Wednesday, July 10, 2024
Michael R. Shields v. Bureau of Workers Compensation et al., Case No. 2023-0996
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Roberta Schlegel v. Summit County, Case No. 2023-1232
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Summit County)
Niv Goomai and Bar Hajbi v. H&E Enterprise LLC and Avi Ohad, Case No. 2023-1541
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
Columbus Bar Association v. Teresa A. Villarreal, Case No. 2024-0492
Franklin County
Can Appellate Court Award Attorney Fees for Defense of Workers’ Compensation Claim?
Michael R. Shields v. Bureau of Workers Compensation et al., Case No. 2023-0996
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUES:
- After an appeals court issues a final judgment, can the appeals court issue a post-judgment order to the trial court to consider awarding the prevailing party attorney fees and costs?
- In a workers’ compensation appeal where the injured worker is entitled to attorney fees and a jury finds in the worker's favor, must the worker file a motion with the trial court requesting the fees?
- If an employer appeals a common pleas court’s decision to award workers’ compensation to an employee, can the employee seek attorney fees from the employer for successfully defending the decision before a court of appeals?
BACKGROUND:
Michael Shields began working as a mechanic for the Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority (RTA) in 1989. In 2015, he suffered a left shoulder injury and received workers’ compensation benefits to treat his injury. In 2018, he requested additional compensation for a right shoulder injury, claiming he relied more on the right shoulder to compensate for his injured left shoulder. The Ohio Industrial Commission, which hears injured worker’s claims, denied additional compensation.
Under R.C. 4123.512, Shields appealed the commission’s decision to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. The RTA opposed Shields’ request for workers’ compensation. After multiple continuances, a jury trial occurred in May 2022, and the jury found that Shields was entitled to coverage.
After the trial, Shields filed a motion with the trial court to recover court costs and was awarded $3,023. In his initial complaint, Shields requested attorney fees if he were to prevail. However, after the verdict, he didn’t file a motion to invoke his rights to attorney fees. R.C. 4123.512(F) allows an injured worker who successfully appeals an Industrial Commission’s denial of benefits to receive attorney fees from the employer or the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC). At the time of the decision, the fee award was capped at $4,200. The General Assembly has since raised the cap to $5,000.
The RTA appealed the decision to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. In April 2023, the Eighth District affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Eighth District decision stated there were reasonable grounds for the appeal and ordered the trial court to carry out its “mandate,” which means to follow the appeals court’s judgment.
About two weeks after the Eighth District ruling, Shields filed a motion with the Eighth District requesting that the RTA pay his attorney fees for defending the trial court’s decision before the appeals court. The Eighth District issued an order to the trial court to determine how much Shields should receive in trial court and appellate court attorney fees.
Two days after the case was returned to the trial court, Shields requested a hearing to have the court determine how much he should receive in attorney fees. Shields suggested that he incurred $27,118 in attorney fees and costs to prevail in the trial court and defend against the RTA appeal.
The RTA opposed any payment. Before the trial court ruled on the fee issue, the transit authority appealed the Eighth District decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Appeals Court Violated Procedural Rules, Transit Authority Maintains
The RTA expresses that procedural rules matter and reminds the Court that all parties and courts must abide by the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure. The transit authority maintains that Shields’ attorneys made a deliberate attempt to sidestep the $4,200 cap on attorney fees for a trial victory by waiting to request fees after the court of appeals ruled on the matter.
In general, parties pay their own attorney fees regardless of the case’s outcome, the RTA explains. However, there are some exceptions, including when state law, such as R.C. 4123.512(F), permits it or when a party files a frivolous appeal. Even though the Eighth District sided with Shields, the RTA notes the appeals court found reasonable grounds for the appeal, so it wasn’t frivolous. R.C. 4123.512(F) caps the fee at $4,200, so the Eighth District’s order to have the trial court calculate attorney fees violates the procedural rules, the RTA asserts.
