Wednesday, Jan. 30, 2019
State of Ohio v. Justin Wintermeyer, Case no. 2017-1135
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
The Farmers State Bank v. Steven Sponaugle et al., Case no. 2017-1377
Second District Court of Appeals (Darke County)
Jeffrey Kljun et al. v. Sarah Morrison, administrator, Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation et al, Case no. 2017-1576
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
A.S. v. J.W., Case no. 2018-0602
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
Does Unsearched Man Have Right to Claim Illegal Police Search?
State of Ohio v. Justin Wintermeyer, Case no. 2017-1135
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUES:
- Can a defendant claim a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure when police discover the contraband that led to his arrest by searching a companion?
- Do prosecutors waive the right to argue a defendant’s lack of standing on appeal if the issue wasn’t raised at a trial court evidence suppression hearing?
BACKGROUND:
Two Columbus police officers were called to check on a vacant house with an open window. One officer was stationed in the back of the house when he saw two men walking in the alley behind the backyard. One of the men, Justin Wintermeyer, went inside a house across the alley from where the officer was standing. Wintermeyer returned to the alley about two minutes later and handed an object to his companion, identified in court documents as Mr. Carlson.
Suspecting he just witnessed a narcotics exchange, the officer walked toward the men and shined a flashlight on them. The officer saw an object in a cellophane baggie in Carlson’s hand, and he grabbed it from Carlson. The officer detained the two men while another officer tested the substance in the baggie and determined it was heroin.
Wintermeyer was indicted for possession of heroin, a fifth-degree felony, and he filed a motion to suppress the evidence, alleging the police search was a violation of his rights against unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment.
Prosecutors Contest Suppression Effort
In response to Wintermeyer’s motion, the Franklin County prosecuting attorney filed a memorandum in opposition that contained several reasons why Wise’s search was valid and argued that the exclusionary rule doesn’t apply in Wintermeyer’s case. The prosecutor cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1978 Rakas v. Illinois decision in which the high court clarified when a defendant has “standing” to file a motion to suppress evidence.
The trial court granted Wintermeyer’s motion to suppress the baggie and the drugs in it. The prosecutor appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. At the appellate court, the prosecutor argued that the trial court committed several errors, including its finding that Wintermeyer had standing to raise the Fourth Amendment protection. The prosecutor maintained Wintermeyer wasn’t searched and the drugs weren’t seized from him.
In a divided opinion, the Tenth District ruled the prosecutor “waived” the right to question Wintermeyer’s standing because the prosecutor didn’t raise the argument at the trial court hearing. The Tenth District affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The prosecutor appealed the case to the Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the state’s argument that Wintermeyer lacked standing to invoke his Fourth Amendment rights.
Standing Argument Not Waived, Prosecutor Maintains
Wintermeyer can only raise the Fourth Amendment to protect his own rights against an illegal search, the prosecutor argues. Since he wasn’t searched, he had no right to argue for the suppression of the evidence, the prosecutor asserts. Though Wintermeyer was charged with possession, the prosecution maintains that it doesn’t have to demonstrate Wintermeyer possessed the drugs — noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has approved the use of drug evidence obtained from another person and rejected the accused’s Fourth Amendment argument.
The issue of standing doesn’t need to be raised by the prosecution at a hearing because Wintermeyer automatically introduced the standing argument when he sought suppression, the prosecution argues. When a defendant wants to exclude evidence, the claim of standing is implied, the prosecution maintains. The prosecution notes it challenged the argument by raising it first in its memo opposing the exclusion of the evidence, and then implicitly at the hearing when it defended the officer’s search and opposed suppression.
The prosecution maintains that since Wintermeyer sought to suppress the evidence, he bears the burden of proof to show the police illegally obtained the evidence and he has standing to make the argument. Because the trial court granted Wintermeyer’s motion, it also gave him standing, the prosecution argues. Because the court gave him standing, the prosecution asserts the state has the right to raise the issue for the first time during the appeal.
