Wednesday, Dec. 8, 2021
Carleton Robert Arnold v. Spencer Township Board of Trustees
, Case no. 2020-1401
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
State of Ohio v. Guy Billy Lee Scott
, Case no. 2020-1583
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Butler County)
League of Women Voters of Ohio, et al. v. Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al., Case no. 2021-1193
Bria Bennett, et al. v. Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al., Case no. 2021-1198
The Ohio Organizing Collaborative, et al. v. Ohio Redistricting Commission, et al., Case no. 2021-1210
Is Employment Contract Between Township and Former Fire Chief Enforceable?
Carleton R. Arnold v. Spencer Township Board of Trustees, Case No. 2020-1401
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
ISSUE: May public employees enter into and enforce employment contracts with public employers?
BACKGROUND:
In 2013, Carlton Arnold started working as a paramedic at the Spencer Township Fire Department. Following promotions in 2014 and 2015, Arnold was appointed in June 2015 as the township’s acting fire chief.
Six months later, the Spencer Township Board of Trustees met and appointed Arnold as the fire chief. The township approved a resolution containing Arnold’s job description and an employment contract. The three-year contract – from Jan. 1, 2016, to Dec. 31, 2018 – included a severance clause, which stated: “Should the Township find it necessary to terminate Mr. Carleton R. Arnold, his severance pay is 80% of the remainder of the contract.”
On April 20, 2016, the township voted to close the fire department due to rising costs and to rescind Arnold’s contract. The fire chief’s position was abolished, and Arnold’s job ended on June 30, 2016.
After the township declined to pay the severance to Arnold, he sued the township in Lucas County Common Pleas Court in February 2017. He alleged that the township breached the employment contract. The court granted summary judgment to Arnold and ordered the township to pay him $77,024.49 in damages, interest, and costs.
The township appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, which in September 2020 reversed the trial court and instead granted summary judgment to the township. Arnold appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted the case.
Former Fire Chief Challenges Sixth District Rationale
The Sixth District relied on two Ohio Supreme Court decisions in its ruling – State ex rel. Gordon v. Barthalow (1948) and Fuldauer v. City of Cleveland (1972). In Barthalow, the city of Columbus was unable to pay the salaries of some city employees during the Great Depression. The employee salaries were set by city ordinance. City council decided in 1948 to pay the judgments on the employee claims by issuing bonds, but the city auditor rejected the approach, believing the judgments were based on contractual obligations. Bonds at the time could be issued on non-contractual, but not contractual, obligations.
The Court ruled the public employees held their jobs as a matter of law, not under a contract, so bonds could be issued to pay the judgments. Arnold notes that, unlike his case, the Columbus employees of seven decades ago had no formal employment contracts with the city. He contends that Barthalow doesn’t apply because the Court didn’t analyze whether formal employment contracts between public employees and employers would be valid.
Arnold also maintains that nothing in the state constitution or state laws prevents certain political subdivisions, such as townships, from exercising their authority to enter into contracts. R.C. 505.38(A) states: “The board [of township trustees] shall provide for the employment of firefighters as it considers best and shall fix their compensation.” To set his compensation, the township had the authority to enter into a contract with him to define the terms of his compensation, Arnold argues.
Arnold asserts that his view isn’t that he had a contractual right to his job or to continued employment with the township, but instead that the contract he and the township agreed to entitled him to the severance pay.
“When the Township breached the agreement, a garden variety contract dispute arose, subject to the basic [tenets] of contractual interpretation,” Arnold’s brief states.
Township Argues Contract with Fire Chief, Public Employees Not Allowed
The township responds that it didn’t have the authority to enter into the employment contract with Arnold. The township maintains that the only contracts political subdivisions can enter with public employees are established in statute – such as for teachers and sanitation district employees. If the General Assembly doesn’t state specifically that a public employer can make employment contracts with employees, then that right doesn’t exist, the township contends.
It argues state law allows it to set the fire chief’s compensation as a matter of law, not to enter into a contract with the chief. Entering into employment contracts with fire department employees isn’t one of the township’s powers, it maintains.
