Wednesday, July 24, 2024
State of Ohio v. Michael Riley, Case No. 2023-1149
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
The estate of Devon R. Cook v. Montville Township et al., Case No. 2023-1285
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Medina County)
State of Ohio v. Garry F. Smith, Case No. 2023-1289
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
State of Ohio v. Chelsie N. Kennedy, Case No. 2023-1299
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
Was Trial Court’s Abrupt Denial of DNA Testing Application Improper?
State of Ohio v. Michael Riley, Case No. 2023-1149
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Does a trial court commit an error when it immediately adopts a proposed judgment entry, drawing final conclusions about the case from the prevailing party without affording the other party a meaningful opportunity to be heard?
BACKGROUND:
Michael Riley is asking the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to revisit his 2016 murder conviction. He is asking the trial court to permit new testing for DNA on bullet casings found at the crime scene. Riley argues an initial misstep by the trial judge when Riley attempted to reopen the case has cascaded into a series of errors, and he wants the process to start over.
In 2016, Juan Mitchell and Tarez Steele were with friends at the Iron City Café in Cleveland. After the bar closed, Mitchell, Steele, and friends were in the parking lot when a vehicle pulled up to engage with another group leaving the bar. A man, later identified as Michael Riley, exited the car. He wore a red V-neck T-shirt with the words “True Religion” on it, white shorts, and big block earrings. Riley shook hands with a man in the lot, then returned to the vehicle, entering the rear driver side door. Moments later, video surveillance cameras caught the flash of gunshots coming from the rear driver side window of the car. The gunfire killed Mitchell, and Steele suffered a foot injury. One of the men’s friends identified Riley as the man who got in and out of the car before the shooting started.
Melanie Edwards knew Riley by his nickname “Wilikgan” and used to buy heroin from him. She said the summer after the shooting, she was driving two brothers she knew through Cleveland. One of the brothers was on the phone with Riley, and the two were arguing about who shot Mitchell and Steele. Edwards said she heard Riley claim credit for the shooting. She later called the police and collected a $1,000 reward for the tip leading to Riley’s arrest. Edwards also showed police an Instagram photo posted under the handle “Wilikgan.” It was a photo of Riley from the day of the shooting, wearing the same distinctive outfit and earrings.
Police collected six gun shell casings from the street near the café. DNA testing conducted on the casings didn’t produce enough DNA to complete a profile of a person. Riley was indicted for aggravated murder, murder, felonious assault, and several firearm charges. After a lengthy pretrial process, Riley opted for a bench trial, which occurred in March 2018. The trial judge noted there was no DNA evidence linking anyone to the shooting, no weapon was found, and no eyewitness that identified a shooter. The judge concluded that Riley was either the shooter because he was last seen as the person in the rear driver side seat or that Riley was complicit in the shooting of the two men.
The judge acquitted Riley of aggravated murder but found him guilty of all other charges. He was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. This sentence was ordered to run consecutively with an additional 11 years of mandatory prison time for the firearms charges, resulting in a total sentence of 26 years to life.
Accused Initiates Multiple Appeals
Riley appealed his conviction in 2018, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. He filed a second appeal in 2021 that he subsequently withdrew.
In October 2022, Riley applied for postconviction DNA testing of the bullet casings. In his application, he argued that new advancements in DNA testing could reveal the identity of the person who fired the weapon. If the DNA indicates anyone other than him, he maintained he is entitled to a new trial.
A postconviction application differs from a traditional appeal of a criminal conviction and follows a specific procedure outlined in R.C. 2953.71 and the code sections that follow. After Riley submitted his application, the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office filed a brief opposing new testing.
The day after the prosecutor’s filing, the trial court sided with the state and denied Riley’s application. The entry contained no explanation for why it was denied. Riley noted that was a violation of procedure and appealed the judge’s ruling to the Eighth District.
The prosecutor returned to the trial judge three days after Riley filed his appeal. The prosecutor prepared and submitted a proposed “Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law,” explaining in the prosecutor’s words why Riley’s application should be denied. The next day, the trial judge issued an order that adopted the prosecutor’s facts and conclusion verbatim. Riley wasn’t notified in advance that the judge was going to issue the order.
