Tuesday, March 26, 2019
State of Ohio v. Eva Christian, Case no. 2017-1691
Second District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
State ex rel. More Bratenahl, et al. v. Village of Bratenahl, et al., Case no. 2018-0440
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
In re Application of Gillian Holzhauser-Graber, Case no. 2018-1425
Board of Commissioners on Character & Fitness
Shelly Materials Inc. v. City of Streetsboro Planning and Zoning Commission et al., Case no. 2018-0237
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Portage County)
Can Trial Courts Switch from Concurrent to Consecutive Sentences when Resentencing?
State of Ohio v. Eva Christian, Case no. 2017-1691
Second District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
ISSUE: After a state appellate court voids a sentence, is the trial court’s resentencing on the affected charge conducted “de novo,” or as if new?
BACKGROUND:
Eva Christian, a well-known restaurant owner in Dayton, was accused in March 2011 of insurance fraud and making false alarms in connection with a fire at one of her restaurants and the burglary of her home. The Montgomery County prosecutor alleged that Christian attempted to blow up the restaurant and hired someone to burglarize her home, then made false insurance claims.
The indictment included two counts of insurance fraud – one for her home and one related to the restaurant, and two counts of making a false alarm – one for her home and one for the restaurant. A count of engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity was added later.
Following a trial, the jury found Christian guilty on all counts. In June 2012, the trial court sentenced Christian to 18 months and 36 months for the two insurance fraud counts, 18 months and 12 months on the counts of making false alarms, and nine years for the pattern-of-corrupt-activity offense. The court ordered the sentences for the first four offenses to be served consecutively to each other (totaling seven years), but concurrently with the nine-year corrupt activity sentence, resulting in a nine-year prison term.
Appeals Pursued, and Restaurant Owner Resentenced
Christian appealed, and in June 2014 the Second District Court of Appeals overturned the corrupt-activity conviction and sent the case back to the trial court. The appeals court ordered the reduction of the sentences on one insurance fraud conviction and one false alarm conviction, because of legislation passed by the Ohio General Assembly (House Bill 86).
The Montgomery County prosecutor appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. As a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling, the Second District reinstated Christian’s sentence for corrupt activity but lessened it from a first- to a second-degree felony based on the underlying offense and returned the case to the trial court for resentencing.
In July 2016, the trial court resentenced Christian to the same prison terms on the first and fourth counts (18 months and 12 months); reduced the sentence on the second count from three years to one year; reduced the sentence on the third count from 18 months to 180 days; and reduced the fifth count, the corrupt-activity sentence, to eight years. The trial court ordered certain counts to be served concurrently with others, while the court made other sentences consecutive to each other, resulting in the same nine-year prison term.
Restaurant Owner Appeals New Sentences
Christian again appealed the sentencing, arguing that the trial court improperly ordered the second count (insurance fraud for restaurant fire) and fifth count (corrupt activity) to be served consecutively when it made them concurrent the first time. The Second District ruled that Christian had served the full sentence for the second count by the time the trial court resentenced her in July 2016, so the trial court couldn’t order the second count to be served consecutively to the fifth count at the resentencing.
The Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Trial Courts Resentence Defendants as if Sentencing for First Time, State Argues
Quoting earlier Ohio Supreme Court cases, the prosecutor explains that any case remanded for resentencing results in a “de novo” sentencing hearing, meaning the court sentences as if the first time. Only the sentences for the offenses affected by the error are newly sentenced, while the sentences not affected by the error aren’t subject to review, the prosecutor states.
In Christian’s case, the sentences for the second, third, and fifth counts were remanded for resentencing, and the prosecutor argues that trial courts resentence defendants as if they never have been sentenced previously. The trial court had discretion to issue new sentences that were either concurrent or consecutive, the prosecutor maintains.
The Second District relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Holdcraft (2013), a case involving postrelease control. Holdcraft states, “Neither this court’s jurisprudence nor Ohio’s criminal-sentencing statutes allow a trial court to resentence a defendant for an offense when the defendant has already completed the prison sanction for that offense.” The prosecutor argues, though, that the Second District improperly extended Holdcraft to the circumstances in this case. While a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, there is no expectation of finality when a sentence is subject to direct review on appeal, the prosecutor argues.