The township states that Barthalow and Fuldauer determined that public employees have no private property right to their employment or the job’s benefits. Given these rulings, the township asserts, Arnold doesn’t have a contractual right to his severance.
The township also maintains that Arnold’s contract was put into place through a resolution, which the board of trustees rescinded in April 2016, a few months before Arnold’s actual end date. Because the resolution was rescinded, its provisions can’t be enforced, the township states. Even if the Court determines the contract is enforceable, Arnold’s position was abolished when the fire department was shut down, so he wasn’t terminated, the township argues. It contends that the severance clause only took effect if Arnold was terminated.
The township’s brief argues Arnold “suffered no injustice” because he found employment and made more money than he would have made had the fire chief position not been eliminated. Any damages must be reduced by the wages he has earned in his subsequent jobs, the brief contends.
Employment Lawyers Ask Court for Clarity
The Ohio Employment Lawyers Association, which filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Arnold’s positions, asks the Court to clarify that Barthalow was interpreted too broadly by the Sixth District. Public employers today have extensive powers under the Ohio Constitution and statutes to hire and fire staff, to make contracts, and to sue and be sued, the association states. Barthalow’s holding – that in the absence of a contract, there is no public right to continued employment – is redundant because all Ohio public and private employees are employees at will, with no right to continued employment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary, the brief maintains.
The group suggests an example of the ramifications of upholding the Sixth District: If Spencer Township wasn’t authorized to enter this contract with Arnold, then Ohio State University, also a public entity, wouldn’t be permitted to give faculty tenure protections, to enter contracts with physicians at its medical center, or to hire a football coach with a contract.
Prohibiting political subdivisions from entering into employment contracts not only would impair their ability to hire qualified candidates but also would invalidate numerous contracts currently in effect, the association maintains. And, the group concludes, “it would allow some unscrupulous public officials to make contractual promises to employees with no intention of fulfilling them and no consequences for breaking them.”
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Carleton R. Arnold: David Nacht, 734.663.7550
Representing the Spencer Township Board of Trustees: Donald Kasson, 614.228.1311
Can Federal DNA Database Search Be Ordered When Offender Applies for DNA Testing?
State of Ohio v. Guy Billy Lee Scott, Case No. 2020-1583
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Preble County)
ISSUE: When considering an application for DNA testing, may a trial court consider the possibility that a DNA profile developed from the crime scene evidence matches a profile contained within the federal CODIS database?
BACKGROUND:
In July 1990, Lesa Buckley was among 80 friends attending a birthday party at Cedar Lake near New Paris, Ohio. Guy Billy Lee Scott was also at the party. Some of the party attendees spent the night on the beach. They picked up trash in the morning, left, and agreed to return later in the day to go swimming.
While swimming, Scott and another man discovered Buckley’s lifeless body floating in the water. An autopsy revealed she had been beaten by fists and sexually assaulted, then dragged into the water where she was likely unconscious when she drowned. The medical examiner found scratches and abrasions consistent with fingernails and drag marks.
Scott was charged with the murder, rape, and assault of Buckley. At his trial, the defense indicated the Preble County authorities never investigated Buckley’s ex-boyfriend, who had physically assaulted her in the past, or the ex-boyfriend’s cousin, who had threatened and harassed Buckley. Scott was convicted of the crimes and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison.
Evolution of DNA Testing Law Prompts Appeal
In 2019, Scott sought postconviction relief, noting the coroner collected a rape kit and DNA from the fingernail scratches on Buckley, but didn’t test the DNA. In his brief, Scott explains that Ohio lawmakers in 2003 adopted a law allowing offenders to submit applications to the trial courts where they were convicted for DNA testing of evidence. At the time, the law stated that a trial judge didn’t have to grant the application unless the results would be “outcome determinative.” The law defined “outcome determinative” as “to find that no reasonable factfinder would have found the inmate guilty of that offense.”