Riley filed his appeal in early January 2023 and requested the Eighth District place the case on its accelerated schedule, which allows a case to move faster but limits the amount of information the parties can provide. Two weeks after he filed his appeal, he submitted his merit brief explaining the trial court didn’t follow the right procedure to deny his DNA testing application.
A week after Riley submitted his brief, the prosecutor asked the Eighth District to supplement the record by including the trial judge’s order adopting the prosecutor’s facts and conclusions. The request was made to indicate the trial judge did ultimately follow the statute and provided the required explanation for denying the DNA testing request.
Riley objected to accepting the new order, but the court accepted it. Understanding that the latest information impacted Riley’s argument to the appeals court, the Eighth District allowed Riley to file another brief to respond to the new information. In his response, he pointed out the prosecutor’s version of events was legally inaccurate, which tainted his appeal, and that he wasn’t allowed to give the judge a response to the prosecutor’s submission before the judge adopted the document verbatim.
In July 2023, the Eighth District affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the retesting. Riley appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Judge’s Abrupt Decision Unfair, Accused Argues
Riley notes that the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the fairness of proceedings when a trial court adopts one side’s position almost immediately after it is submitted. He asserts the Supreme Court of Ohio reached a similar conclusion in its 2022 State v. Bunch decision when the Court criticized the trial court’s next-day adoption of a prosecutor’s findings and conclusions. The actions “make it appear less likely that the court actually considered the entirety of the trial record and the matters filed by the parties,” the Court stated.
While the Court raised questions in Bunch, Riley argues that the Court can use his case to address the issue of the one-sided adoption of conclusions. He claims he was denied a fundamental opportunity to be heard and being denied a right to question the findings before the judge issued the order led the trial court to adopt inaccurate findings. He suggests had he been able to question the prosecutor’s proposal or submit his own version of the facts and conclusions, it could have changed the trial court’s decision.
After the judge made an abrupt decision on its denial, Riley’s legal rights were impacted again when the Eighth District accepted the order after the appeal had already been initiated, he argues. This forced Riley to have to swiftly adjust his arguments in his appeal. Riley asserts that the entire process was unfair because of the mistakes made at the trial level and the attempts to fix those errors. He asks the Court to remand the case to the trial court to allow him to respond to the prosecutor’s assessment of his DNA application.
Revisiting Matter Won’t Change Outcome, Prosecutor Asserts
The prosecutor maintains that Riley is mistaken about the process for considering a DNA testing application and that Riley had opportunities to slow down his appeal if he wanted a chance to be heard. The prosecutor notes that under R.C. 2953.73, once the prosecutor responds to the DNA application, the law doesn’t entitle the applicant to reply. The office notes while local court rules in some counties permit the applicant to respond, Cuyahoga County doesn’t have such a rule.
The prosecutor asserts that while it might appear unfair when a judge quickly adopts the prosecutor’s position, the law requires the judge to fully read the document and ensure its accuracy. The office notes the postconviction application is filed with the trial judge who heard the initial case, which often means the judge is quite familiar with the facts and issues raised. If Riley disagreed with the trial court’s decision, he had the opportunity to contest the conclusions when he filed his appeal. The office notes it was Riley’s choice to accelerate the appeal. The prosecutor asserts if Riley felt that decision was hampering his ability to make legal arguments, he could have asked the Eighth District to place the case on the regular schedule.
As to the evidence itself, the prosecutor explains the application for DNA testing must show the test results would be “outcome determinative” and could change how a trial court would rule in the case. In this matter, determining whose DNA was on the bullet casings would have no impact because the trial judge made it clear that it didn’t matter, the office asserts. The trial judge stated that all the eyewitness evidence and video recordings indicated it was most likely Riley was the shooter. Still, the judge specifically ruled that he didn’t conclude Riley was the shooter. The judge ruled that Riley was complicit in Mitchell’s killing and that he was convicted for his role in the murder based on his participation in the crime. The DNA might very well show someone else handled the gun, but that doesn’t change the fact that Riley was convicted for his role in the murder, the prosecutor maintains. The lower courts correctly denied his application, the prosecutor concludes.
Attorney General Will Participate in Case
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus curiae brief supporting the prosecutor’s position. The Court granted the attorney general’s request to share oral argument time with the prosecutor.
Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Submitted
The Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers submitted an amicus brief supporting Riley’s position. The Office of the Ohio Public Defender also filed a brief supporting Riley.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Michael Riley: Joseph Patituce, attorney@patitucelaw.com
Representing the State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Kristen Hatcher, khatcher@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: T. Elliot Gaiser, thomas.gaiser@ohioattorneygeneral.gov
Is Township Responsible for Death of Motorist Struck by Roadside Tree?
The estate of Devon R. Cook v. Montville Township et al., Case No. 2023-1285
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Medina County)
ISSUE: Is a township immune from civil liability for the death of a motorist traveling on a county road who was struck by a falling tree partially situated on parkland owned by the township?
BACKGROUND:
In August 2017, Devon Cook was driving on Medina County Road 49 with her 1-year-old daughter in the back seat. As Cook passed Austin Badger Park in Montville Township, a large ash tree fell onto her car. The fallen tree was 84 feet tall and weighed more than 10,000 pounds. The tree crushed the roof of the vehicle and fractured Cook’s neck. Her daughter was unhurt. Cook’s car drifted onto the park property, and first responders attempted to rescue her. Approximately 10 minutes later, she died from her injuries.
Cook’s estate filed a negligence and wrongful death lawsuit against Montville Township, claiming the tree was on park property. The lawsuit claimed the township examined the tree before it fell and knew it was dead because of ash borer insect infestation, but it hadn’t taken steps to remove it. The township asked the Medina County Common Pleas Court to grant it summary judgment. The township claimed it was immune from financial liability for the accident under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). The township noted Cook’s estate didn’t sue the county even though she was on a county road when the accident occurred, and the tree trunk was predominantly on the county’s property.
The trial court denied summary judgment, and the township appealed to the Ninth District Court of Appeals. The Ninth District affirmed the trial court’s decision. Montville appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Park Did Not Cause Highway Death, Township Asserts
Montville explains the trial court refused to dismiss the case early in the proceedings because “genuine issues of material fact” prevented the court from determining whether the township was immune from a civil lawsuit. The township explains that under R.C. Chapter 2744, political subdivisions are generally immune from civil lawsuits involving personal and property injuries.
The legislature created five exceptions in R.C. 2744.02 allowing a person to sue a local government for injuries. Cook’s estate claimed Montville lost its immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), which states the government body is “liable for injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by the negligence of their employees and that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used in connection with the performance of a governmental function, including, but not limited to, office buildings and courthouses, but not including jails, places of juvenile detention, workhouses, or any other detention facility.”
Montville argues this is a very narrow exception that does not apply to Cook’s accident. The township explains that Cook’s estate would have to prove three things: 1) a township employee’s negligence caused her injury; 2) it occurred on the grounds of a building used in connection with a government activity; and 3) the injury was due to physical defects on or within the grounds or buildings.
The township argues that Cook’s injuries occurred on the county road and by a tree owned by the county. Cook’s vehicle traveled after the injury onto the township’s park property, where she died. The township argues because the event that led to her death happened on county property, the death didn’t meet the requirement of occurring on the grounds of a building used in connection with the performance of a governmental function.
The township also argues none of the park buildings meet the definition of “a building used in connection” with government activity.” The township acquired 252 acres of land from a former golf course in 2015 and transformed it into three connected public spaces. The land included three buildings far from the accident scene used to house maintenance equipment for the parks.
The Ninth District noted that park properties included an active railroad overhead crossing. Montville inherited and maintained two wooden “covered shelters” below the railroad crossing that were used to protect park visitors from any debris from the railroad above and for shelter when it rained. The Ninth District asserted that there was a factual question for the trial court as to whether those constituted buildings used in connection with a governmental function.
The township argues that the immunity law wasn’t written to include buildings that have a mere incidental use for governmental purposes. Montville notes the law provides some examples, such as office buildings and courthouses, as the types used to provide a governmental function, and nothing on the park property fits the definition.
The township argues that the wording of the exception allows for a lawsuit regarding an injury from a physical defect immediately around a government building where a government employee would reasonably anticipate that the public would have access to the building. The law doesn’t envision a government body being labeled negligent because its employees didn’t inspect every remote portion of its park property for defects, especially in areas where the public wasn’t anticipated to visit.
Because Cook’s injury wasn’t the result of the negligent failure to discover and rectify a defect on the grounds of a building used in connection with a government function, her estate cannot hold Montville liable for her death, the township concludes.
