Court News Ohio
Court News Ohio
Court News Ohio

Tuesday, June 11, 2019

State of Ohio v. Ronald Boaston, Case no. 2018-0364
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)

State of Ohio ex rel. the Cincinnati Enquirer v. Honorable Donald E. Oda II, Case no. 2018-0506
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Warren County)

Barry L. Browne et al. v. Artex Oil Company et al., Case no. 2018-0942
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Guernsey County)

Ohio State Bar Association v. Watkins Global Network LLC et al., Case no. 2019-0008
Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law


Did Prosecutor Provide Required Report about Expert Testimony to Defense?

State of Ohio v. Ronald Boaston, Case no. 2018-0364
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)

ISSUE: Under the rules for criminal proceedings, must a written report outlining the anticipated nature of expert testimony be provided to the opposing party no later than 21 days before trial?

BACKGROUND:
Ronald Boaston and Brandi Gonyer-Boaston married in 2005, and divorced in 2006. They later reunited and moved in together in west Toledo with the two children from their marriage and three children from other relationships.

In early February 2014, Gonyer-Boaston moved out. Her mother and co-workers said Gonyer-Boaston told them she and Boaston argued and he tried to drown her in the bathtub. While living with her mother, Gonyer-Boaston returned to Boaston’s home regularly to help the children do homework and get ready for school.

After finishing her night shift as a nurse, Gonyer-Boaston left work about 7 a.m. on Feb. 14, 2014. She bought two sausage breakfast sandwiches at a fast-food restaurant and drove to Boaston’s home to prepare the kids for school. Boaston stated that she arrived about 7:30 a.m. and left near 10:30 a.m.

The Fulton County Sheriff’s Department was alerted the next morning to a vehicle stopped in the county on the side of a road with the engine running. The sergeant who investigated found a dead woman – later identified as Gonyer-Boaston – in the back of her SUV.

Prosecutor Provides Autopsy Report and Photographs
Boaston was indicted in Lucas County for murder in April 2014. The prosecutor’s office states that it gave the autopsy report to Boaston’s attorney a year before Boaston’s September 2015 trial. The report described Gonyer-Boaston’s stomach contents, the prosecutor notes, and discovery provided to defense counsel included photographs comparing a buckle on a glove Boaston owned with a distinct abrasion under Gonyer-Boaston’s chin.

Nineteen days before trial, Boaston’s attorney spoke with deputy coroner Dr. Diane Scala-Barnett. Boaston’s attorney learned the deputy coroner planned to testify that, based on the stomach contents, Gonyer-Boaston must have died within two hours of eating the breakfast sandwich. Based on Boaston telling police that Gonyer-Boaston ate about 7:30 a.m., the deputy coroner indicated that Gonyer-Boaston died at Boaston’s home before the time he said she left. The deputy coroner also conveyed that the chin bruise was caused by a glove buckle similar to Boaston’s.

Objections Raised about Coroner’s Testimony
At trial, Boaston’s attorney objected to Scala-Barnett’s testimony, arguing that the conclusions drawn from the stomach contents and about the glove buckle weren’t contained in her autopsy report from the year before. The court overruled the objections.

In September 2015, a jury found Boaston guilty of murder. The court sentenced him to 15 years to life in prison.

He appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court’s decision. The Ohio Supreme Court agreed to review the issue whether criminal rules about expert testimony were followed. Boaston and the Lucas County Prosecutor’s Office disagree about the application of Rule 16(K) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure to this case.

Criminal Rule: Expert Witnesses and Reports
Rule 16(K) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
“(K) Expert Witnesses; Reports. An expert witness for either side shall prepare a written report summarizing the expert witness’s testimony, findings, analysis, conclusions, or opinion, and shall include a summary of the expert’s qualifications. The written report and summary of qualifications shall be subject to disclosure under this rule no later than twenty-one days prior to trial, which period may be modified by the court for good cause shown, which does not prejudice any other party. Failure to disclose the written report to opposing counsel shall preclude the expert’s testimony at trial.”

Criminal Rule: Expert Witnesses and Reports
Rule 16(K) of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
“(K) Expert Witnesses; Reports. An expert witness for either side shall prepare a written report summarizing the expert witness’s testimony, findings, analysis, conclusions, or opinion, and shall include a summary of the expert’s qualifications. The written report and summary of qualifications shall be subject to disclosure under this rule no later than twenty-one days prior to trial, which period may be modified by the court for good cause shown, which does not prejudice any other party. Failure to disclose the written report to opposing counsel shall preclude the expert’s testimony at trial.”