In 2006, the legislature amended the law and expanded the availability to request DNA testing. The law also amended the definition of “outcome determinative” to a “strong possibility that no reasonable factfinder would have found the inmate guilty of the offense.” The new law also allowed judges to consider “all available, admissible evidence” when considering a DNA application. The law also permits judges to order profiles of DNA from the crime scene to match them with the federal Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), which collects DNA from across the nation from those arrested and convicted of felonies.
Scott applied for DNA testing, maintaining he would receive an ‘exclusion result” that demonstrated his DNA wasn’t on Buckley’s body and that a known offender’s DNA instead would be found. The trial court denied the application, citing overwhelming other evidence from the incident, including alleged admissions by Scott that he killed Buckley. The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Scott appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
DNA Matching Can Be Considered by Judges, Offender Argues
Although the Twelfth District denied Scott’s request to certify that its decision conflicts with other appellate courts, Scott notes the Twelfth District and the Third District Court of Appeals have similarly ruled a trial judge doesn’t have the right to examine a potential match of DNA in the CODIS database when considering an application for DNA evidence. However, the Second and Eighth appellate districts have done so.
The language and procedural processes outlined in R.C. 2953.74 have led to the conflict, Scott explains. To be eligible to apply for DNA testing under R.C. 2953.74(A), an offender must show “that DNA exclusion when analyzed in the context of and upon consideration of all available admissible evidence” would be outcome determinative of the case.
R.C. 2953.74(B) and (C) provide several criteria regarding the availability and results of DNA testing that must be met. Those provisions note an “exclusion result” can be considered when deciding to grant the application, he notes. However, he adds, the authority to request a match against the CODIS database is included in a separate section of the law, R.C. 2953.74(E). Scott argues the lower courts wrongly concluded a trial court couldn’t move to the stage of requesting DNA matching to the CODIS database until after an application is accepted.
Scott maintains the lower courts too narrowly interpret the term “all available admissible evidence,” and notes that the Ohio Supreme Court in other cases has defined “available” as “obtainable.” Because a DNA match to the CODIS database is obtainable, the results are available and admissible in court, he argues. The amended law was intended to give trial courts more latitude in evaluating DNA evidence when considering postconviction relief claims, he asserts. Scott argues there is a high likelihood that DNA from one of the alternate suspects in the case will be in CODIS. He argues the case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to consider running a search for a CODIS match
CODIS Match Not Evidence, Prosecutor Maintains
The Preble County Prosecutor’s Office argues the legislature has laid out a detailed process for requesting DNA testing and Scott is trying to change that, which is an argument to make to the legislature and not to the courts.
The office notes the law specifically states that DNA testing is allowed if an exclusion result is outcome determinative. The prosecutor argues that the overwhelming evidence of Scott’s guilt was provided at his trial and the exclusion of his DNA would not change the outcome, particularly because of the state of Buckley’s body when it was found in the water.
The prosecutor states the admissible evidence includes everything in the case record. The possibility of a CODIS match isn’t evidence, but rather “putative evidence” that is alleged or may be evidence. The ability to seek a test for alleged evidence establishes a new legal standard for what can be considered by the trial court, and that standard can only be changed by the legislature, the office asserts.
Because the trial court properly followed the procedural process in the law, Scott’s application was correctly denied, the prosecutor maintains.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief
An amicus curiae brief supporting the Scott’s position was submitted by The Innocence Network. The Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association filed an amicus brief supporting the prosecutor.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Guy Billy Lee Scott: Donald Caster, 513.556.4273
Representing the State of Ohio from the Preble County Prosecutor’s Office: Martin Votel, 937.568.4156
Did Commission Comply with Voter-Approved Changes to Redistricting Process?
League of Women Voters of Ohio et al. v. Ohio Redistricting Commission et al., Case No. 2021-1193
Bria Bennett et al. v. Ohio Redistricting Commission et al., Case No. 2021-1198
Ohio Redistricting Commission
ISSUES:
- Does Article XI, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution set forth a mandatory prohibition against partisan gerrymandering?
- Did those who voted for the General Assembly district maps – the Senate president, speaker of the House of Representatives, governor, secretary of state, and state auditor – violate Section 6(B) of Article XI?