The RTA notes that Shields’ attorneys intentionally asked only for “costs” after the jury verdict and didn’t ask for attorney fees at that time. Because Shields didn’t ask, he forfeited the right to the fees when the case moved to the Eighth District, the RTA maintains. When the case was initiated in the Eighth District, Shields didn’t mention attorney fees. When the Eighth District ruled in Shields’ favor, it issued a final judgment that simply affirmed the jury’s verdict. The Eighth District’s mandate to the trial court was to carry out the decision it previously made and nothing more, the transit authority asserts.
The Eighth District then violated the rules when it entertained Shields’ request for attorney fees, the RTA argues. The appeals court has no power to issue a post-judgment decision after it renders its final judgment, the RTA asserts, and the order to consider paying attorney fees for the appellate court case should be vacated.
Fee Is Capped, Workers’ Compensation Bureau Asserts
The BWC notes that it is a named party in all workers’ compensation court cases, and while it didn’t participate in the case at the trial and appellate court level, it is expressing its view on the law to the Supreme Court. The bureau maintains that R.C. 4123.512(F) applies to any appeal, whether at the trial or appeals court level. The BWC asserts that Shields is entitled to only the $4,200 limit in place when his appeal was initiated.
The BWC maintains that the Eighth District improperly accepted the RTA’s appeal and had no authority to rule in the matter. The bureau maintains that when the trial court concluded the case without deciding on awarding attorney fees, it didn’t enter all the required final orders for a case to be appealed. Because the trial court case wasn’t final, the Eighth District was without jurisdiction to consider the case, the BWC argues.
If the Supreme Court believes the trial court case was concluded, the bureau asserts that Shields forfeited his right to attorney fees by failing to seek them after the trial and not raising the issue until after the Eighth District issued its judgment. The BWC argues that Shields isn’t entitled to attorney fees, but if the Court rules otherwise, he is only entitled to no more than $4,200.
Fees Permitted to Preserve Favorable Judgment, Worker Maintains
Shields explains that R.C. 4123.512(F) mandates that an injured worker be awarded legal fees when successfully appealing the commission’s ruling to a common pleas court. He requested the fees when he filed his complaint, he argues, and the law requires nothing more from an injured worker than what he did. The law also only applies to the successful appeal to the common pleas court, he maintains. Once the decision is issued, any further appeals are governed by the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure and by local rules of the appellate court, he asserts.
Shields counters the RTA arguments, noting that R.C. 4123.512(F) has no time limits and doesn’t require that he makes a specific request at the end of the trial for the fees. He maintains that since the $4,200 cap applies only to the attorney fees for the trial, he can use another legal theory to seek fees for the appeal. Shields notes one exception that allows for appellate court fees is when a statute provides for them. The statute doesn’t have to specifically state that it allows for appellate court fees, he maintains.
Shields argues that R.C. 4123.512(F) would be meaningless if he won a hard-fought challenge in the common pleas court for the right to receive compensation and then had to use his own funds to fend off any challenge by his employer to that victory. The law’s purpose would be defeated, and employers would have an incentive to appeal all workers’ compensation cases, he asserts.
Additionally, Shields argues the appeals court has the authority to issue post-judgment decisions and routinely does so. The Eighth District decided the merits of the case when it ruled in his favor, Shields notes, and its post-judgment order had no impact on the issue of whether he was entitled to workers’ compensation. Post-judgment orders that don’t impact the case’s merits can be issued, and he concludes that the Eighth District was authorized to direct the trial court to consider additional attorney fees.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Greater Cleveland Regional Transit Authority: Brian Gutkoski, brian.gutkoski@gcrta.org
Representing Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: T. Elliot Gaiser, thomas.gaiser@ohioattorneygeneral.gov
Representing Michael R. Shields: Mark Owens, officemgr@grubbandassoc.com
Is County Liable for Flooding of Private Property Because of Sinkhole in Road?
Roberta Schlegel v. Summit County, Case No. 2023-1232
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Summit County)
ISSUE: Are political subdivisions liable for loss to property when they fail to keep roads in repair or remove obstructions if the failure leads to damage on nearby property?
