Tuesday, May 24, 2022
Anthony McClain v. State of Ohio, Case No. 2021-0718
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
Estate of Jennings Fleenor v. County of Ottawa doing business as Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home, Case No. 2021-1004
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Ottawa County)
Hunter Morey v. Savanna Campbell and Carol and Rick Speelman, Case No. 2021-1199
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Summit County)
State of Ohio v. Michael Stansell, Case No. 2021-0948
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Is Former Inmate Entitled to Jury Trial to Be Declared Wrongfully Imprisoned?
Anthony McClain v. State of Ohio, Case No. 2021-0718
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUE: In a lawsuit requesting to be declared a “wrongfully imprisoned individual,” is the plaintiff entitled to a jury trial?
BACKGROUND:
In 1995, Anthony McClain was convicted of murder and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. In 2002, McClain sought a new trial based on newly discovered evidence . He was granted a new trial in 2004. In 2006, a jury acquitted him..
McClain initially filed a lawsuit in 2008, under R.C. 2743.48(A), to be declared a “wrongfully imprisoned individual,” which is the first of a two-step process to be financially compensated for the time he was incarcerated. After several delays, his case was transferred from Franklin County to Hamilton County, where he requested a jury trial. In 2020, the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court denied his request. A bench trial was conducted, and the trial judge declined to declare McClain wrongfully imprisoned.
McClain appealed the decision to the First District Court of Appeals, which in a split decision affirmed the trial court’s ruling that McClain was not entitled to a jury trial.
McClain appealed the First District’s decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Constitution Grants Right to Jury Trial, Former Inmate Asserts
Article I, Section 5 of the Ohio Constitution grants a right to a jury trial, , and the trial court was wrong to try the case from the bench McClain maintains. He notes the Supreme Court of Ohio in a 1929 opinion ruled in civil trials, the right to a jury trial is limited to cases that existed under common law prior to the adoption of the state constitution in 1851. From that point on, a state statute had to specify a right to a jury trial for claims that didn’t exist under common law, or the plaintiff had to prove that a new type of claim is related to one that existed before the state adopted the constitution.
McClain concedes that R.C. 2743.48 doesn’t specify that a jury trial is permitted, but argues the claim of wrongfully imprisoned evolved from common law. He maintains that the claim of wrongful imprisonment has roots in the common law claim of false imprisonment, which carried a right to a jury trial. While the claim of false imprisonment was mostly associated with actions taken by private individuals, McClain asserts the Supreme Court recognized that it applied to actions by state officials as early as 1918.
McClain notes the Court in its 1918 Brinkman v. Drolesbaugh decision defined false imprisonment as “a wrongful or unlawful detention or restraint of one’s liberty.” He cites the dissenting First District judge, who agreed that the wrongful imprisonment claim in state law has its roots in common law false imprisonment. Because the modern law is an extension of the common law, he is entitled to a jury trial, McClain concludes.
Law Provides No Right to Jury, State Maintains
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office explains that wrongful imprisonment is a new type of legal claim which state lawmakers adopted in 1986. State law creates a two-step process to be compensated for wrongful imprisonment, the office notes. First, a previously incarcerated individual must sue in common pleas court, where the person must demonstrate the state illegally withheld evidence from the defendant or that the defendant didn’t commit the charged offense. Once declared wrongfully imprisoned, the former inmate can sue in the Ohio Court of Claims to recover money lost a result of being wrongfully imprisoned.
The first step of the process itself is not a claim for money and is not rooted in the common law claim of false imprisonment, which is a claim for compensation for being wrongfully detained, the state argues. Because the two claims aren’t connected, McClain has no right to a jury trial based on his claim that wrongful imprisonment existed at common law, the attorney general asserts.
Without a link to a common law claim, McClain must have a right under state law to seek a jury trial. However, R.C. 2743.48, like many other provisions in state law, creates a “special proceeding” in a trial court, the office explains. These new types of lawsuits created by state law, and which don’t exist under common law, are tried by a judge, unless the law specifically permits a jury trial. The wrongful imprisonment law doesn’t specifically permit a jury trial, and the trial court correctly denied McClain’s request, the attorney general concludes.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Anthony McClain: Charles Koenig, 614.454.5010
Representing the State of Ohio from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Benjamin Flowers, 614.466.8980
Must Board of Commissioners Be Named in Lawsuit Against County-Owned Nursing Home?
Estate of Jennings Fleenor v. County of Ottawa doing business as Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home, Case No. 2021-1004
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Ottawa County)
ISSUE: Can Ohio counties, county agencies, and county departments be sued, or can counties only be sued through claims against county boards of commissioners?