- Did those who voted for the legislative district maps violate Section 6(A) of Article XI?
- Did those who voted for the maps attempt to comply with Section 6 of Article XI?
- Was a violation of Section 6 justified by the need to comply with other provisions of Article XI?
OVERVIEW:
On Nov. 3, 2015, 71% of Ohio voters amended the state constitution to alter the process for drawing the maps of the districts for the General Assembly – 99 districts for the House of Representatives and 33 districts for the Senate. Redrawing legislative maps, called redistricting, occurs every 10 years after the U.S. census is taken.
The purpose of the changes, made to Article XI of the Ohio Constitution, was to “end the partisan process for drawing Ohio House and Senate districts, and replace it with a bipartisan process with the goal of having district boundaries that are more compact and politically competitive,” according to the ballot explanation. The amendment created the Ohio Redistricting Commission, which is responsible for drawing the legislative district maps. The seven-member commission, which replaced the former five-member Apportionment Board, is made up of the governor; state auditor; secretary of state; two members of the Ohio House of Representatives, as defined in Article XI; and two members of the Ohio Senate, as defined in Article XI.
Five Republicans and two Democrats comprise this year’s redistricting commission. The Republican members – the governor, state auditor, secretary of state, president of the Senate, and speaker of the House – approved a legislative district plan on Sept. 16, 2021. The two Democratic members opposed the plan. The adopted plan led to three separate lawsuits, which were filed directly with the Ohio Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has combined the three cases for oral argument. Each side will be allotted 30 minutes.
The first lawsuit was filed by the League of Women Voters of Ohio; the Ohio A. Philip Randolph Institute, a national organization for African American trade unionists and community activists; and six citizens – from Dayton, Kent, New Franklin, and Sylvania. (The second lawsuit presents a few distinct legal arguments, which are described in the next preview article.)
A group of 10 voters who live in districts they argue were drawn in violation of Article XI filed the third lawsuit – Bennett v. Ohio Redistricting Commission. The voters are from Alliance, Amherst, Cincinnati, Cleveland Heights, Columbus, Maple Heights, North Canton, Toledo, Trotwood, and Warren. Their arguments center on Section 6 of the constitutional amendment and are similar to those made in the League of Women Voters brief in the first case.
BACKGROUND:
The redistricting process relies on data collected as part of the U.S. Census conducted every 10 years – most recently in 2020. Typically available in March of the year after it is collected, the 2020 data reached the state on Aug. 12 this year. The constitution requires public hearings on proposed legislative district maps and sets a Sept. 1 deadline for the commission to adopt a plan.
At a Sept. 9 commission meeting, Senate President Matt Huffman presented proposed maps. The Democratic commission members – Sen. Vernon Sykes and House minority leader, Rep. Emilia Sykes – said they offered amended maps on Sept. 13. The Senate president and House Speaker Robert Cupp stated that they produced a counteroffer on Sept. 14, and the Democratic commissioners responded with a plan on Sept. 15.
Later on Sept. 15, the Senate president presented revised maps. Just after midnight on Sept. 16, the five Republican commissioners voted to adopt those maps. The Democratic commissioners voted against the plan.
Because the majority approving the maps didn’t include at least two members from each of the two largest political parties in the General Assembly, the constitution states that the adopted legislative districts are effective for four, rather than 10, years. The constitution also requires “a statement explaining what the commission determined to be the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio and the manner in which the statewide proportion of districts in the plan whose voters, based on statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each political party corresponds closely to those preferences, as described in division (B) of Section 6 of [Article XI].”
Proportional Representation Mandated if Other Criteria Not Violated, League Argues
Much of the argument in the redistricting cases focuses on the language in Article XI, Section 6 stating that the “redistricting commission shall attempt to draw a general assembly district plan that meets all of the following standards … .”
The League of Women Voters and the others who joined its side in the lawsuit (collectively, LWV) argue the use of the word “attempt” doesn’t lessen the mandatory force of “shall” before it. The LWV contends that Section 6 instructs the commission that it “shall attempt” to follow the Section 6 standards as long as compliance doesn’t mean violating other Article XI rules – in Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 – for drawing the maps. If complying with Section 6 doesn’t necessitate violating those other sections, then the commission must follow the standards in Section 6, the LWV argues.