BACKGROUND:
Roberta Schlegel bought a home in Sagamore Hills Township, located in Summit County, in 1992. Schlegel has lived in the home for more than 30 years. Her property is located near the intersection of Boyden Road and Meadowview Drive.
Under the roads at the intersection, there are culverts, which are large pipes designed to drain water. In 2016, the county inspected the culverts and began planning for their replacement with larger-diameter pipes.
Before May 21, 2017, a part of Boyden Road adjacent to Schlegel’s property collapsed after heavy rains. Summit County workers initially placed an orange construction barrel over the sinkhole in the road. On May 21 and 25, the basement of Schlegel’s home flooded. Schlegel called the county reporting that a culvert under the road was obstructed because of the sinkhole. County workers removed the barrel, cleared debris, and placed a metal plate over the sinkhole and a caution cone in the area. On May 28, Schlegel’s basement flooded again. In the days following, workers returned, making repairs and clearing road debris from the collapsed culvert below Boyden Road. Schlegel said her basement didn’t flood after that. Later in the summer, a vendor completed the county project to replace the culverts.
Schlegel has stated that her property never flooded until May 2017. She said the culvert collapse blocked water flow and clogged sanitary sewer drains, leading to the flooding of her front yard, septic tank, and basement. To address the damage, she hired a company for remediation and cleanup services. The services, which included sewage cleanup, sanitization, and bagging and hauling away contaminated items, cost $6,636. Schlegel also obtained an estimate of $52,503 for repairs to her residence. She noted there were other damages, too, including destroyed personal property and lost use of her basement.
Property Owner Sues County Over Flooding
Schlegel filed a lawsuit against Summit County alleging negligence. Government entities typically are immune from liability. However, there are exceptions, including when there is a failure by a government entity to maintain a public roadway. The county asserted that this and other exceptions don’t apply in this case and asked the Summit County Common Pleas Court for summary judgment.
The court denied the request, finding there were factual issues that needed to be evaluated in a trial. The county appealed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals, which reversed and concluded that the county had immunity. The court said the county was maintaining a sewer system, which is a proprietary function, and the county can’t be sued regarding those types of functions. The appeals court returned the case to the trial court to consider other claims.
The trial court then analyzed Schlegel’s argument that the county’s immunity should be lifted based on an exception for failing to maintain the road. The court found that Schlegel wasn’t using the road or injured by a road condition. The exception didn’t apply, and the county was entitled to immunity from the lawsuit, the court concluded.
Schlegel appealed again to the Ninth District, which upheld the trial court decision. The Ninth District determined that the road upkeep exception involves the county’s duty to maintain the safety of the road, not of nearby properties.
Schlegel appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case.
County Failed to Repair Sinkhole and Collapsed Culvert, Property Owner Argues
R.C. 2744.02 states that “political subdivisions are liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property caused by their negligent failure to keep public roads in repair and other negligent failure to remove obstructions from public roads.”
The statute excludes “berms, shoulders, [and] rights-of-way” from the definition of “public roads.” Schlegel points out, though, that culverts and drainage pipes under a road aren’t excluded in the law. She emphasizes that the road itself collapsed, causing the damage. Had the General Assembly wanted to exclude culverts and drainage pipes under the road from the meaning of “public road,” it would have included those exceptions when writing the law, she adds.
She also contends that damage caused by failing to maintain a road isn’t limited to damage caused only to the road. There is no requirement in the law that the damage must occur to the road, she argues. The county is liable for the damage it caused by failing to maintain the road even when the damage occurs on nearby property, she maintains.
Schlegel asserts that if the county had properly maintained the road before, during, or immediately after the sinkhole occurred, her property would not have flooded and been damaged. The county isn’t immune from liability, and the arguments should be considered at trial, she argues.
She also disputes that immunity can be restored to the county under R.C. 2744.03. The law would give the county immunity if its conduct was necessary or essential to the county functions or if the county was exercising its discretion over resources and personnel with the culvert replacement project. Schlegel contends that her lawsuit isn’t about the county’s discretion to stop future sinkholes by replacing the culverts. It is instead about the county’s failure after the early May 2017 sinkhole was discovered to effectively clear the blocked culvert, Schlegel contends.