Prosecutor Didn’t Adhere to Criminal Rules for Expert Testimony, Boaston States
Boaston argues the deputy coroner never supplied the required written report explaining the scientific basis for her conclusion that Gonyer-Boaston died within two hours after eating or for the determination that his glove buckle could have caused the chin injury. Because the prosecutor didn’t provide any written reports about this expert testimony – let alone providing the reports at least 21 days before trial – Crim.R. 16(K) clearly prohibited the deputy coroner’s testimony on these issues at trial, Boaston maintains.

He indicates that the autopsy report described only the cause of death. Without the expert report described in Crim.R. 16(K), the deputy coroner could testify about the stomach contents, but not about her interpretation of what the contents meant as far as determining Gonyer-Boaston’s time of death, Boaston argues. However, Boaston’s brief states, the deputy coroner’s testimony – particularly about time of death – was key in suggesting his guilt and had a critical role in the trial’s outcome.

As for the glove-buckle testimony, Boaston asserts that the deputy coroner’s conclusion was “conjecture” and should have been substantiated in a written report, which would have detailed the scientific basis for the conclusion.

He suspects that some state appellate courts are interpreting Crim.R. 16(K) as discretionary, rather than mandatory, based on the version of the rule in effect before 2010. Without the written reports, the deputy coroner’s testimony on these issues had to be excluded at his trial under the post-2010 version of the rule, Boaston states. He concludes he is entitled to a new trial without the admission of the time-of-death and glove-buckle expert testimony that didn’t conform to Crim.R. 16.

Defense Knew about Coroner’s Expected Testimony, State Argues
The prosecutor maintains that the autopsy report, which was supplied a year before Boaston’s trial, satisfied Crim.R. 16. Even if it’s thought that the deputy coroner testified about opinions that weren’t in the autopsy report, the prosecutor suggests that a single additional sentence in the autopsy report about the victim’s time of death and the glove buckle would have met Crim.R. 16’s requirements. But, the office contends, defense counsel obtained more information from talking with the coroner 19 days before trial than would have been provided in an expert testimony written report. The prosecutor adds that Ohio courts have ruled that such testimony is permitted when it’s a logical extension of the expert’s area of expertise and doesn’t result in unfair surprise.

“Testimony regarding the approximate window of the time of death was at most a supplement to the opinions contained in the report, and the trial court could properly exercise its discretion in admitting the testimony, particularly when it was apparent that defense counsel knew the substance of the testimony well in advance of trial,” the prosecutor’s brief states.

The prosecutor also states that appellate courts have allowed materials other than a “written report” to meet Crim.R. 16’s requirements – including medical records and a transcript of an expert’s testimony in a related case. The office additionally indicates that Crim.R. 16 offers trial courts remedies for violations of the rule other than excluding the testimony. Specifically, Crim.R. 16(L)(1) allows trial courts to permit discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, bar the introduction of the questioned evidence, or make other orders deemed just, the prosecutor maintains.

In the prosecutor’s view, Boaston can’t demonstrate that this testimony affected the trial’s outcome. Other evidence – including the couple’s “tumultuous relationship,” Boaston’s use of software to monitor Gonyer-Boaston’s text messages and phone, and the event timeline – supported the verdict, the office argues.

Lawyer Group Supports Boaston’s Arguments
An amicus curiae brief supporting Boaston’s position was submitted by the Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, which maintains that the language of Crim.R. 16(K) doesn’t give trial courts the discretion to ignore the stated remedy that testimony must be excluded when one side doesn’t provide the required report from an expert witness.

- Kathleen Maloney

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Contacts
Representing Ronald Boaston: Stephen Hanudel, 440.328.8973

Representing the State of Ohio from the Lucas County Prosecutor’s Office: Evy Jarrett, 419.340.5931

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Was Gag Order for Participants in Teenage Girl’s Trial for Murder Warranted?

State of Ohio ex rel. the Cincinnati Enquirer v. Honorable Donald E. Oda II, Case no. 2018-0506
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Warren County)

ISSUES:

  • When a gag order is directed at trial participants in a criminal case and not to media outlets, is there less consideration of free speech rights in determining whether there is substantial probability that absent the gag order, a fair trial may be compromised?
  • If there is a lower standard, did a trial judge make sufficient findings to support the issuance of a gag order?