“Because Christian’s sentence was subject to direct review, it could be modified, and in fact was required to be modified by the trial court due to the Second District’s remand,” the prosecutor’s brief to the Supreme Court states. “Christian did not have a legitimate expectation of finality and, therefore, Christian could not have completed her void prison term for Count II at the time of the re-sentencing.”
The prosecutor adds that, at resentencing, Christian received credit toward her new sentences for the time she already has served in prison.
Defendants Can’t Be Resentenced if Prison Time Completed, Restaurant Owner Asserts
Christian agrees with the Second District’s conclusion that she already served her sentences for the first four counts by the time the trial court resentenced her in July 2016. She had been in prison for four years at that time, she notes. The Second District stated, “We reject the conceptual fiction that a complete but voided sentence has no legal existence. Otherwise, years served on such counts would be subject to being served twice.”
Christian argues the trial court improperly decided that the second and fifth counts should be served consecutively to protect the public, even though the facts of her case hadn’t changed.
Describing the trial court’s actions as a “particular brand of mischief,” Christian’s brief states, “The trial court restacked the sentencing blocks to achieve a particular result even though all legal requirements pointed elsewhere.”
In her view, her sentences, though voided, must have meaning when she has completed them. Sentences are voided not because of a defendant’s mistake or neglect, but because of a trial court error or an action by a prosecutor, Christian states. In her case, the mistaken sentences occurred because the prosecutor didn’t adjust the charges based on changes made in H.B. 86, and the trial court imposed the sentences without accounting for those legislative changes. She maintains that she now must serve her sentence on the second count twice because of the prosecutor’s and trial court’s mistakes.
If the state prevails on this issue, prosecutors and trial courts will be incentivized to let void sentences go into effect and if an appeal goes against them, such as in this case when certain sentences were reduced, the court will be able to issue all new sentences, Christian argues. She asks the Supreme Court to vacate the new sentences and send the case back to the trial court to resentence her on the fifth count, which is the only sentence that she hadn’t completed when she was resentenced.
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office: Heather Jans, 937.496.7609
Representing Eva Christian: Brock Schoenlein, 937.224.0039
Did Village Council’s Secret Vote Violate Open Meetings Law?
State ex rel. More Bratenahl, et al. v. Village of Bratenahl, et al., Case no. 2018-0440
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Does a public body violate the Ohio Open Meetings Act when it votes on matters of public business using secret ballots?
BACKGROUND:
In January 2015, the Bratenahl Village Council conducted a regular council meeting. Patricia Meade, who published a community news publication — MOREbratenahl — attended the meeting. Council business that evening included the selection of a president pro tempore, which the village describes as a mostly ceremonial position. The village’s president pro tempore serves as the acting mayor if the village’s mayor isn’t able to conduct village business.
At the meeting, one council member indicated the village’s protocol has been to select the president pro tempore by secret ballot. Another member questioned whether it was legal under Ohio law. The council proceeded with the secret ballot process that ultimately required three rounds because of some confusion. At the meeting, the ballots were submitted to the village solicitor, who announced the winner, but didn’t state how each council member voted.
In January 2016, Meade, citing R.C. 121.22(I)(1), filed a lawsuit against the village seeking a declaratory judgment that the secret ballot voting violated the Ohio Open Meetings Act (OMA), and asked for an injunction that would prohibit the village from using secret ballots in the future. Her lawsuit also sought a financial penalty from the village and Meade’s reasonable attorney fees.
The village requested summary judgment from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, arguing that council complied with the law. The trial court ruled in the village’s favor, and Meade appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Meade appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Secret Actions in Public Violates Law, Publisher Argues
Meade notes that R.C. 121.22, known as the Open Meetings Act, indicates the law is to be “liberally construed to require public officials to take official action and conduct all deliberations upon official business only in open meetings unless the subject matter is specifically excepted by law.” While the use of secret ballots isn’t discussed in the OMA, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found violations of the law even when the conduct was not specifically identified but appeared to violate the “spirit” of the act, Meade asserts.