Standing Waives When Search Defended, Accused Argues
Wintermeyer maintains the prosecutor filed a “boilerplate” motion against this request to suppress the evidence that it uses regularly in trial court. Rakas is cited in the opposition memo, but the prosecutor never argued standing in more detail in the memo or raised the issue at the hearing, Wintermeyer notes. Instead, he states, the prosecution made several arguments to defend the police search and the validity of it.
Citing the Second District Court of Appeals’ 2013 State v. Boyd decision, Wintermeyer argues that once he alleged the warrantless search was invalid, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove the search was legal. In Boyd, the appellate court noted that one way to prove a search is legal is to prove the defendant lacked standing to bring the challenge.
“The Tenth District’s reliance on Boyd, as well as other cases cited was appropriate. The state’s failure to argue the issue of standing in the trial court constitutes a waiver of such issue for purposes of appeal,” Wintermeyer’s brief states.
Search Was Illegal, Wintermeyer Adds
If the Supreme Court agrees that the prosecutor didn’t waive the standing argument, the Court still should conclude that Wintermeyer had standing to challenge the search, he argues.
Wintermeyer actually possessed the baggie, and for that, he was charged with possession. When he handed it to Carlson, the two were immediately detained. After the two were illegally detained, the property was taken, he argues, and he had a reasonable expectation in the privacy of the plastic bag. Because he was detained and had an expectation of privacy in the item searched, he had standing to raise a Fourth Amendment argument, he concludes. The Tenth District rejected all of the prosecution’s arguments that Wise conducted a valid, warrantless search, and the Court should affirm the decision, Wintermeyer states.
- Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office: Seth Gilbert, 614.525.3555
Representing Justin Wintermeyer: Dustin Blake, 614.224.4114
Was Foreclosed Home Sold Too Soon?
The Farmers State Bank v. Steven Sponaugle et al., Case no. 2017-1377
Second District Court of Appeals (Darke County)
ISSUES:
- If a foreclosure decree is a non-final order, can a sheriff’s sale be confirmed?
- Is a foreclosure decree that determines liability and the amount due to the foreclosing lender and that leaves the remaining amounts to be calculated later a final order allowing its execution?
BACKGROUND:
Karen and Steven Sponaugle obtained three loans from the Farmers State Bank for their home in Bradford. After the Sponaugles defaulted on their loans, Farmers State filed a foreclosure action in October 2013 against them and any others with an interest in the property. In an amended complaint filed with the trial court, Farmers State added American Budget Company and Midland Funding as defendants.
In a May 2014 settlement, the Sponaugles agreed to pay $120,000 to the bank on or before Aug. 23, but they didn’t pay the bank by the deadline.
The court granted summary judgment to Farmers State, and the court’s “judgment entry – decree of foreclosure” was entered in January 2016. In the decree, the court ordered the sale of the property and gave the following priorities to the claims against the property: property taxes owed to the Darke County treasurer; Farmers State’s three mortgage loans; and American Budget Company’s interest.
Property Owners Appeal Foreclosure
The Sponaugles appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, they asked the trial court to stay the foreclosure judgment during the appeal, which the court agreed to if the Sponaugles posted a bond of $141,458. When the bond wasn’t posted, the property was sold at a sheriff’s sale in February 2016. The bank purchased the property for $85,334.
In April, the Second District dismissed the Sponaugles’ appeal, stating that the January 2016 decree wasn’t a final order that could be appealed because it didn’t include the amounts due on each loan. A few days later, the trial court confirmed the property’s sale.
The Sponaugles appealed the confirmation of the sale to the Second District, which reversed the trial court’s order. In June 2017, the appellate court determined that the trial court had no authority to confirm the property sale because there was no final order. The Second District ordered the trial court to vacate the sale confirmation and issue a final order, which would then allow for the sale of the property.
Farmers State appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to review the issues.