Property Owner Wasn’t Using Road, Culvert Wasn’t Part of Road, County Counters
Summit County argues that the culverts beneath the roads aren’t part of the traveled surface of the road, but instead are more like a berm or a shoulder. The county also contends that the flooding occurred in the ditch off the side of the road in the berm or shoulder area. “The roadway collapsed as a result of the faulty, rusted culvert, not because the road itself was in disrepair,” the county’s brief maintains.
The county compares this case to Baker v. Wayne Cty., a 2016 Supreme Court of Ohio ruling about a teen driver who died when her vehicle went off of a high edge drop at the side of the road. The Court found that the edge drop was part of the berm or shoulder, which aren’t part of the road under state law, so the county was immune from liability. Summit County also argues that Baker and other appellate court decisions make clear that the government’s immunity for failing to maintain a road is lifted only for those who were traveling on the road.
The county also points to experts who reported that the flooding wouldn’t have occurred if Schlegel had an appropriate drainage system around her house.
The county maintains that it was unaware of the sinkhole before Schlegel called on May 26, 2017. Because it had plans to replace the rusting culverts at the intersection, the county argues it is immune from liability for the flooding because it was exercising its discretion in scheduling the replacement project.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Roberta Schlegel: Matthew Romano, mromano@lawromano.com
Representing Summit County from the Summit County Prosecutor’s Office: John Galonski, galonski@prosecutor.summitoh.net
If Prevailing Party Is Awarded No Damages, Can It Be Compensated for Attorney Fees?
Niv Goomai and Bar Hajbi v. H&E Enterprise LLC and Avi Ohad, Case No. 2023-1541
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUE: To be awarded attorney fees for a deceptive trade practice, must the prevailing party first obtain an award or remedy on the legal claim?
BACKGROUND:
Niv Goomai and Bar Hajbi purchased a property in the Cincinnati neighborhood of Camp Washington as an investment. They paid $25,000 in October 2017 for the multifamily property, which needed renovation and repairs. Goomai and Hajbi hired Avi Ohad and H&E Enterprises for the work and paid them $50,000. The project was to be completed by January 2018.
Ohad didn’t disclose to the property owners that he lacked the license needed for the renovation and the correct city work permits. In January 2019, Ohad conveyed that the necessary items had been obtained and the renovation could continue. However, renovation and repairs weren’t completed.
In May 2019, the property owners sold the property at a loss, for $50,000. They sued Ohad and H&E Enterprises. By the time of the trial, the property owners narrowed their legal claims. They alleged breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and violation of the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
The jury found in 2021 that H&E Enterprises breached its contract and that the company and Ohad violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The jury awarded $30,604 in damages to the property owners for breach of contract and $0 for the Deceptive Trade Practices Act violation.
Property Owners Request Attorney Fees
The property owners asked to be compensated for their attorney fees. The request was based on provisions for paying attorney fees in the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. After a hearing, the trial court denied the request. In May 2022, the court stated that the property owners weren’t the “prevailing party” as meant in the Deceptive Trade Practices Act because the jury awarded no damages on that claim.
The property owners appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court decision. The First District ruled that the prevailing party under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is the party that obtained a court judgment in its favor, regardless of whether the party received a remedy as part of the judgment.
H&E Enterprises and Ohad appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
State Law Explains When Attorney Fees Can Be Awarded
The Deceptive Trade Practices Act addresses attorney fees in R.C. 4165.03(B):
“An award of attorney’s fees may be assessed against a plaintiff if the court finds that the plaintiff knew the action to be groundless. An award of attorney’s fees may be assessed against a defendant if the court finds that the defendant has willfully engaged in a trade practice listed in division (A) of section 4165.02 of the Revised Code knowing it to be deceptive.”