BACKGROUND:
In 2016, 77-year-old Jennings Fleenor was a resident of Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home, a facility owned and operated by Ottawa County. In July 2016, a nurse’s aide attempted to move Fleenor, who had both legs amputated, from a wheelchair and into a rollable shower chair. As the aide attempted to move Fleenor into the shower, the chair tipped over and Fleenor hit the ground.
Over the next few days, the nursing home noted that Fleenor experienced “poor alertness.” Six days later he died. No autopsy was performed, and on his death certificate, the manner of his death was listed as natural and caused by end-state dementia and other contributing diseases.
Fleenor’s estate filed a lawsuit against “County of Ottawa d/b/a/ Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home,” alleging negligence, wrongful death, and violations of the Ohio Nursing Home Patients’ Bill of Rights. Ottawa County requested the case sought summary judgment. The Ottawa County Prosecutor’s Office argued that the nursing home employees weren’t negligent, Fleenor’s death wasn’t caused by his fall, and the county has statutory immunity, which prevented it from being liable for Fleenor’s death.
The prosecutor also argued the case should be dismissed because the Ottawa County Board of Commissioners weren’t named as a party. The prosecutor maintained the county and the nursing home are “sui juris,” a Latin term meaning they are incapable of being sued. Any claims against the county or a county agency must be filed against the board of commissioners, the prosecutor maintained.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the county, and Fleenor’s estate appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals. The Sixth District reversed the trial court’s decision and ordered further proceedings in the case. The Sixth District didn’t address the county’s claim that the estate failed to name the commissioners.
The county appealed the Sixth District decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
County Can Only Be Sued Through Commissioners, County Asserts
The county argues that because the estate didn’t sue the commissioners, the case should be dismissed and the statute of limitations has run, which prevents the case from moving forward. The county notes that Article X, Section 1 of the Ohio Constitution states that the powers of county governments are granted by the General Assembly and, in general, Ohio counties don’t have the authority to file lawsuits or be sued. The office notes two exceptions in the Ohio Revised Code allow for counties to adopt “alternative forms” of county governments, and those provisions allow for those counties to sue or be sued in the name of the counties.
Ottawa County didn’t adopt an alternative form of government, and under state law, only the board of county commissioners can file lawsuits or be sued in any case regarding the county, its departments, or agencies, the county asserts. The county argues that when the estate was informed during the trial court proceedings that it misnamed the parties by suing the county, the estate took no action to correct that issue. Because the state law is clear and unambiguous, the Supreme Court should reverse the Sixth District’s ruling and dismiss the estate’s case, the county concludes.
Mislabeled Case Participant Can Be Sued, Estate Maintains
The estate denies the county’s allegation that it didn’t attempt to amend the caption of its complaint to add the board of county commissioners by name. It argues that under court rules, the trial court can and should permit the revision. The estate also argues the mislabeling of the case is logical because the county, when filing lawsuits on behalf of the nursing home, lists itself as “County of Ottawa d/b/a/ Ottaway County Riverview Nursing Home.” The estate maintains the county regularly files lawsuits for unpaid debts to the nursing home using the name County of Ottawa. The estate notes that in several other court records, the commissioners list themselves as County of Ottawa in cases dealing with county business.
The county wasn’t harmed by the lawsuit not naming the commissioners, and without the county showing any prejudice from the wrong name in the complaint, the case should move forward, the estate asserts. The estate notes that the county commissioners participated in the case from the onset, including directing nursing home employees to participate in the case at the trial level. Because the commissioners participated in the case, they can be added as a party with permission from the trial court, the estate argues. Dismissing the case because of a failure to properly name the board of commissioners in the original complaint would be a drastic and unfair result, the estate asserts. The Supreme Court should allow the case to proceed in the trial court on its merits, the estate concludes.
Friend-of-Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting the Ottawa County’s position has been submitted by the County Commissioners Association of Ohio. The Ohio Association for Justice filed an amicus brief supporting the estate of Fleenor.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the County of Ottawa doing business as Ottawa County Riverview Nursing Home: Teresa Grigsby, 419.241.2201
Representing the estate of Jennings Fleenor: William Eadie, 216.777.8856
What Must Court Consider in Custody Dispute Between Mother and Grandparents?
Hunter Morey v. Savanna Campbell and Carol and Rick Speelman, Case No. 2021-1199
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Summit County)
ISSUE: When a parent asks to regain custody of a child from a nonparent who has custody, must a court first find that circumstances with the child or custodian have changed before modifying the custody arrangement?
BACKGROUND:
Savanna Campbell had a daughter in July 2011. A year later, Campbell was sentenced to a 3-year prison term. The child’s maternal grandparents – Carol and Rick Speelman – filed paperwork in court for legal custody of the child. Hunter Morey, the child’s father, also sought custody.