Sale Could Go Forward Regardless of Whether Owners Could Appeal, Bank Maintains
Farmers State argues that if the January 2016 decree wasn’t a final order, the sheriff’s sale nevertheless could proceed, and the trial court was permitted to confirm the sale. State appellate courts besides the Second District have ruled that a trial court’s foreclosure judgment subjects the property to sale, regardless of whether the order can be appealed, the bank maintains.
The Second District cited a 1988 Ohio Supreme Court decision, which concluded all claims and counterclaims in a foreclosure action must be resolved before the sale of a mortgaged property. However, Farmers State maintains that all claims and counterclaims were resolved in the Sponaugles’ case before the sale. Only the specific amounts owed to individual parties had to be determined, the bank notes.
In the bank’s view, because it resolved all claims against all parties, the January 2016 decree was a final order. The Second District ruled the decree wasn’t final because it didn’t state the specific amount of property taxes due nor the amount due to American Budget Company. However, Farmers State argues, the Ohio Supreme Court determined in CitiMortgage Inc. v. Roznowski (2014) that a judgment is final and appealable if each party’s rights and responsibilities are noted even when the “ministerial task” of calculating final, specific amounts is left until later.
Court Must Itemize Amounts Due to Each Party Before Decree Is Final, Owners Counter
The Sponaugles respond that the trial court’s decree wasn’t final because the amounts due for property taxes and to American Budget Company weren’t specified in the order. They also argue the bank’s position threatens their due process rights. They state that they couldn’t appeal the January 2016 decree because it wasn’t final, and a final order is required for a property sale to be executed.
“It makes little sense to permit a plaintiff to recover money from a defendant before it is finally determined that the defendant is liable. Once rights and duties are permanently fixed by the trial court, the next phases of the process – enforcement of the judgment or appeal – can begin,” their brief states.
The Sponaugles note their home was sold and they were forced to leave in August 2016, even though the trial court has issued no final order. While Roznowski stated that foreclosure decrees don’t have to itemize the amounts owed for taxes, insurance, and appraisals, Farmers State wants the Supreme Court to extend that conclusion to amounts due on loans, the Sponaugles maintain. They counter that determining the amounts due to each party isn’t a ministerial calculation, but instead must be detailed in a final order.
The Sponaugles ask the Court to uphold the Second District’s decision and order the trial court to return the property.
Banking Groups and Community Banks Support Farmers State
An amicus curiae brief supporting Farmers State’s position has been submitted collectively by the following organizations:
- Community Bankers Association of Ohio
- Farmers and Merchants Bank, Greenville National Bank, Osgood State Bank, and Twin Valley Bank – community banks located within the area covered by the Second District Court of Appeals
- Independent Community Bankers of America
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the Farmers State Bank: Terry Posey Jr., 937.443.6857
Representing Karen and Steven Sponaugle: Brian Flick, 513.645.3488
Did Appellate Court Misapply Law-of-the-Case Doctrine?
Jeffrey Kljun et al. v. Sarah Morrison, administrator, Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation et al, Case no. 2017-1576
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Does the “law-of-the-case doctrine” apply only to matters addressed in an earlier appeal of the case or can it extend to issues not addressed in the earlier appeal?
BACKGROUND:
As part of the 2012 mid-biennium budget review bill, state lawmakers amended R.C. 4123.57(B), which required that workers’ compensation payments for workers who lost limbs, organs, or other bodily systems to be paid “loss-of-use” compensation in weekly installments. Prior to the act, state law had allowed the payments to be made in weekly installments, but also allowed the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC) to control the process through rules. In 2010, the BWC approved a rule allowing lump-sum payments for loss-of-use injuries.
Jeffrey Kljun and five other injured workers filed a lawsuit in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court against the bureau, claiming the 2012 amendment violated the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution because it was unrelated to the budget bill. The lawsuit requested an injunction that prevented the BWC from enforcing the new law and required lump-sum payments.