The publisher maintains that selection of a president pro tempore is official public business and a requirement in the Ohio Revised Code, making it subject to the OMA. Meade cites a 2011 Ohio attorney general opinion sought by the Ohio Board of Education that asked if it could vote by secret ballot. The opinion stated that a “public body” subject to the OMA can’t vote by secret ballot at an open meeting.
Meade also relies on the Fifth District Court of Appeals’ 1998 Manogg v. Stickle decision, in which township trustees whispered and passed notes to prevent the audience from understanding the actions they were taking. The Fifth District found that the OMA requires more than just allowing the public to sit in the same room as the officials, but mandates that the officers allow the public to ascertain how they voted.
The Bratenahl council members didn’t attach their names to the ballots, and Meade argues there was no way to know from the minutes of the meeting how council members voted. It wasn’t until after she filed the lawsuit that the village provided its version of how the council members voted, and Meade contends that even now the village hasn’t provided an accurate count.
Meade objects to the Eighth District’s conclusion that Bratenahl officials didn’t intend to keep the vote secret because it published the results in its minutes. The publisher counters that the village never complied with the law by including how members voted, and that the OMA doesn’t exempt officials from compliance based on their intent. Meade concludes that the Eighth District’s holding impacts far more than an officer vote in Bratenahl. If not reversed, it would allow all public bodies in Ohio to vote by secret ballot on any issue, she contends. If that were allowed “there would be no public scrutiny or accountability,” she maintains, and voters would be “left in the dark.”
Meetings Law Not Violated, Village Asserts
The village argues that the council conducted an anonymous vote and immediately announced the vote tally results in public. It states that neither the OMA nor any state statute prohibits anonymous ballot voting by public bodies, and that the burden of proving a meetings act violation is on Meade. The village argues she hasn’t proved the village broke the law.
The village explains that while courts must construe the open meetings law liberally, the courts can’t “interpret a statute to mean what it does not state,” and that no Ohio law mentions a voting procedure for the selection of a president pro tempore.
The village argues the Attorney General’s 2011 opinion doesn’t apply to the situation because that issue involved the state board of education, which never intended to make the secret ballots public. And it maintains the Manogg decision has no impact because the trustees in that case intended to conceal their votes from the public. In contrast, the village maintains there was no intent to conceal public business. The tally of the council’s vote results were announced immediately in open session and the ballots were made part of the public record, the village concludes.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief
An amicus curiae brief supporting Meade’s position has been jointly submitted by the Ohio Coalition for Open Government, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and the Ohio Association of Broadcasters.
- Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing More Bratenahl et al.: Curt Hartman: 513.379.2923
Representing Village of Bratenahl et al.: David Matty, 216.621.6570
Applicant, a 1988 Law School Graduate, Seeks Admission to Practice Law for Fourth Time
In re Application of Gillian Holzhauser-Graber, Case no. 2018-1425
Board of Commissioners on Character & Fitness
The Board of Commissioners on Character & Fitness recommends that the Ohio Supreme Court reject Gillian Holzhauser-Graber’s 2016 application to be admitted to practice law in the state. Holzhauser-Graber, who graduated from law school in 1988, has applied for admission four times. Based on omissions in her most recent application and her testimony at a character and fitness hearing, the board determined that Holzhauser-Graber didn’t sufficiently demonstrate that she has the required character and fitness to practice law.
Noting that Holzhauser-Graber took the bar exam a second time in 1991 and those results were sealed because she hadn’t met the profession’s character and fitness requirements, the board also suggests that the Supreme Court now release her 1991 bar exam results.
Woman’s First Application to Practice Law Rejected
Candidates who want to practice law in Ohio must submit a registration application, which requires complete disclosure of many aspects of the candidate’s past. In addition, local bar associations conduct character and fitness interviews of candidates, and the board holds hearings in certain circumstances.