Township Did Nothing About Dangerous Tree, Family Asserts
Montville Township used grant funding to transform the former golf course into public parkland, Cook’s family notes. University of Akron doctoral students prepared an extensive inventory of plants, animals, and trees on the property as part of the grant application, and the inventory made the township aware of the dying ash trees near the road, the estate asserts. Also, as part of the grant application, the township hired an expert to examine the trees. The expert warned that the ash borer infestation left many of the trees dead or dying on the property, and photos showed that the large tree that struck Cook was leafless and dead while fully leafed trees surrounded it. That tree was on property jointly owned by the township and the county, and the estate notes that under Ohio law, both governmental bodies are joint owners of the tree and jointly responsible for maintaining it.
The estate argues that its claim meets all three requirements to hold the township legally responsible for Cook’s death. The injury was caused by employee negligence because park officers knew of the dead tree and the risk of it falling into the road but did nothing about it, the estate argues. The negligence, which caused the tree to fall, occurred on township grounds, as the township didn’t maintain a tree it jointly owned, the family asserts. And the death happened on township property when Cook’s car landed there, the estate notes. The Ninth District applied the language of the law when it found the death occurred on township property because Cook’s car was on parkland when she died of her injuries, the estate notes.
The estate maintains the tree suffered from physical defects, and the tree was on the grounds of buildings the township uses to perform the governmental function of operating a public park. The estate rejects the township’s argument that R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) applies only to a building or the immediate vicinity of a building. The family notes that the Ninth District ruled that the trial court should conduct further proceedings to determine whether the covered shelters near the accident scene meet the definition of “buildings used for a government function.” The estate argues the Ninth District correctly ruled that more facts need to be considered by the trial court before determining whether the township is immune from the lawsuit.– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the estate of Devon R. Cook: Eric Zagrans, eric@zagrans.com
Representing Montville Township et al.: Tonya Rogers, tonya@bakerfirm.com
Were Statements That Victim Made to Police in Ambulance Admissible at Trial?
State of Ohio v. Garry F. Smith, Case No. 2023-1289
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Did a domestic violence victim make statements with the primary purpose of a substitute for testimony at a trial or to meet an ongoing emergency, which doesn’t require the victim to testify?
BACKGROUND:
On March 21, 2020, a 911 caller reported that a woman had been assaulted in Cleveland. Local police responded to the home of the caller, believed to be a relative of the victim. The relative hadn’t witnessed the incident. When police arrived, the victim, identified in court documents as B.B., was in the back of an ambulance with emergency medical personnel.
An officer wearing a body camera went to talk with B.B. Her eye was swollen shut, her face was swollen, blood was visible where her hair had been ripped out, and her shirt was dirty and ripped. B.B. was pregnant and said she had been struck in her knees, chest, and stomach. She explained to the officer that she lived with her fiancé, whom she later identified as Garry Smith. She said she had been drinking, she and Smith’s niece argued, and Smith intervened. He began striking B.B. and pulling out her hair. Afterward, Smith left, and B.B. walked a few blocks to her relative’s home. On the body cam video, the EMT assessing B.B. expressed concern about her rapid heart rate and asked her if she had been using drugs. She responded she had used cocaine. She told the officer more about the altercation and said Smith threatened to shoot and kill her.
She was taken to the hospital and her diagnoses included a broken nose. A domestic violence detective tried to contact B.B. by phone. Typically, detectives try to reach a victim three times and visit their residence. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, detectives stopped visiting people in person.
Smith was indicted in November 2020 and charged with two counts of domestic violence. The charges were elevated to fourth-degree felonies because Smith had an earlier conviction for domestic violence. Each count specified that B.B. was pregnant at the time of the offense. After his arraignment, Smith was released on bond.
In December 2020, another incident involving B.B. occurred. Smith was charged in January 2021 with additional offenses – two counts of felonious assault and one count of domestic violence, with gun specifications. His bond connected to the March incident was revoked, and he remained incarcerated through his trial. While incarcerated, Smith contacted B.B. more than 600 times.
Defendant Asks Court to Exclude Body Cam Video From Evidence
The cases were combined for a bench trial. Smith’s attorney filed motions to exclude evidence, including the officer’s body camera video of his discussion with B.B. The requests were denied. B.B. didn’t appear at the trial. The court found Smith guilty of all counts and specifications in both cases. He was sentenced to 9 to 12 years in prison for the December 2020 assault and one year for the March 2020 offenses.