Both sides asked for summary judgment and the trial court ruled in the BWC’s favor. Kljun appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the lower court. The Eighth District found the amendment was unconstitutional and directed the trial court to enter a judgment in Kljun’s favor.
The bureau didn’t appeal the decision and neither party submitted any additional motions or documents to the trial court. The trial court then issued a written entry that declared the law unconstitutional and required lump-sum payments. The bureau again appealed the decision to the Eighth District. It argued that by declaring the law unconstitutional, the law reverted back to its prior form. In that form, the BWC was, by law, required to make monthly payments, even though it had the option to alter payments through rule-making. The BWC maintained the Eighth District never ordered the trial court to mandate lump-sum payments.
The Eighth District rejected the bureau’s appeal, stating the trial court followed the “law-of-the-case” doctrine and applied the correct judgment. The BWC appealed the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Appeals Court Misapplied Doctrine, Bureau Argues
The bureau argues the Eighth District has misapplied the law-of-the-case doctrine by applying it not only to the issue argued before the appellate court — whether the amendment was constitutional — but also to the “relief” requested by Kljun. The BWC maintains that there were two distinct issues, and when the appellate court ruled the law unconstitutional, the only directive to the trial court was to invalidate the law and reinstate the old law. The older version of the law didn’t require lump-sum payments, and the trial court wasn’t instructed by the Eighth District to impose lump-sum payments.
The Eighth District noted that the BWC didn’t challenge its initial ruling and that Kljun has asked for the required imposition of lump sums so the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes the BWC for bringing up the argument again. The BWC argues the appellate court was wrong, and the law-of-the-case only applies to the matter resolved in the first round, which was the constitutionality of the law. In the second round, the issue of whether lump sums are required should be resolved at the trial level, the bureau maintains.
Worker Argues Doctrine Followed
Kljun cites the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2018 Giancola v. Azem decision, in which the Court reminded the Ohio judiciary that the legal questions resolved by a reviewing court remain as the law of the case for subsequent proceedings at the trial- and appellate-court levels. He notes the Eighth District didn’t order further proceedings in the case, which signaled to the bureau that the appellate court was directing the lower court to both invalidate the law and require lump-sum payments. The BWC could, but didn’t, appeal the decision to the Supreme Court or ask the Eighth District to reconsider, Kljun notes. Because the bureau took no action until the trial judge ruled in Kljun’s favor, the Eighth District correctly applied the law of the case and rejected the bureau’s appeal.
Kljun also claims the BWC is advancing a “revolutionary theory” that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies only to issues that were addressed by the appellate court. He argues that in the 1996 Hubbard ex Rel. Creed v. Sauline decision, the Ohio Supreme Court stated the doctrine applies not only to issues that were fully pursued, but also to those issues available to be pursued in the first appeal. The BWC was aware that he was seeking both to invalidate the rule and to prevent the bureau from making weekly payments. The issue could have been pursued in the first appeal, and the law-of-the-case doctrine was properly applied by the Eighth District in the second appeal, he concludes.
- Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Sarah Morrison, administrator, Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation et al. from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Eric Murphy, 614.466.8980
Can Court Bypass Provision Regarding Calculation of Commissions for Child Support Purposes?
A.S. v. J.W., Case no. 2018-0602
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
ISSUE: For the purpose of calculating child support, are commissions treated in the same manner as overtime and bonuses when determining “gross income”?
BACKGROUND:
A couple identified in court documents as A.S. and J.W. had a child, who was born in February 2015. The couple ended their relationship before the child was born, but the parents were cooperating and agreed to a shared parenting plan in July 2016. In September 2016, A.S. filed a complaint to establish parental rights and responsibilities and, in August 2016, a trial was conducted on economic issues.
The parties presented their incomes from the prior few years and the mother, A.S., indicated she earned $131,000 in 2015 and expected to earn $140,000 in 2016. J.W. testified that the bulk of his earnings were through commissions and, in 2015, he had a base salary of $90,000 and received $212,000 in commissions. For 2016, he stated his salary would increase to $94,000 and his 2016 commissions would be about $369,000. J.W. testified that the 2016 commission was abnormally high due to the product of several years of work that came to fruition in 2016.