To comply with Section 6(B), the LWV states, the commission must look at state and federal partisan elections in Ohio over the past 10 years to identify the proportion of districts whose voters favor a political party based on those elections and identify the statewide preferences of Ohio voters based on those elections. Then those percentages are compared and, if they don’t correspond closely, the maps violate Section 6(B), the LWV argues.
The LWV maintains that the plan adopted this year violates this standard. One of their expert witnesses noted that in the past 10 years Republicans received 54.5% of the two-party vote in Ohio and Democrats received 45.5 %. However, the LWV’s brief states, the expert found that the adopted plan favors Republicans in 67% of House districts and 69% of Senate districts. Another expert who computer-generated 5,000 representative redistricting plans determined that the adopted plan produces more Republican districts in the House and Senate than any of the 5,000 possible plans.
The LWV contends that this data illustrate that the Republicans who drew the maps made no effort to develop a plan that closely corresponds to Ohio voter preferences, but instead drew maps to favor their own party. Primarily drawing a plan that favors or disfavors a political party violates Section 6(A), the LWV maintains.
The group argues that Article XI also envisions the commissioners working together as a whole to analyze various possible maps and then proposing a plan as a commission. Instead, as happened in the years before this constitutional amendment, the process took place behind closed doors and was controlled by one party, the LWV states. The Democrats on the commission weren’t included in drafting the maps, there was “a lack of any meaningful opportunity” for the public to consider the plan, and only the two Republican legislative leaders and their staffs drew the maps – even excluding the Republican governor, secretary of state, and auditor, the LWV maintains.
When a legislative district plan is adopted by a simple majority that isn’t bipartisan, the commission must present a statement explaining the adopted plan. According to the statement, the commission found that Republican candidates won 13 of 16 prior elections, reflecting that 81% of Ohio voters favored Republicans and 19% favored Democrats. That led the commission to draw the state’s districts in a range between 54.5% and 81% favoring Republicans. The LWV protests that drawing the districts based on the number of elections won by Republican candidates “tortures Section 6(B) beyond any reasonable construction.” Comments by Governor Michael DeWine, Secretary of State Frank LaRose, and State Auditor Keith Faber demonstrated their concerns about this methodology as well, the LWV notes.
The group concludes that there are thousands of examples of legislative maps that can be drawn that comply with the constitution’s technical requirements and more fully achieve the standards in Section 6.
Section 6 Standards Are Aspirational, Republican Legislative Leaders Assert
Senate President Huffman and House Speaker Cupp respond that Section 6 details goals for the process but uses the word “attempt” to indicate that the goals may not be accomplished. However, Article XI makes the other sections – 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7 – mandatory, and only Section 6 uses “shall attempt,” a signal that it isn’t mandatory, Huffman and Cupp maintain.
When the legislative district plan was adopted without bipartisan support, the constitutionally required statement released with the plan described what the commission determined to be the statewide preferences of Ohio voters, they note. However, they assert, the statement isn’t required to explain how the commission complied with Section 6 – which would imply the section is mandatory. They argue the commission holds the discretion to determine Ohio voters’ preferences and how the plan the commission adopts corresponds closely to those preferences.
The legislative leaders contend that Section 6 is vague in several respects, including not defining how to calculate the 10-year statewide preferences based on election results. They maintain in their brief that the LWV and others advocate for statewide proportional representation, but the groups “care little for the reality” that enforcing strict statewide proportional representation will deny equal representation to Republican voters in urban counties. The LWV’s interpretation of Section 6(B) would violate the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment, which ensures equal protection under the law, and the Court should sever Section 6(B) from Article XI as unconstitutional, the legislative leaders argue.