Smith appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The court upheld Smith’s convictions for the December incident, but reversed the convictions from the March incident. The Eighth District found the admission of the body cam video violated Smith’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. The appeals court returned the case regarding the March incident to the trial court for a new trial.
The Cuyahoga County prosecutor appealed the reversal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to review the issue.
Key Cases Address Out-of-Court Statements and Right to Confront Witnesses
The brief from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office and from Smith highlight a line of cases from the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Ohio that dealt with the right of people accused of a crime to confront witnesses against them. “Testimonial” statements made out of court are typically barred from being admitted as evidence in court. “Nontestimonial” statements are allowed. The U.S. Supreme Court explained the difference between the two types of statements in a 2006 ruling, Washington v. Davis:
“Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”
The U.S. Supreme Court provided further explanation in Michigan v. Bryant (2011). The case involved a man who was shot in his home and drove to a gas station. Police talked to the man at the gas station about 20 minutes after the shooting. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the Michigan Supreme Court “employed an unduly narrow understanding of an ‘ongoing emergency’” that wasn’t required by earlier rulings. Courts must evaluate the circumstances in which the police questioning occurs and the statements and actions of the parties to determine whether it’s an ongoing emergency, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled.
Victim Statements to Police Part of Ongoing Emergency, State Asserts
The Cuyahoga County prosecutor quotes more from Bryant: “Implicit in Davis is the idea that because the prospect of fabrication in statements given for the primary purpose of resolving that emergency is significantly diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not require such statements to be subject to the crucible of cross examination.”
The prosecutor explains that certain statements made outside of court can be admitted as evidence in court. They include excited utterances and statements made for a medical diagnosis. In the prosecutor’s view, the Eighth District focused too much on 30 minutes that elapsed between when B.B. was attacked and the police interview. That approach disregards the instruction from Bryant to evaluate the full circumstances, the prosecutor contends.
B.B. was in the back of the ambulance, with obvious injuries, and in need of medical care. She was injured, in pain, had drugs and alcohol in her system, and was concerned about her pregnancy. Also, Smith’s location was unknown. His absence from the scene doesn’t eliminate the need to analyze whether there is an ongoing emergency, the prosecutor argues. It was unknown whether B.B. was entirely safe, and Smith might have been armed, the prosecutor maintains. B.B.’s primary purpose in her statements was not to create an out-of-court statement for later trial testimony, the prosecutor argues.
“[I]t is difficult to imagine how she could have formed the intent necessary for her statements to be testimonial. An objective person in B.B.’s position would have more immediate concerns than Smith’s eventual prosecution,” the state’s brief argues. The body cam video was properly allowed as evidence at the trial, the prosecutor concludes.
Victim Statements Reported Past Crime for Future Prosecution, Man Argues
Smith counters that B.B.’s statements to police were hearsay, which are inadmissible in court unless an exception applies. And no exception applies in this case, Smith argues.
He notes that B.B.’s statements were made at least 30 minutes after the alleged assault. She walked to her relative’s house, and her relative called 911. Smith states that the relative wasn’t showing concern for B.B.’s safety or the community’s safety, and there were no signs of the potential suspect. Nor did the officer alert law enforcement to be on the lookout for the suspect, Smith maintains. B.B. wasn’t requesting medical attention, and she was able to calmly tell the officer what happened. With this context, it is clear her statements weren’t excited utterances and weren’t made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment, Smith argues.
Before police arrived, B.B. was receiving medical attention, and the emergency needing police assistance had ended before their questioning, Smith contends. He argues that she would have been simply waiting to tell the story to police. The officer asked what happened to determine events that occurred in the past, similar to if B.B. had walked into a police precinct three days later to report the attack, Smith maintains. Her statements made to police on the body cam video were testimonial – to be used for a future prosecution – so the body cam video could not be used at trial, he contends.
Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Filed in Support of Prosecutor
Amicus curiae briefs supporting the Cuyahoga County prosecutor’s positions were submitted by the Legal Aid Society of Cleveland and the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. Several support and advocacy groups for victims of domestic violence also filed a joint brief supporting the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s arguments.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Kristen Hatcher, khatcher@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Representing Garry Smith from the Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s Office: Michael Wilhelm, mwilhelm@cuyahogacounty.us
How Are Sentences From Different Judges Considered in Requests for Judicial Release?