BACKGROUND:
Brooke Richardson was 18 years old when she was charged with murdering her newborn baby and burying the baby in her backyard. The case has drawn significant media coverage in southwestern Ohio where the incident occurred. Warren County Common Pleas Judge Donald Oda II is presiding over the case. In August 2017, Judge Oda issued a gag order preventing participants in the trial, including attorneys, witnesses, and law enforcement officers, from speaking to the news media about Richardson’s case. The order didn’t prevent the media from otherwise covering the trial and noted that news outlets can attend any court proceeding and observe courthouse activity.

The Cincinnati Enquirer objected to the order, and Judge Oda conducted an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the only piece of evidence was a listing of internet links to local news stories compiled by Judge Oda demonstrating the extensive pretrial coverage the case had received. Judge Oda then issued a final order, which included: his findings of fact that attorneys were expressing opinions and observations that may not be presented as evidence in the trial; that investigators and prospective witnesses made statements that may not be true or admissible in court; and that the court can reasonably conclude that parties in the case will continue to make public statements. Judge Oda ruled the statements were a “serious and imminent threat” to selecting a jury pool and were compromising the court’s ability to conduct a fair trial. He indicated he considered less-restrictive alternatives, but none would accomplish the goal other than the participant gag order.

The Enquirer sought a writ of prohibition from the Twelfth District Court of Appeals to prevent Judge Oda’s order from taking effect. In February 2018, the Twelfth District granted the writ, ruling there wasn’t sufficient evidence to indicate a gag order was necessary.

Judge Oda appealed the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to consider the case.

Issuance of Gag Order Reasonable, Judge Maintains
Judge Oda argues the appeals court used a too strict standard when considering if he sufficiently considered free speech protections before concluding a gag order was necessary. He noted that precedent exists in federal law and in some states that allows for a less-stringent test of free speech rights when a gag order is directed to non-media participants, such as attorneys. He cites the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1991 Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada decision, in which the court stated that the speech of lawyers representing clients in cases may be regulated “under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press.”

Judge Oda explains that Ohio has applied a test developed in the Ohio Supreme Court’s 1976 State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Kainrad decision to cases concerning gag orders. In Kainrad, the Court found a trial court couldn’t consider a gag order unless it clearly appears a defendant's right to a fair trial will be jeopardized and there is no other recourse within the power of the court to protect the defendant's rights.

The Kainrad decision required a court to conduct a hearing and make a finding that all other measures within the court’s power wouldn’t ensure a fair trial.

Judge Oda argues that Kainrad still appears to be the standard used in the state when considering a gag order directed at parties in the case and not the media. He maintains a judge is required to determine if there is “substantial probability” that the defendant will be prejudiced by the pretrial publicity before issuing the order, and he concludes that there was.

Judge Oda argues that under this test, he met the standard that evidence must appear “clearly in the record” that demonstrates the media coverage is compromising the ability to conduct a fair trial. He notes that his order indicated that, at the time he issued it, he found the coverage to be “remarkably fair” to the extent that representatives on both the state’s and Richardson’s sides of the case had opportunities to comment on their positions. Yet, the fairness of the trial will be compromised if the statements outside of court by the parties continued, he ruled.

Judge Oda argues the Twelfth District disregarded the news articles, which he maintains was part of the evidence demonstrating a threat to a fair trial. He concludes that he did make specific findings by pointing to statements made by trial participants that could jeopardize the trial and he drew rational inferences from the evidence that a gag order was necessary.

Newspaper Asserts Gag Order Unnecessary
The Enquirer argues there is no lower standard of free speech consideration for gag orders regarding party participants, although courts have been given more leeway to place gag orders on “court personnel,” which isn’t an issue in this case. The newspaper maintains the Twelfth District reached the right conclusion because Judge Oda didn’t produce any evidence from the record, but rather a list of random examples of balanced reporting about the trial. The Enquirer states that Judge Oda is seeking no standard at all, but rather speculating about what potentially could happen.

The newspaper argues the Ohio Supreme Court standard requires more than proof of publicity, which Judge Oda produced, but also evidence that the publicity would compromise a fair trial. The Enquirer asserts that the judge never provided sufficient reasons why less-restrictive means, such as changing venue or delaying the trial until media interest died down, weren’t better solutions than a gag order.