Holzhauser-Graber’s journey to join the Ohio bar began in 1988. That year, the Ohio Northern University College of Law graduate gave false testimony at a hearing before a panel of the character and fitness board. The board disapproved her application and recommended that she not be permitted to sit for the bar exam until at least February 1991. However, because Holzhauser-Graber has a vision impairment, the Supreme Court gave her special permission to take the bar exam in February 1989. The Court ordered that the results remain sealed until the same time all the early 1991 bar exam results were released if she met the required character, fitness, and moral qualifications.
In January 1991, the Findlay/Hancock County Bar Association found that Holzhauser-Graber demonstrated the necessary character and fitness, and the board agreed. However, she didn’t pass the bar exam.
Applicant Takes Bar Exam for Second Time
She retook the test in July 1991. Before those results were released, the bar association’s acting president informed the board about a personal-injury lawsuit Holzhauser-Graber filed against Blanchard Valley Hospital. Holzhauser-Graber acknowledged that she lied in her testimony in that suit. The board recommended that the Supreme Court deny her application and permanently prohibit her from reapplying to practice law. Based on testimony from Holzhauser-Graber’s psychologist, the Court in 1993 decided, however, to allow her to reapply in two years if she continued counseling and underwent another fitness and character evaluation after the waiting period. The Court ordered the sealing of her July 1991 bar exam results, which remain sealed.
In 1995, the board recommended Holzhauser-Graber’s admission, but the Court, without explanation, declined to adopt the recommendation. The Court’s February 1996 order stated that she couldn’t reapply for another two years.
Woman Reapplies for Admission to Ohio Bar Twice More
Holzhauser-Graber reapplied in 1998, but the bar association raised concerns about her suspected role in hiding her father’s assets to make him eligible for financial assistance from a church pension board. The bar association denied her application in 2000, and she didn’t appeal. She reapplied again in 2013, but the bar association noted that she didn’t disclose the Blanchard Valley Hospital case in her application, and she then mischaracterized the litigation when questioned. She appealed the bar association’s disapproval but then withdrew her appeal.
Candidate Encounters Issues with 2016 Application
She filed her most recent application in 2016. While she disclosed most of her earlier applications for admission, she didn’t note her 2013 application and its denial. In addition, she didn’t disclose her involvement in two 1984 Hancock County probate court matters, which she had never disclosed on any application. She supplemented her application with additional details, but didn’t offer an explanation why she hadn’t noted them in her application.
Although she had personal references and treating psychologists testify on her behalf, the board’s panel stated that this support for her didn’t outweigh its concern about her ability to be honest and forthright as an attorney. The board determined that Holzhauser-Graber didn’t show by clear and convincing evidence that she has the current character and fitness to practice law, and the board disapproved her admission to the Ohio bar.
Holzhauser-Graber is entitled to an automatic review of this decision on the record before the Supreme Court.
Applicant Argues She Is Rehabilitated
In her objections, Holzhauser-Graber points to the testimony from four psychological experts, who indicated she has faced her earlier issues making untruthful statements and who believe she presents the character and fitness to practice law. She also describes the support various personal references, including church officials and an attorney, made in support of her admission.
She notes that the lawsuits at issue were resolved many years before her 2016 application, and she maintains that their omission from her application doesn’t reveal a lack of candor with the board. She states that she subsequently submitted the entire case files from those cases to the board. She argues that she has rehabilitated herself with extensive therapy and is fit to practice law in Ohio.
She asks the Court to admit her to the bar if she passed the bar exam, and offered to submit to monitoring for the first few years. Alternatively, she asks that she not be forever barred from being admitted to practice law and that her bar exam results be released.
Bar Association Sees Pattern of Deceit and Omission
The bar association filed a written answer to Holzhauser-Graber’s objections, but has waived its opportunity to participate in oral argument. In its response, the bar association states that the 30-year procedural history in this case shows a “pervasive pattern of lies and omissions.” Noting that Holzhauser-Graber was 32 years old when she first lied to the board’s panel in 1988, the bar association argues that her lack of candor isn’t youthful indiscretion.