The Summit County Domestic Relations Court considered the requests. While the case was pending, the child split her time between her father and her grandparents. In a plan adopted by the court in January 2014, the custody arrangement continued, with Morey and the Speelmans sharing time while Campbell was in prison. Once she was released, she and Morey would share custody, the plan stated.
However, the parenting plan was modified in November 2015 to designate the child’s father and grandparents as the child’s “residential caretakers.” Campbell agreed to the custody arrangement.
Mother Attempts to Regain Custody
The child’s father then died. Campbell, who was out of prison, asked in May 2016 for custody of her daughter. The court denied the request, determining there was no significant change in circumstances to justify a custody modification. The court concluded that the Speelmans should continue as the child’s residential parents and legal custodians.
Campbell tried again six months later. The day before the hearing , though, she agreed that the grandparents should keep custody of her child. In May 2019, Campbell made another custody request.
The court held a hearing about whether changed circumstances should play a role in a custody dispute between a biological parent and a nonparent. Campbell argued that as the child’s parent she didn’t have to show a change in circumstances to reestablish custody. The magistrate agreed with the mother, and the court upheld the magistrate’s decision.
After the hearing and before the court could fully review Campbell’s custody request, she withdrew it. The court moved forward with other motions from the grandparents. Campbell later agreed that the grandparents would keep custody and she would have supervised parenting time.
The grandparents appealed the court’s earlier decision on whether changed circumstances must be identified in a dispute between a parent and a third party with custody. The Ninth District Court of Appeals ruled that in custody challenges between a parent and a nonparent, courts consider the child’s best interest. Establishing changed circumstances is not required, the appeals court stated.
The Ninth District determined that its ruling conflicts with decisions from other state appellate courts.
The Supreme Court of Ohio accepted the case to review the conflict.
Grandparents Argue Parent Must Show Situation Has Changed
The Speelmans note that Ohio has laws for domestic relations courts about custody litigation between biological parents and for juvenile courts handling custody disputes between biological parents and third parties. In both situations, the laws describe a process for modifying initial custody determinations. The procedure explains that the court first must find that circumstances have changed for the child or custodian, then determine whether the custody modification will serve the child’s best interest, the Speelmans state.
They argue, however, that the statutes lack direction for custody claims, like this one, heard in domestic relations courts between parents and nonparents. The state’s appellate courts disagree over the standards for resolving these cases. Although the Ninth District arrived at the opposite conclusion, the Fourth District Court of Appeals and the Twelfth District Court of Appeals have ruled that changed circumstances must be established first before considering the child’s best interest and modifying a custody arrangement, the Speelmans maintain.
The grandparents contend that the legislature conveyed a clear intent about custody modifications by requiring changed circumstances to be shown first. For a parent who voluntarily relinquishes custody through an agreement, the parent must prove a change in circumstances in the lives of the child or the current custodian to regain custody from a nonparent in domestic relations courts, the Speelmans argue. They conclude that this interpretation provides stability for children.
Mother Responds That Correct Focus Is Child’s Best Interest
Campbell asserts that the statutes guiding custody modifications in domestic relations courts don’t address custody arrangements between a parent and a third party, such as a grandparent. She argues that neither the law about custody issues between parents in domestic relations courts nor the law for custody cases in juvenile court between parents and third parties applies to this case.
Given the lack of clarity, the fundamental rights of parents should be given priority, Campbell maintains. She contends that a ruling in the Speelmans’ favor would violate a parent’s constitutional right to due process because it would interfere unnecessarily with the parent’s fundamental rights.
She contends that the Ninth District’s decision keeps parents on a level playing field with nonparent and third-party custodians. A change in circumstances doesn’t need to be established first for a parent to regain custody – what needs to be shown is only that the custody modification is in the child’s best interest, Campbell concludes.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Carol and Rick Speelman: Corinne Hoover Six, 330.922.4491
Representing Savanna Campbell: John Lysenko, 330.745.7010
These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court’s Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews aren’t part of the case record, and aren’t considered by the Court during its deliberations.
Can Offender Challenge Life Sentence No Longer Permitted for Charged Offense?
State of Ohio v. Michael Stansell, Case No. 2021-0948
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Can a sentence that exceeds the maximum for a charged offense be corrected by a trial court when the sentence wasn’t challenged on direct appeal and the time for an appeal has passed?
BACKGROUND:
In 1997, Michael Stansell was indicted by a Cuyahoga County grand jury on 38 counts associated with the sexual assault of two boys under the age of 13. Among the charges he faced was rape with a sexually violent predator specification that permitted a life sentence. He also faced charges of forcible rape, which also carried potential life sentences. Stansell had no prior convictions for a sexually related offense.