The Enquirer maintains that the First Amendment requires public and press access to criminal proceedings and the right to speak to party participants who chose to talk about the case. A court may limit that right only if there is a “compelling need and no less restrictive alternative,” the newspaper argues, and concludes that Judge Oda failed to provide evidence to support the gag order.

- Dan Trevas

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Contacts
Representing Judge Donald E. Oda II: Mark Weaver, 614.221.2121

Representing the Cincinnati Enquirer: John Greiner, 513.629.2734

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How Long Does Landowner Have to Terminate Oil and Gas Lease When Claiming Lack of Production?

Barry L. Browne et al. v. Artex Oil Company et al., Case no. 2018-0942
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Guernsey County)

ISSUES:

  • When a landowner wants to terminate an oil and gas lease under the lease’s provisions regarding lack of production in paying quantities, is the applicable statute of limitations 21 years?
  • When considering the statute of limitations for terminating an oil and gas lease for lack of production, does the time clock begin to run when a “justiciable controversy” arises?

OVERVIEW:
In 2015, the Ohio Supreme Court explained that an oil and gas lease is both a contract and a conveyance of property rights. The leases “straddle the line between property and contract,” the Court stated in Chesapeake Exploration LLC v. Buell. In this case, the landowner requests that the matter should be resolved by using a statute of limitations that applies to a property dispute. The oil and gas explorer is arguing the statute of limitations that applies to a contract dispute should be used.

BACKGROUND:
Barry and Rose Browne own 86 acres in Guernsey County that they bought in 2012. In 1975, the previous owner, Mary Mercer, signed an oil and gas lease that allowed for Mammoth Production Company to operate a well on the property. The terms of the lease were typical for the oil and gas industry. It had a one-year primary term requiring the company to drill a well within a year, and a secondary term known as a “habendum clause,” which allowed the lease to continue as long as the well produced oil or gas “in paying quantities.” In 1999, Artex Oil Company acquired the well from Johnson Oil and Gas. Artex’s records indicate it produced about 1,800 barrels of oil and gas from 1999 to 2014, earning about $100,000 in revenues from the sales. It paid royalties to the landowners for the mineral sales.

The Brownes’ research of the well indicated that the oil companies didn’t report to the Ohio Department of Natural Resources any production of oil or gas from the time the well was completed in 1977 until 1999. The couple obtained a chart from Mammoth indicating declining production from 1977 to 1980 and no production from 1986 to 1996.

Couple Seeks to Terminate Lease
The Brownes filed a lawsuit against Artex and other related companies in December 2014, seeking to declare the lease terminated for lack of production. The couple asked the Guernsey County Common Pleas Court to terminate the lease, pay them damages for conversion of minerals extracted after the lease expired, and pay restitution for unjust enrichment from the sale of oil and gas. The Brownes alleged the well hadn’t produced anything commercially from 1981 until 1999, and there were periods after 1999 when it didn’t produce at all. The lack of production triggered the secondary term of the lease, requiring the well to produce in paying quantities. When the well didn’t produce, the lease automatically terminated, the lawsuit asserted.

Artex asked the trial court for summary judgment, producing affidavits from the Mercer family and others that stated the well did produce oil during those 22 years after it was drilled and before Artex owned it. Artex produced documentation asserting the well met production requirements to keep the lease active during its entire time of ownership.

In its argument to the trial court, Artex characterized the dispute as a “breach of contract” claim by the Brownes, and argued the statute of limitations for bringing a contract claim at the time the lawsuit was filed was 15 years. Ohio has since reduced that time to eight years, the company notes. The Brownes countered that there was no “breach” of the contract, but rather the lease came to an end when production stopped. Under R.C. 2305.04, Ohio has a 21-year statute of limitations to file a lawsuit to recover the title or possession to real estate, and that applies to their case because they are seeking to recover title to the mineral rights.

The trial court sided with Artex, finding that since the 15-year statute of limitations was in effect, no evidence presented by the Brownes about what occurred prior to 1999 was relevant. The trial court ruled that Artex proved it complied with the lease and wouldn’t terminate it.

The Brownes appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s opinion, and the couple appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Supreme Court agreed to hear only the couple’s legal arguments that the 21-year statute of limitations applies, and that the time begins to run on the statute of limitations when the landowners learn the well stopped producing.