Also, Holzhauser-Graber doesn’t address in her objections any reasons for her failure to disclose past court cases in her most recent application or why she was less than candid in hearings, the bar association notes. Nor does the positive testimony of the psychologists and personal references invalidate her conduct in the admissions process, the organization maintains.
The bar association argues Holzhauser-Graber hasn’t shown candor or evidence of rehabilitation. It asks the Court not to approve her application, and concludes that, after 30 years, Holzhauser-Graber should be prohibited from reapplying again for admission to practice law in Ohio.
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Gillian Holzhauser-Graber: F. Stephen Chamberlain, 419.235.5125
Representing Findlay/Hancock County Bar Association: Christian Pedersen, 419.422.5688
Did Zoning Commission Correctly Assess Evidence When Denying Request to Mine for Sand and Gravel?
Shelly Materials Inc. v. City of Streetsboro Planning and Zoning Commission et al., Case no. 2018-0237
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Portage County)
ISSUEs:
- Must a common pleas court reverse a decision by an administrative body if the court finds any one of the statutory grounds for reversal has been met?
- Does an appeals court exceed its authority to address “questions of law” when it considers evidence presented to an administrative body?
BACKGROUND:
There are three active sand and gravel mines in Streetsboro and 12 active permits in the Portage County area surrounding the city. In June 2015, Shelly Materials Inc. obtained the mineral rights to about 226 acres of land in Streetsboro commonly known as Sahbra Farms. To the north of the farm is an existing 160-acre surface mine and processing operation. To the south are residential properties. Sahbra Farms is in an area zoned as “rural-residential” by Streetsboro. Since 1981, surface mining is a permitted “conditional use” of land within a rural-residential district.
In April 2016, Shelly applied for a conditional use certificate from the Streetsboro Planning and Zoning Commission to mine the Sahbra Farm’s site. Prior to applying for the certificate, Shelly conducted a public meeting to explain the proposal to mine the area during the next 30 to 50 years. The meeting prompted landowners to form a group called “Stop Sahbra Dig.” Prior to Shelly’s formal application submission, the citizens group petitioned the planning and zoning commission to remove surface mining as a conditional use from the city zoning code. The commission recommended to Streetsboro City Council that surface mining be removed as an approved land use, and council enacted the zoning code change in June 2016.
The commission conducted hearings on Shelly’s application with the final hearing taking place after the new zoning code took effect. At the hearings, Shelly provided several expert witnesses who provided reports and testified that mining would have no adverse impact on the surrounding properties. Paul Bidwell, a certified residential and commercial appraiser hired by Shelly, reported that the surface mining would have no adverse impact on the values of the homes in the immediate area.
The opponents of the permit didn’t provide any expert witnesses, but the Streetsboro planning director and the Portage County Regional Planning Commission director testified that property values would be negatively impacted by the project. One of the residential neighbors to the farm submitted an appraisal he commissioned for his home, which projected a 30 percent loss in value if the mining were approved.
The commission denied the permit, and Shelly appealed to the Portage County Common Pleas Court. A magistrate conducted hearings on the matter and, in March 2017, ruled in Shelly’s favor. The commission objected, and a Portage County trial judge conducted additional hearings. The judge ordered the commission to issue a permit to Shelly in May 2017. The commission appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, which in a 2-1 decision reversed the lower court.
Shelly appealed the Eleventh District’s decision, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.
Company Argues Trial Court Applied Law
Shelly’s arguments include its insistence that the trial court met the standard in Ohio law to reverse the commission’s decision, and that the Eleventh District exceeded its authority to overrule the trial court.
Shelly notes that R.C. 2506.04 lists conditions that allow a trial court to overturn an administrative decision. The Portage County trial court could overturn the zoning commission if it found the decision was:
- unconstitutional
- illegal
- arbitrary
- capricious
- unreasonable or
- unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record.
Shelly maintains the trial court met more than one of the legal standards in R.C. 2506.04. The trial court ruled the commission’s actions were “arbitrary and capricious” by finding the commission was trying to retroactively apply the new change to the zoning code to outlaw surface mining. The trial court also found that the preponderance of evidence on the whole record indicated Shelly met all the application standards to receive a permit. Shelly argues that meeting more than one standard is more than enough for the trial court to correctly overturn the commission.