They also point to Section 9(D)(3), which explains part of the Supreme Court’s role in redistricting cases and begins: “If the supreme court of Ohio determines that a general assembly district plan adopted by the commission does not comply with the requirements of Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 of this article, the available remedies shall be as follows: …” This lead-in conveys that no remedy exists for a “stand-alone violation of Section 6” because Section 6 isn’t mentioned, the legislative leaders argue. First, they maintain, there must be a violation of Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7, then – in a case where a legislative district plan lacked bipartisan support – the Court considers whether Section 6 was violated.
Because no violation of Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 has been asserted, the Court has no jurisdiction to hear this case or to order the commission to draw a new map, the legislative leaders contend, concluding that that case must be dismissed.
Commissioners Were to Collaborate in Drawing Maps, Democratic Leaders Maintain
The Democratic commissioners, Sen. Sykes and Rep. Sykes, state that they agree with the LWV’s arguments. They add that, under Article XI, the commission is supposed to propose a legislative district plan, but the commission as a whole never worked to propose one plan. They maintain that maps that comply with all sections of Article XI can be drawn, but the Republican commissioners chose to ignore the provisions of Section 6. Those proportionality standards were made part of the constitution to achieve fair legislative maps, the Democratic commissioners argue.
They assert that the adopted plan will be harmful to communities of color. The adopted map gives Republican candidates an advantage by “packing” Black voters into certain districts, creating an overrepresentation of Black voters there, and diluting these voters in other areas – all in violation of Section 6(B), the commissioners contend. They ask the Court to order the commission to adopt a new plan that complies with the state constitution and tracks closely with the 54% Republican and 46% Democratic preferences of Ohio voters.
Challenges Require Claim of Violating Other Districting Rules, Statewide Officials Contend
The governor, secretary of state, and state auditor filed their own joint brief in the cases. They agree with Huffman and Cupp that a lawsuit challenging a legislative district map must first present a claim that the map violates one of the neutral districting requirements in Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 or the constitution’s broader guarantees that apply to how districts are drawn.
The statewide elected officials also maintain that individual commission members can’t be sued, only the commission can.
They add that each of them made efforts to bring the Republican and the Democratic legislative leaders together to craft 10-year bipartisan maps – to no avail. However, that lack of compromise doesn’t undermine the legitimacy of the adopted legislative maps, they maintain. And, they argue in their brief, “any independent requirement of proportionality would mandate gerrymandering.”
A brief was filed on behalf of the redistricting commission. It incorporates the contents of the briefs from the statewide elected officials and the Republican legislative leaders.
Lawsuits Attract Friend-of-the-Court Briefs
In League of Women Voters of Ohio, the following submitted amicus curiae briefs in support of the LWV:
- Campaign Legal Center, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that works for open and fair voting processes
- City of Cincinnati
- David Niven, University of Cincinnati political science professor and researcher
- Ohio State Conference of the NAACP
- We Are Ohio, a nonpartisan organization that defends the rights of Ohio workers and their families.
Renew Ohio, a nonprofit organization formed “to support wise policymaking by Ohio leaders,” filed a brief supporting the adopted legislative district plan.
In Bennett, the city of Cincinnati and Niven also filed amicus briefs supporting the voters who sued. Renew Ohio submitted an amicus brief endorsing the commission’s plan.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket. (Also 2021-1198.)
Contacts
Representing the League of Women Voters of Ohio et al.: Freda Levenson, 614.586.1972
Representing Bria Bennett et al.: Donald McTigue, 614.263.7000
Representing Senate President Matt Huffman and House Speaker Robert Cupp: William Dornette, 513.357.9353
Representing Sen. Vernon Sykes and House minority leader, Rep. Emilia Sykes: Diane Menashe, 614.221.6500
Representing Governor Michael DeWine, Secretary of State Frank LaRose, and State Auditor Keith Faber – from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Bridget Coontz, 614.728.2035
Representing the Ohio Redistricting Commission: Erik Clark, 614.481.0908
Did Commission Comply with Voter-Approved Changes to Redistricting Process?
The Ohio Organizing Collaborative et al. v. Ohio Redistricting Commission et al., Case No. 2021-1210
Ohio Redistricting Commission
ISSUES:
- Does the Ohio Supreme Court review the General Assembly district plan independently, without a presumption of constitutionality?