Landowners Argue Property Timeline Correct
The Brownes note that Ohio appeals courts have issued conflicting decisions on the question of whether the time a well stops producing should be considered a termination of the lease or a breach of the lease terms. Claims of breaching the lease would concern the contract side of an oil and gas lease and be governed by the 15-year statute of limitations. The Brownes argue that no breach occurred, but this lease, like all leases, has a termination date. The secondary term of an oil and gas lease terminates when production in paying quantities ends. At that point, the lease no longer is in effect, the couple maintains.

At the point the lease no longer was in effect, Artex had no rights under the terms of the lease to the oil and gas it was extracting, the couple argues. And with no lease in effect, the Brownes maintain they are entitled to sue for recovery of their property, including the oil and gas below it. The Brownes argue the lease transferred title of the oil and minerals to Artex and that their action is to recover the title to the minerals. The statute of limitations for recovering title is 21 years, and they are permitted to prove to a court that the well stopped producing oil within the 21 years before they filed their lawsuit. The couple also argues that since the lease automatically terminates when the well stops producing, the property rights revert to the landowners at that time. They note in some states because of this “automatic” transfer, there is no statute of limitations on the landowner’s right to retake control of the property.

The Brownes also note lower courts have taken varying views of when the statute of limitation clocks begin to run in well-termination cases. Some declare it starts at the time production stops, while others have started it when a “justiciable controversy” arises. The couple explains a justiciable controversy begins at the point the landowner should know that there is a dispute about whether the well is producing. The couple argues that because the oil companies operate the well and obtain the documentation regarding its operation, the landowners don’t receive any immediate notice of its production. The clock should begin when landowners are notified, which triggers their right to take legal action, they argue.

Shorter Time Limit Governs, Company Argues
Artex maintains the company and its predecessors have been in compliance with the terms of the habendum clause since the well’s inception and urges the Court to dismiss  the case. It argues that when there is a dispute about whether a well is producing, the issue is addressed by the contract provisions of the lease.

R.C. 2305.04 governs issues related to the recovery of “title” or “possession” of property, and Artex argues an oil and gas lease doesn’t grant a title to the drillers. The company notes that oil and gas “migrate” beneath the surface and don’t belong to any one landowner. The energy companies receive a right to “capture” the oil and gas, and they don’t acquire any ownership of the minerals until they possess them, Artex concludes.

Leasing mineral rights comes with the obligation to develop the property to produce minerals and the energy companies pay the landowners royalties when the gas or oil is produced and sold. Making that payment is governed by contract, the company argues, and the 15-year statute of limitations applies.

The company also maintains it doesn’t gain “possession” of the Browne’s property by the lease terms. It notes that under Ohio law, minerals are realty while they are in the earth and no one has actual possession of them while they are in the ground. The lease grants title of the oil and gas to the drilling companies, but the company doesn’t acquire title or possession of the minerals until they release them from the earth. At that point, the oil and gas become “personal property” of the energy companies, and aren’t real estate. The Brownes’ claim to cancel Artex’s lease isn’t aimed at recovering possession of “real property,” because Artex isn’t in possession of the oil and gas that lies below the Brownes’ property.

Artex argues that, from a property rights perspective, the right it obtains from a landowner is similar to an “easement” to come onto the land, construct wells to seek minerals, and leave with the substances. That right doesn’t give the drilling company a possessory interest in the land, and the 21-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.04 doesn’t apply.

Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting the Brownes’ position has been filed jointly by the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation and the Guernsey County Farm Bureau Federation. An amicus brief supporting Artex’s position has been submitted jointly by the Ohio Oil and Gas Association and the Southeastern Ohio Oil and Gas Association.

- Dan Trevas

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Contacts
Representing Barry L. Browne et al.: Ethan Vessels, 740.374.5346

Representing Artex Oil Company et al.: Daniel Corcoran, 740.373.5455

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Penalty Sought for Non-Lawyer Representing Small Businesses in Negotiating Debt Settlements

Ohio State Bar Association v. Watkins Global Network LLC et al., Case no. 2019-0008
Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law

The Board on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) recommends that the Ohio Supreme Court order a Columbus company and its owner pay a $31,000 penalty for negotiating debt settlements for small business owners and charging contingent fees for their work.

