either side the chance to present arguments on that claim. The prosecutor asks the Supreme Court to reiterate that appellate courts can’t rule on a new and unbriefed issue without giving the parties notice and the chance to address the issue.
Moore, however, believes the Supreme Court can interpret the statute without addressing the constitutional claim and, if the Court does that, the prosecutor’s objection to the Sixth District’s decision becomes moot. If the Court instead determines it needs to review this issue, then Moore contends that appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, are permitted to, and have, considered a statute’s constitutionality without the parties raising such issues on their own. The Sixth District decided that it didn’t need briefing on the equal protection issue and properly ruled on that claim, Moore states.
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Erie County Prosecutor’s Office: Jonathan McGookey, 419.627.7697
Attorney Discipline
Disciplinary Counsel v. Andrew Mahlon Engel, Case no. 2017-1087
Montgomery County
A Dayton area lawyer who has twice been sanctioned by the Ohio Supreme Court for violating the rules governing attorneys faces a two-year suspension, with 18 months stayed, for failing to respond to a client matter and other conduct violations.
The Board of Professional Conduct recommends the suspension of Andrew M. Engel of Centerville, who was publicly reprimanded by the Supreme Court in 2001, and suspended for two years, with six months stayed, in 2004. The board is recommending Engel now be forced to cease practicing law for six months with the possibility of having to sit out two years if he doesn’t meet certain conditions.
Engel counters that he provided the board sufficient evidence to show he was suffering from a mental health disability at the time of his misconduct and that he is successfully undergoing treatment for the condition. He argues that his behavior warrants a fully stayed two-year suspension as long as he meets the conditions recommended by the board.
Engel Neglects Client’s Debt Settlement Case
In April 2015 Dianne Shelton hired Engel to represent her in a consumer debt matter. She paid Engel a $500 retainer, and he obtained information from Shelton and two municipal courts in order to pursue a settlement with Shelton’s creditor. Shelton had explained to Engel that the debt was preventing her and her husband from financing the purchase of a home.
About two weeks after the initial meeting, Engel sent a letter to the lawyer for the creditor. More than a month later, Shelton called Engel seeking information about the status of her case and was unable to reach him. In mid-June Engel promised to call the opposing attorney to follow up, and then sent a follow up letter to the creditor’s lawyer. Between June and mid-August, Shelton repeatedly tried to reach Engel about the status of her case, and Engel didn’t respond to phone calls or emails. By mid-August, Engel hadn’t spoken directly to the opposing attorney, and Shelton field a grievance against Engel with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.
In September 2015, Engel responded to Shelton by email and sent another follow up letter to the opposing attorney. At the time he wasn’t aware of the grievance Shelton filed against him. In October, the disciplinary counsel sent a letter of inquiry to Engel, and Engel responded later that month. In November, he told the disciplinary counsel he would contact Shelton and ask if she wanted him to continue to represent her or return her fees.
But Engel didn’t respond to follow up contacts from Shelton or the disciplinary counsel until February 2016. She agreed to allow Engel to continue to represent her, but after not hearing from him for several weeks, she settled her debt herself in March 2016. After being informed of the settlement, Engel promised to refund Shelton the “balance” of her $500 retainer. In May 2016, Engel sent Shelton $50. The disciplinary counsel continued to request documentation from Engel who appeared for a June 2016 deposition. Weeks after the deposition, Engel sent a letter to Shelton apologizing for her failure to respond to her, and refunded the remaining $450 of her retainer.
A three-member panel of the board found Engel violated several rules of professional conduct while representing Shelton, including a requirement that he act with diligence to resolve her legal matter, and failing to keep her reasonably informed about the status of her case. The board also found that he failed to respond to information requests from the disciplinary counsel and violated his duty to cooperate with the disciplinary proceeding.
Board Considers Sanction
The board considers several issues before recommending a sanction, including aggravating circumstances that can increase a penalty and mitigating factors that can lessen it. The board noted that Engel has prior disciplinary offenses, committed multiple rules violations, and didn’t cooperate in the investigative stage of the disciplinary process.
It also found that he didn’t act with a dishonest or selfish motive, eventually made full disclosure to the board and cooperated in the proceedings, provided proof of good character and reputation, and presented proof of a disorder that affected his representation of Shelton.