Stansell agreed to plead guilty to eight counts, including two counts of rape each with the sexually violent predator specification, and agreed to a 20-years-to-life prison sentence.
Series of Appeals Follow Conviction
Shortly after his conviction, Stansell filed a direct appeal, challenging several aspects of his conviction, but not the imposition of the sexually violent predator specifications. The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions in 2000.
In 2004, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled in State v. Smith, that a sexually violent predator specification can only be imposed if the offender had committed a prior sexually related offense. In 2013, Stansell challenged his sentence, arguing that under Smith, the sexually violent predator specifications couldn’t be imposed on him, and he couldn’t be subjected to a life sentence. The trial court denied the request to vacate the life imprisonment portion of his sentence. The Eighth District affirmed the decision in 2014, finding Smith didn’t apply retroactively to Stansell’s 1997 conviction.
In 2019, Stansell challenged the life sentence again, arguing his constitutional rights were violated. A three-judge panel of the Eighth District agreed and vacated the life sentence. The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office requested an en banc opinion from the full Eighth District. As the appeal was being reconsidered, the Supreme Court issued its decisions in State v. Harper, State v. Hudson and State v. Henderson. The cases centered on the finality of sentencing and sought to provide clarity on when challenges to sentences must be initiated.
Based on the Eighth District’s interpretation of Harper and Henderson, the appellate court noted it was unjust to have Stansell serve a sentence that exceeded what a trial court was authorized to issue, but that Stansell had to have challenged the sentence during his direct appeal, 20 years earlier.
Stansell appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Trial Court Can Modify Sentence, Offender Argues
Stansell maintains his circumstances are profoundly different than those of the offenders in Harper, Hudson, and Henderson. In Harper and Hudson, the Supreme Court ruled the defendants waited too long to challenge postrelease control terms. Stansell notes that in those cases, the trial court had the authority to impose the terms, but failed to properly sentence the defendants. In Henderson, the Court ruled that the prosecution waited too long to challenge an 18-years-to-life sentence that was incorrectly entered as an 18-year sentence. Stansell explains that in that case, the trial judge improperly imposed a sentence that was shorter than the law allowed. Unlike these cases, his trial court imposed a sentence that exceeded what the law authorized, Stansell argues.
He maintains if Ohio courts follow the precedent of those three cases, then inmates who don’t immediately challenge their sentences will serve extra prison time beyond what the law allows. Being subjected to a prison term that is longer than allowed violates his constitutional rights to due process and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, Stansell argues.
Stansell notes the Supreme Court is within its rights to promote “judicial economy” by limiting the number of appeals and by specifying when appeals can be initiated. But those rules are generally inapplicable when life or liberty is at stake, he notes.
The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office offered Stansell a plea bargain, which included the sexually violent predator specifications be imposed as part of the deal, he notes. Now that Ohio courts recognized the specifications don’t apply to Stansell, those sentences cannot be imposed, he asserts. While Stansell faced several charges, including others with potential life sentences, he emphasizes that he must only serve the time for the offenses for which he was convicted. Now that the life sentences for his convictions are no longer applicable, a trial court should have the authority to modify his sentence, he concludes.
Sentence Should Stand, Prosecutor Argues
The prosecutor argues Stansell’s sentence should stand, noting that he agreed to the sexually violent predator classification as part of the plea bargain and was aware that he faced the possibility of life in prison for other charges that were dropped. Stansell also knew at the time he was charged with the crimes that it was not legally settled whether a sexually violent predator specification could only be imposed if the offender was previously convicted of a sexually related crime, the office asserts. If Stansell wanted to challenge the designation and the sentence that the specifications carried, he could have done so on direct appeal, the office maintains.
The prosecutor also argues that the Eighth District’s 2014 decision rejecting Stansell’s appeal should stand. The Eighth District improperly allowed Stansell to appeal the issue again in 2019 according to the prosecutor who denies that Stansell’s constitutional rights were violated and notes his circumstances aren’t different than those in Harper, Hudson, and Henderson. As with the trio of cases, at the time Stansell’s sentence was imposed, the trial court was within its right to classify an offender as a sexually violent predator without a prior conviction, the prosecutor concludes.
Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting Stansell’s position has been submitted by the Ohio Public Defender. The Ohio Attorney General has filed an amicus brief supporting the Cuyahoga County prosecutor. The Court also permitted the attorney general to share oral argument time with the prosecutor.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Michael Stansell from the Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s Office: John Martin, 216.443.7583
Representing the State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Frank Zeleznikar, 216.443.7800
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Benjamin Flowers, 614.466.8980