The UPL board maintains that a non-attorney can’t represent debtors in Ohio by advising, counseling, or negotiating settlements of their debts with creditors. The UPL charges that Mario W. Watkins, the owner and sole employee of Watkins Global Network, attempted to settle debts for a number of small businesses even though he isn’t an attorney. The UPL notes that Watkins registered the fictitious company name “Jones, Marco & Stein” so that his business appeared to be a law firm when sending letters to creditors. Watkins testified he did this because lawyers who received correspondence from him were more likely to open it, but points out the letters never indicated the company was a law firm.

Watkins, representing himself, maintains that he didn’t engage in practices only permitted by attorneys, but rather was conducting debt settlement functions that non-lawyers are legally permitted to do. He points to case law, cited by his former attorney, stating that the board had previously cleared another company of participating in the same type of collection action as Watkins Global.

Watkins Established Tax-Settlement Business
Watkins maintains he merely attempted to negotiate a debt settlement for one client, and that the 30 other charges against him by the board relate to tax debt settlements with local, state, and federal tax authorities. He argues he was entitled to negotiate tax debts for clients as a non-lawyer.

The board reported that Watkins charged the businesses a retainer ranging from $250 to $500 to ensure he would be paid for his services. If the debt wasn’t resolved with the creditor, the retainer was returned to the business. If the reduction offer was accepted, Watkins would collect a contingency fee of up to 35% of the amount of the debt reduction.

The Ohio State Bar Association filed a complaint against Watkins with the board, charging that between 2007 and 2013, he and his company and fictitious firm were engaged in the business of attempting to resolve and collect claims against the businesses by their creditors, and the actions were the unauthorized practice of law. Watkins agreed to halt the business after receiving the complaint.

Watkins counters that the taxing authorities aren’t creditors of the businesses, and under R.C. 1337.53 and R.C. 1321.45, he was authorized by the businesses to settle their tax debts. The UPL wrote that R.C. 1337.53 didn’t take effect until March 2012, and that Watkins didn’t comply with the terms of that law with any of the 31 entities he represented between 2007 and 2013.

The board also maintains that R.C. 1321.45 doesn’t apply to Watkins because it governs debt collection practices by entities attempting to collect a debt for their client. Watkins wasn’t collecting debts, but reducing debts owed to creditors by the companies he represented, the board concludes.

Collector Consults Lawyer for Advice
The board notes that Watkins was previously prosecuted by the Ohio Attorney General’s Office for unfair and deceptive acts by charging excessive fees, and other violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act and the Ohio Debt Adjustor Act. He was ordered to pay $16,000 in restitution.

The board states that Watkins ended his business representing homeowners facing foreclosure and opened Watkins Global to represent small businesses. He sought out legal advice to determine if he could provide the service.

Watkins received a legal analysis from a Columbus attorney who cited the UPL board’s December 2004 Cuyahoga Bar Association v. Margles et al. decision. The board concluded there wasn’t enough evidence to charge an inactive attorney who offered mediation services between debtors he found from public record searches and their creditors. The analysis provided to Watkins indicated the board ruled that “negotiations” alone aren’t enough to be considered the unauthorized practice of law. Watkins claims he was only negotiating debts and that is not enough to charge him with the unauthorized practice of law.

The analysis purported to inform Watkins that because the Supreme Court didn’t act on the Margles decision, it takes precedent over prior decisions that found negotiating a debt for another isn’t permitted by non-lawyers. Watkins argues it isn’t fair to charge him with violating the law when he reasonably relied on the advice of his attorney, who has since died, to conduct his business.

The board states that Margles was never “affirmed or accepted” by the Supreme Court as binding precedent, and that because of the unique set of circumstances, it didn’t charge respondent Margles with the unauthorized practice of law.

Bar Association Supports Penalty
The bar association objects to Watkins submitting the emails and correspondence with his former lawyer to the Court, arguing that Watkins is introducing them for the first time, and his arguments weren’t raised during the board’s proceedings.

The bar association maintains the findings against Watkins are supported by exhibits and Watkins’ sworn testimony. The bar association supports the board’s report and proposed penalty.

- Dan Trevas

Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.

Contacts
Representing the Ohio State Bar Association: Alvand Mokhtari, 614.561.2880

Representing Watkins Global Network et al.: Mario Watkins, number not available

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These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court's Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews are not part of the case record, and are not considered by the Court during its deliberations.

Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.