The panel heard from several witnesses including psychologist Marsha K. Weston, who testified that Engel was depressed and anxious when he first started to see her in August 2016. Weston prescribed medication and said Engel responded well to it and can competently practice law.
Engel testified that he was insufficiently attentive to Shelton’s case and didn’t realize he was suffering from depression and anxiety that was affecting his practice. He admitted he should have been more responsive and that this type of misconduct will not happen again. He said he contracted with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (OLAP) for treatment assistance and hired a new office associate to focus on client communications. He also entered into a mentoring relationship with attorney Jonathan Hollingsworth, the former Ohio State Bar Association president, who has advised Engel.
The disciplinary counsel recommended a two-year suspension with six months stayed. The board adopted the recommendation, stating it was consistent with sanctions imposed on lawyers with similar infractions. It recommended to the Supreme Court that the 18-month stay be conditioned on Engel continuing to receive counseling from Weston or another qualified health care provider; that he adhere to recommendations from his primary care physician, and stay in compliance with his OLAP contract. In addition, the board suggested that once Engel is reinstated to practicing law, he should be placed under two years of monitored probation.
Engel Seeks Fully Stayed Suspension
Engel notes the parties and the board stipulated to nearly all the facts as well as the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case, except for one. He argues the hearing panel did not “expressly” adopt the position that Engel’s mental disorder contributed to his misconduct or credit him for being sufficiently treated for the disorder. He also maintains the board didn’t consider his participation in OLAP, his attorney mentoring with Hollingsworth, or the changes to his legal practice as mitigating factors.
Engel cites several cases, including the Court’s recent 2017 Ashtabula County Bar Association v. Brown as examples where lawyers similarly situated to him have received fully stayed suspension on certain grounds. Engel noted that he had to part with his initial attorney handling his disciplinary matter after serious disagreements. He objects to the panel’s refusal to allow him to supplement his closing arguments with additional information, including the impact of the Brown case, which was decided after closing arguments were submitted. He maintains the failure to consider the cases he cited along without crediting him for his contributions to the profession by teaching for the Supreme Court’s Judicial College and representing a population that is underserved in Ohio led the board to erroneously suggest a sentence that prevents him from practicing law.
Disciplinary Counsel Says Suspension Warranted
The disciplinary counsel observes that this is the third time Engel has been found to have neglected a client and the second time he has failed to cooperate in a disciplinary matter, and insists that this behavior warrants an actual suspension from practicing law. The disciplinary counsel notes that Engel’s behavior caused a delay in Shelton’s ability to purchase a home and left her to settle her debt on her own.
The disciplinary counsel compares the mental disability claims of one of Engel’s past disciplinary matters with the current case. In Engel’s 2004 case, he didn’t receive mitigation credit for his mental disability because he didn’t present evidence that the depression contributed to his misconduct, the disciplinary counsel explains. The 2004 sanction specified his reinstatement was conditioned on providing a statement from a qualified mental health professional that he was could ethically and competently practice law, which he did provide.
Similarly to 2004, the disciplinary counsel contends in the Shelton matter, Engel presented evidence of a mental health disability, but no evidence that the disorder prevented him from following the professional conduct rules. The disciplinary counsel notes Engel didn’t seek treatment until after he received an official board complaint about his behavior.
The disciplinary counsel maintains that Weston, Engel’s treating psychologist, wouldn’t conclude whether Engel was competent to practice law when he sought treatment, and she could not explain why Engel neglected this client and apparently did not neglect other clients at the same time. Nevertheless, the disciplinary counsel argues the board did give Engel some mitigation credit for the disability.
Absent significant mitigation credit, Engel’s record and failure to cooperate would warrant an indefinite suspension, the disciplinary counsel argues. While the board may not have stated explicitly how it factored his mental health treatment into its finding, the recommended lower sanction of a two-year suspension, rather than an indefinite suspension, indicates Engel was given mitigation credit, the disciplinary counsel maintains.
The disciplinary counsel supports the proposed sanction recommended by the board, and argues that it’s consistent with prior sanctions handed down to attorneys displaying similar patterns of misconduct. The disciplinary counsel also rejects Engel’s arguments that he was unfairly prevented from providing supplemental material after closing arguments and suggests that Engel’s own inaction to promptly notify the board of his request for more time led to its exclusion.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the Office of Disciplinary Counsel: Jennifer Bondurant, 614.461.0256
Representing Andrew M. Engel: Thomas Pyper, 937.610.1990
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