- Does the legislative district plan violate Article XI, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution?
- Does the plan violate Article XI, Section 6 of the constitution?
- Do constitutional violations in a legislative district plan require the Supreme Court to invalidate the plan and order the commission to adopt a new plan?
BACKGROUND:
This case is the second lawsuit of three filed with the Ohio Supreme Court regarding the legislative district maps adopted in September by the Ohio Redistricting Commission. The context and background of the three cases are discussed above in League of Women Voters of Ohio (LWV) v. Ohio Redistricting Commission.
This lawsuit was filed by the Ohio Organizing Collaborative, which organizes grassroots projects and campaigns focused on racial, social, and economic justice; the Council on American Islamic Relations, Ohio; the Ohio Environmental Council; and six Ohio voters, from Cincinnati, Columbus, Cleveland, Dublin, and Toledo.
Standard for Proving Redistricting Violation Has Changed, Collaborative Maintains
The Ohio Organizing Collaborative and its partner groups and voters in the lawsuit (collectively, OOC) address the burden of proof in these redistricting cases, stating that the requirement that a map must be proved unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt – as the Ohio Supreme Court stated in its 2012 redistricting case, Wilson v. Kasich – changed with the 2015 voter-approved constitutional amendment reforming the redistricting process.
“[T]he voters abrogated these rulings in imposing non-discretionary standards on the Commission, deleting the provisions and language on which the Wilson majority had based its conclusions, and creating mandatory Article XI remedies for violations of fundamental constitutional rights,” the OOC brief states.
Along with arguments about Article XI, Section 6 similar to those in the LWV case, the OOC also points to Section 3 – which mandates that the General Assembly district plan comply with the Ohio and U.S. constitutions and federal law.
The Ohio Constitution states that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people” and citizens have a right to “alter, reform, or abolish” the government, the group explains. Ohio citizens also have the right to vote on equal terms with other citizens of the state, the group argues. However, the OOC maintains, the adopted legislative plan is invalid because it severely limits voters’ ability to vote on equal terms and to associate together to elect their representatives. The maps were drawn in a partisan manner that discriminates, without justification, against Democratic voters, the group argues.
Remedies Unclear for Maps Allegedly Drawn to Favor One Party, Elected Officials Argue
The governor, secretary of state, and state auditor respond that those opposed to the adopted redistricting plan don’t identify a way for the Court to sort out the competing expert claims that a plan has drawn districts to advantage one political party over another and then determine a solution. They maintain that the OOC acknowledges that Section 9 offers the Court no remedy for a violation of only Section 6.
They also reject the OOC’s claims based on other state constitutional rights – such as equal protection and freedom of assembly and association. They indicate the OOC’s view would mean Ohio leaders have been violating the state’s bill of rights in the constitution for 50 years, but no one thought to raise those rights as a way to stop violations.
Briefs from Other Parties Echo Arguments in Separate Redistricting Cases
Huffman’s and Cupp’s brief and the Sykeses’ brief make arguments paralleling their positions in the LWV case.
Amicus Briefs Submitted to Court
Supporting the OOC’s positions in amicus curiae briefs are the city of Cincinnati; David Niven, University of Cincinnati political science professor and researcher; and the Ohio State Conference of the NAACP.
Renew Ohio, a nonprofit organization formed “to support wise policymaking by Ohio leaders,” filed an amicus brief supporting the positions of the Republican members of the redistricting commission.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the Ohio Organizing Collaborative et al.: Peter Ellis, 312.207.6429
Representing Governor Michael DeWine, Secretary of State Frank LaRose, and State Auditor Keith Faber – from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Bridget Coontz, 614.728.2035
Representing Senate President Matt Huffman and House Speaker Robert Cupp: William Dornette, 513.357.9353
Representing Sen. Vernon Sykes and House minority leader, Rep. Emilia Sykes: Diane Menashe, 614.221.6500
Representing the Ohio Redistricting Commission: Erik Clark, 614.481.0908
These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court’s Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews aren’t part of the case record, and aren’t considered by the Court during its deliberations.