Renovator Argues Actual Award of Damages Required To Be Prevailing Party
H&E Enterprises states that the property owners are seeking $201,696 in attorney fees and $3,823 in costs. The company argues that Farrar v. Hobby, a 1992 U.S. Supreme Court ruling, applies to this case. The renovator maintains that Farrar explained that a plaintiff is a prevailing party only if it receives actual relief on the merits of the case in a way that modifies the defendant’s behavior, directly benefiting the plaintiff. H&E Enterprises also cites Parker v. I&F Insulation, a 2000 decision from the Supreme Court of Ohio. The case involved the Consumer Sales Practices Act. The Court ruled that a prevailing party in that type of case is the party that “is awarded either rescission or damages by the trial court.”
Because the jury awarded no damages or relief to the property owners for the violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, they aren’t a prevailing party and they’re not entitled to attorney fees or costs, the company concludes.
Property Owners Counter That Prevailing Party Not Dependent on Amount of Award
The property owners note that “prevailing party” isn’t defined in R.C. 4165.03(B). The First District consulted Black’s Law Dictionary to determine the common meaning of the phrase, and found that the prevailing party is “a party in whose favor judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded.”
The property owners reject the ruling in Farrar because the case involved a federal civil rights claim, not the state Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
They also note that they received damages on the breach of contract claim. It would have been inappropriate and duplicative to award additional damages on the deceptive trade practices claim, the property owners maintain. They state that the jury first considered whether there was a breach of contract, then decided whether there was a deceptive trade practice. The trial court noted that the claims were closely related. The property owners conclude that recovering damages only once was proper in this case, and that doesn’t prevent them from seeking attorney fees based on the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing H&E Enterprise LLC and Avi Ohad: Gary Franke, gff@garyfrankelaw.com
Representing Niv Goomai and Bar Hajbi: Ilana Linder, ilana.linder@manleyburke.com
Suspension Suggested for Columbus Attorney Who Filed Frivolous Claims
Columbus Bar Association v. Teresa A. Villarreal, Case No. 2024-0492
Franklin County
The Board of Professional Conduct recommends a one-year suspension with six months stayed for attorney Teresa Villarreal of Columbus. The board found that Villarreal committed 18 professional conduct rule violations while handling four legal matters. Several of the rule violations stem from Villarreal’s representation of a business owner seeking payment for work that was completed.
During the disciplinary investigation, the Columbus Bar Association and Villarreal agreed that the appropriate sanction for the rule violations would be a fully stayed one-year suspension with certain conditions. However, the board determined that a greater sanction was warranted. It has recommended to the Supreme Court of Ohio that the attorney receive an actual six-month timeout from practicing law.
Villarreal has objected to the board’s proposed sanction. Because she disagrees with the board recommendation, the disciplinary matter will be heard during Supreme Court oral arguments.
Attorney Represents Business Owner in Payment Disputes
Zachary and Nicole McMichaels entered a contract with K. Hovnanian Homes to build a home. Hovnanian Homes hired J. Harris Construction as a subcontractor on the project. John Harris, the owner of J. Harris Construction, said that the homebuilder didn’t pay him in full for the project after it was completed. In April 2016, Harris filed a “mechanic’s lien” on the McMichaels property to try to secure payment.
On Harris’ behalf, Villarreal filed a complaint in August 2016 in Fairfield County Common Pleas Court against the homebuilder and the McMichaels. The court noted that Villarreal filed the complaint after attending a hearing a month earlier where the lien was removed from the property. The court determined that Villarreal filed the lawsuit despite knowing that it lacked evidence because the lien had been discharged. Sanctions and attorney fees were assessed against Villarreal and Harris for filing frivolous lawsuits.
Similar scenarios played out in two other cases in Delaware County and Franklin County courts. Harris filed mechanic’s liens on properties, alleging that he wasn’t paid for work he did on a driveway and other construction projects. Villarreal represented Harris. The Delaware County Common Pleas Court found them in contempt for not complying with a court order to remove the lien. The court also found that they made false and misleading statements in legal filings and engaged in frivolous conduct. The court imposed sanctions on Villarreal and ordered her and Harris to pay attorney fees and costs.