Shelly also explains that lawmakers had good reason not to require the applicant meet more than one standard. It notes that an administrative decision might be unconstitutional yet supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In that situation, a trial court should be allowed to overrule the administrative body, Shelly maintains.
Shelly argues the Eleventh District didn’t follow the law. The company maintains the appellate court turned the law on its head by finding that an administrative ruling must meet two standards — be unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable and not be supported by the evidence. It argues that the Eleventh District reversed the trial court because it believed the commission’s decision was supported by the evidence.
Appeals Court Should Rely on Trial Court’s Determination, Company Maintains
Shelly maintains the Eleventh District has no legal right to second-guess the trial court. The company notes the magistrate and trial court wrote that the commission relied on “highly emotional” and “not scientific data” from non-expert witnesses to counter Bidwell’s appraisal that found property values wouldn’t be negatively impacted. Shelly argues that the law gives the trial court the right to consider the evidence in the case and make a determination whether the commission’s decision should be reversed. It maintains the appeals court had no right to re-examine Bidwell’s appraisal and conclude that the commission was within its rights to consider it unreliable.
Shelly notes that R.C. 2506.04 states the trial court decision may be appealed by “any party on questions of law.”
The company argues the dispute over the validity of Bidwell’s appraisal is not a question of law, and the Eleventh District’s review of the appraisal was beyond its scope. Shelly asserts the appellate court needed to accept the factual findings of the trial court, which found Bidwell’s appraisal was sufficient. The company argues that regardless of whether the appeals court finds Bidwell’s evidence was not sufficient enough to grant the permit, the trial court still had the authority to overturn the commission. Shelly asserts that because the trial court found the city acted with the unlawful intent to ban surface mining, the court had the authority under R.C. 2506.04 to require the commission to issue the permit.
Permits Rightly Rejected, Commission Maintains
The commission noted that under its zoning process, Shelly had to prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that it met all six requirements to receive a conditional use permit. The commission found it failed to meet several requirements, including that the proposal “will not be detrimental to property in the immediate vicinity or the community as a whole.” The commission maintained that Bidwell’s appraisal was flawed. The Eleventh District also focused on the property-value standard and ruled that if Shelly failed to prove it met this standard, the commission could deny the permit regardless of whether it met the other five standards. The commission notes the Eleventh District wasn’t required to accept Bidwell’s evidence, even if no other expert testified.
The commission maintains that while the city planning director and the regional planning commission director are not appraisers, their years of experience about the effect of permits on property values was competent testimony. The commission also argues Bidwell’s admissions of shortfalls when cross-examined also justified the commission’s conclusion that Shelly failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that it met the property-value standard.
The commission argues that the trial court had a duty to defer to the findings of the commission, which heard the arguments on the permit. The agency maintains the trial court provided no evidence to support its finding that the commission didn’t have “substantial, reliable, and probative evidence” to support its permit denial.
The commission also counters Shelly’s argument that the Eleventh District exceeded its authority. The commission maintains the appellate court addressed only legal questions and the court is permitted to examine the evidence, such as Bidwell’s testimony and report, to reach an opinion on the legal question. The Eleventh District found the trial court didn’t follow the law and correctly overruled it, the commission concludes.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting Shelly’s position has been jointly submitted by the Ohio Chamber of Commerce; NAIOP (formerly known as the National Association of Industrial and Office Properties) of Ohio, Inc.; the National Federation of Independent Business; the Ohio Chemistry and Technology Council; the Ohio Aggregates and Industrial Minerals Association; the National Stone, Sand and Gravel Association; Flexible Pavements of Ohio; the Ohio Ready Mixed Concrete Association; the Ohio Forestry Association; the Ohio Home Builders Association; and the Ohio Contractors Association.
- Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Shelly Materials Inc.: Reginald Jackson, 419.241.6000
Representing the City of Streetsboro Planning and Zoning Commission et al.: Robert Cahill, 216.928.2200
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