State of Ohio v. Chelsie N. Kennedy, Case No. 2023-1299
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUE: Can a judge grant an inmate’s judicial release from prison only for the prison sentences that judge imposed?
BACKGROUND:
In 2014, Chelsie Kennedy was charged in three indictments alleging she was a getaway driver in several Columbus robberies. Judge Richard Sheward of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court heard one case. Franklin County Common Pleas Judge Timothy Horton presided over the two other cases.
Kennedy pled guilty before Judge Sheward to two robberies and a one-year firearm specification. In July 2014, Judge Sheward sentenced Kennedy to a total of nine years in prison. Kennedy also pled guilty in the cases before Judge Horton to additional robbery charges and a one-year firearm specification. In January 2015, Judge Horton imposed concurrent sentences on the robbery charges, resulting in a six-year prison sentence. He ordered the six-year sentence to run consecutively to Judge Sheward’s nine-year sentence, for a total of 15 years. Kennedy’s release date was calculated to happen in August 2028.
Offender Asks Court for Judicial Release From Prison
In October 2021, Kennedy applied in each of the three cases for judicial release from prison. According to state law, “the sentencing court may reduce the offender’s aggregated nonmandatory prison term or terms through a judicial release.” It was mandatory for Kennedy to serve two years for the firearm specifications. Whether she qualified for judicial release depended on her nonmandatory sentences, which totaled 13 years, and whether she met waiting periods and other requirements. In January 2022, Judge Sheward’s successor – Judge David Young – determined Kennedy didn’t qualify for release. However, in August 2022, Judge Horton’s successor – Judge Chris Brown – found Kennedy qualified for release once she completed the nine-year sentence in the first case.
The Franklin County prosecutor appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals. The prosecutor argued a court evaluates a request for judicial release only based on sentences that court, not other courts, imposed. Kennedy countered that a court considers the “aggregate” sentence an offender is serving when deciding whether the offender can be released. The Tenth District ruled Judge Brown correctly looked at Kennedy’s total 13-year sentence across the three cases when determining that she qualified for judicial release, which she did.
The prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case.
State Argues Court Can Grant Judicial Release Only for Its Sentences
The Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office argues state law doesn’t allow all prison terms imposed by different courts to be combined when deciding whether judicial release can be granted. The prosecutor points to the language of the relevant statutes. An offender is eligible for judicial release if serving “a stated prison term that includes one or more nonmandatory prison terms.” “Stated prison term” means prison terms “imposed by the sentencing court,” the prosecutor notes. The prosecutor maintains the offender must file the request for judicial release in a case with “the sentencing court” for that case.
“The natural reading of these provisions is that eligibility is determined separately for each stated prison term, and that a sentencing court may grant judicial release only on the stated prison term imposed by that court,” the prosecutor’s brief states.
The prosecutor contends the state legislature wouldn’t have intended for courts to combine prison terms from different courts when deciding judicial release because it would make it possible for one judge to interfere with another judge’s sentence. Separate prison terms imposed by separate courts aren’t combined when determining whether an offender qualifies for judicial release across all cases, the prosecutor concludes.
Offender Asserts All Sentences Must Be Considered When Determining Judicial Release
The law says the sentencing court can reduce “the offender’s aggregated nonmandatory prison term or terms” through judicial release. Kennedy notes that “aggregated nonmandatory prison term or terms” is defined as “the aggregate of … [a]ll nonmandatory definite prison terms.” She emphasizes “all” and argues the use of “all” places no limit on the sentences that the court combines when determining whether an offender qualifies for judicial release.
Kennedy asserts that state law requires the sentencing court to total all nonmandatory sentences the inmate was serving, regardless of who imposed them. She also maintains “the sentencing court” is a court that imposed any of the sentences that are part of the “aggregated” nonmandatory prison terms. She contends Judge Brown was permitted to consider her judicial release request because that court imposed one of the nonmandatory prison terms she was serving,
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office: Darren Burgess, dburgess@franklincountyohio.gov
Representing Chelsie N. Kennedy: Steven Nolder, snolder9@gmail.com