Attorney Mishandles Custody Case With Spanish-Speaking Client
Another legal matter investigated by disciplinary authorities involved Madelyn Contreras, who hired Villarreal to represent her in a custody and child support case beginning in 2018. Because Contreras is more comfortable speaking Spanish than English, Villarreal used a Spanish-speaking independent contractor interpreter to communicate with her client.
A shared parenting agreement was negotiated between Contreras and the father in July 2020 and was approved by the court in December 2020. The agreement required each parent to notify the other parent of changes in address or phone number. Villarreal explained to Contreras how to file any updates directly with the court. In September 2020, Contreras moved from Columbus to Springfield but didn’t send her change of address to the court. In March 2021, Contreras reached out to Villarreal and asked about whether her address had been updated with the court. Villarreal said she would check but never got back to Contreras.
The children’s father filed a motion for contempt based on Contreras’ failure to notify the court of her new address. Contreras hired a new attorney. The contempt motion was dismissed in exchange for Contreras agreeing to waive $2,000 in back child support payments.
Board Recommends More Serious Sanction
In a report filed with the Supreme Court in April 2024, the board concluded that while representing Harris with the mechanic’s liens, Villarreal willfully asserted frivolous claims in the courts; made false and misleading statements; failed to act competently; and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. In the Contreras matter, the board found that Villarreal failed to handle the matter diligently, didn’t communicate with her client, and didn’t properly supervise the non-lawyer independent contractor.
The Columbus Bar Association and Villarreal agreed on a proposed sanction of a fully stayed one-year suspension with additional conditions. The board panel that heard the case determined, though, that the quantity and type of rule violations combined with the aggravating and mitigating factors warranted a one-year suspension with only six months stayed – for a six-month actual timeout. The aggravating factors, which can increase a sanction on an attorney, were that Villarreal acted with a dishonest or selfish motive, had a pattern of misconduct, and engaged in multiple rule violations. The attorney’s lack of a prior disciplinary record, her good faith effort to make restitution, and her cooperative attitude in the disciplinary process were found to be mitigating circumstances, which can lessen a sanction.
The board adopted the panel’s proposed one-year suspension with six months stayed and the conditions, which include completing continuing education on law office management and, if reinstated, working for one year with a monitoring attorney.
Attorney Argues That Sanctions Paid and Clean History Weren’t Weighed Properly
Villarreal disagrees with the shift from a fully to a partially stayed suspension as the recommended penalty for her misconduct. She emphasizes her 35-plus years working as a solo practitioner and her lack of any prior discipline during that long period. She also points out that three of the four legal matters involved one client, Harris. She argues that the board should have given more consideration to the mitigating circumstances, which counter the aggravating factors and favor a fully stayed suspension.
Villarreal contends that the Supreme Court has given significant weight to long legal careers with no disciplinary record when sanctioning attorneys. She stresses that she paid the full $48,000 in sanctions and attorney fees from her own funds in the Delaware County case. She also cooperated with the disciplinary proceedings and was remorseful, she adds. She suggests that a longer suspension of 18 months, but fully stayed, will adequately protect the public.
Bar Association Supports Fully Stayed Suspension
The Columbus Bar Association agrees with Villarreal. It explains that the attorney was cooperative, honest, and remorseful about her misconduct and that she agreed to extensive stipulations – 18 violations of 11 rules. The bar association notes that Villarreal and Harris were friends, and she agreed to assist him with the mechanic’s liens to protect him, even though she lacked experience handling liens in court. In the association’s view, the board failed to properly consider her payment of a hefty $48,000 sanction, the other mitigating factors, and her clean disciplinary history during 35 years of practicing law. The bar association agrees with a fully stayed 18-month suspension with conditions.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Teresa A. Villarreal: Alvin Mathews Jr., amathews@ubglaw.com
Representing Columbus Bar Association: Holly Wolf, holly@cbalaw.org