The magistrate hearing the case ordered J.W. to pay $2,984 per month through 2015 and that beginning in 2016, he would pay $4,372 per month. The magistrate stated the increase was calculated by including the 2016 commission in a three-year average of J.W.’s gross income. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision, and J.W. objected to the child support award. The trial court affirmed the decision in March 2017, and the father appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals.
Citing R.C. 3119.05(D), J.W. argued that the law prohibited the trial court from using his 2016 commissions to establish his child support obligation. The Sixth District affirmed the lower court decision, noting that the state legislature “mistakenly included commissions” in portions of R.C. 3119.05(D), and that the trial court was justified in using the payments to calculate child support.
J.W. appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Wrong Standard Used to Calculate Support, Father States
J.W. argues that Ohio courts have wrongly equated two separate provisions of the statute regarding the calculation of gross income for paying child support. In his case, he maintains, the Sixth District relied on R.C. 3119.05(H), rather than R.C. 3119.05(D). The provision in subsection (H) states that a court or child support enforcement agency, “when appropriate, may average income over a reasonable period of years.” In his case, the courts relied on this provision to include his 2016 commissions over his objection that it was unreasonable because he earned an unusually high commission in 2016.
By using subsection (H), J.W. asserts the court ignored subsection (D), which states that when a court or child support enforcement agency calculates gross income, it should compute the amount of overtime and bonuses through one of two methods. It should either select the “yearly average of all overtime, commissions, and bonuses received during the three years immediately prior to the time when the person’s child support obligation is being computed,” or the total “overtime, commissions, and bonuses” earned in the prior year, he maintains. J.W. argues that if the trial court had used subsection (D), his support would have been based on the average commissions from 2013, 2014, and 2015, which better reflects his actual income.
The Sixth District concluded that state lawmakers mistakenly added commissions to subsection (D), because the subsection meant to address bonuses and overtime, not commissions. J.W. argues the intent of the lawmakers only comes into play when a law is ambiguous. He maintains the law is clear that when factoring commissions into gross income, the total is based on calculating the three years prior to the year the payments start.
“The question is not what did the general assembly intend to enact, but what is the meaning of that which it did enact,” J.W.’s brief stated, citing the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2004 State v. Harrison case.
Averaging Provision Not Required, Mother Maintains
While R.C. 3119.05(D) can be used by courts to average commissions when calculating income, it isn’t a mandate, A.S. argues. The provision doesn’t trump the goal of the R.C. Chapter 3119 and its overriding concern of the “best interest of the child,” she maintains. R.C. 3119.05(D) conflicts with other provisions of the chapter, and the legislature has granted judges broad discretion in computing child support orders that are in the best interest of the child, A.S. notes. She argues that the magistrate’s order was clearly within the law and justly supported by the trial court and Sixth District.
The General Assembly has consistently updated the child support guidelines, including a recent change that takes effect in March 2019. The latest version expands from eight to 15 the guidelines granted to local authorities to establish child support orders, the mother notes. A.S. argues the legislature didn’t address whether R.C. 3119.05(D) supersedes other provisions. She adds that R.C. 3119.01(C)(7) provides the definition of “gross income” and doesn’t treat commissions the same as bonuses and overtime.
A.S argues allowing R.C. 3119.05(D) to supersede the other guidelines would be illogical and also lead to intentional efforts to delay the payments of commissions as a way of making them unavailable to be figured into a three-year average. She notes that while J.W. admits he received the unusually large commission in 2016, he earned it over a four-year period. The fact that he received it 45 days into 2016, shouldn’t put it beyond the reach of the court to include in a reasonable child support order, she concludes.
- Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing J.W.: Jeffrey Nunnari, 419.578.9246
These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court's Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews are not part of the case record, and are not considered by the Court during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.