Tuesday, February 11, 2025
State ex rel. Gatehouse Media Ohio Holdings II Inc. v. Columbus Police Dept., Case No. 2023-1327
Franklin County
In re P.M.S., Case No. 2023-1531
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Warren County)
State ex rel. Susan Boggs et al. v. City of Cleveland, Case No. 2023-1557
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Darrell Crozier et al. v. Pipe Creek Conservancy LLC et al., Case No. 2024-0034
Seventh District Court of Appeals (Belmont County)
Can Police Officers Be Crime Victims Under Marsy’s Law?
State ex rel. Gatehouse Media Ohio Holdings II Inc. v. Columbus Police Dept., Case No. 2023-1327
Franklin County
ISSUES:
- Can a police officer be considered a “victim” under the term’s definition in the Ohio Constitution?
- Can a police officer’s identity be withheld from a public record if the officer became a victim while performing official duties?
BACKGROUND:
In 2017, Ohio voters approved Marsy’s Law, which expanded the rights of crime victims. With its passage, Article I, Section 10a(D) of the Ohio Constitution defined “victim” as “a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act.”
In April 2023, the General Assembly enacted legislation to further implement the crime victim rights provided under Marsy’s Law. This included amendments to R.C. Chapter 2930. The chapter indicated that “victim” had the same definition as provided in Article I, Section 10a(D). R.C. 2930.07 requires law enforcement to redact from case documents the “name, address, or other identifying information” of a crime victim.
After Shootout, Columbus Police Redact Names of Officers
In July 2023, two Columbus police officers were in a cruiser when they were alerted to a bank robbery and that other officers were pursuing a black SUV. The officers stationed their vehicles on an Interstate 70 entrance ramp, and when the suspected SUV passed them, they pursued. The vehicle abruptly stopped in the middle of I-70, and two individuals fled the vehicle and ran off the highway. As one officer chased the suspects, a third suspect emerged from the SUV and shot the officer multiple times. The second officer saw the third suspect, later identified as Abdisamad Ismail, and fired his gun at him. Other officers also fired at Ismail, who was killed.
The first officer was transported to a hospital and treated for gunshot wounds. He underwent eight surgeries and survived the incident.
On the day of the shooting, the Columbus Dispatch newspaper sent an email request for video of the shooting from Columbus police body cameras and cruiser dash cameras. The newspaper also requested all use-of-force reports related to the incidents. Columbus police initially declined to release the video, citing that under the Ohio Public Records Act, footage that shows “grievous bodily harm” to peace officers is exempt from the act and doesn’t need to be disclosed. The Dispatch limited the request to versions of the footage redacting images of officers being harmed.
In September 2023, the Dispatch received video that redacted the identities of the officers who were shot at. The newspaper asked for the identities of the officers. Two days later, the city attorney issued a statement that, in accordance with Marsy’s Law, the identifying information of the officers was removed because they became crime victims once shots were fired at them.
The Dispatch sought a writ of mandamus from the Ohio Supreme Court in October 2023 to compel the police to provide unredacted video footage of the shootout and any use-of-force reports. The city reiterated it had no use-of-force reports, and the Dispatch limited its request to only footage about the I-70 incident. The Supreme Court approved a request to hear oral argument in the case.
Officers’ Identity Not Shielded by Marsy’s Law, Newspaper Asserts
The Dispatch argues that police officers don’t meet the definition of “victim” when performing their public duties and exercising governmental authority. The newspaper urges the Court to follow the precedent set in its 2020 City of Centerville v. Knab decision. In that case, the Court ruled that a “municipal corporation” cannot be a crime victim under the definition in Marsy’s Law. The opinion noted that voters wouldn’t have understood that a “victim” would include a city, which in its governmental capacity operates public safety agencies and responds to reported crimes.
In its court filings, Columbus police noted the definition presented to voters defines a victim as “a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed” and argues police officers are human beings and are covered by the definition. The Dispatch counters that police officers are human beings employed by the city with vested governmental powers and also receive additional safeguards for undertaking dangerous acts. The newspaper notes that had Ismail survived, he would be charged with elevated penalties that apply to crimes against peace officers.
The Dispatch also points to the concurring opinion in Centerville, in which Chief Justice Sharon L. Kennedy explained that corporations also meet the definition of person in Ohio law and that, in some instances, there is no difference between a private corporation and a municipal corporation. Municipal corporations carry out governmental functions, such as law enforcement, and “proprietary” functions, which are operations the government performs but could be handled by others, such as private corporations or contractors. Because law enforcement is a governmental function, the chief justice wrote that when the city and its officers carry out those functions, they are not “persons” under the definition in Marsy’s Law. The newspaper maintains that the opinion supports the argument that public records regarding those functions should reveal the officers’ identities.
To exempt a record from the Public Records Act, the government must prove the record sought is covered by an exemption in the law, the Dispatch explains. The newspaper argues the police department can’t clearly demonstrate that R.C. 2930.07, which calls for concealing the names of crime victims, includes the names of police officers. Without that clarity, the Public Records Act requires the release, the Dispatch concludes.
Officers Are Crime Victims, Police Department Argues
Columbus police point directly to the definition of ‘victim” in Marsy’s Law and note a “person” is a human being. The officers were shot at and meet the definition’s requirement of being “a person whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed,” Columbus police argue. There is nothing in the law that excludes police officers from being a “victim” under the definition in the law, the department asserts.
Columbus police argue the Centerville case applies to the city, which sought restitution as a crime victim for the costs of responding to a fake emergency response call. The police argue there is a significant difference between recovering the costs for responding to calls in their official capacity, and human beings being shot at while wearing a badge and gun. In this case, the officers were directly assaulted by a shooter and were the victims of a crime, the police maintain. The voters approving Marsy’s Law would have understood the difference and considered the officers as victims, the police conclude.
If the Court accepts the Dispatch’s argument, all public employees performing their official duties would be exempt from the definition of crime victim, the police argue. That would include a cashier who was the victim of an armed robbery or a court bailiff receiving a death threat, the police contend. The law is broader than the Dispatch believes and does include public employees, the department asserts. The police also note another distinction from the Centerville case. It explains, in that case, the city was urging the Court to read the word “municipality,” which voters would not typically consider to be persons, into the definition of “victim.” In this case, the Dispatch is asking the Court to exclude officers, who voters would consider to be persons. The Court shouldn’t disregard the plain language of the law, the department concludes.
Friend-of-Court Briefs Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting the police department’s position was submitted by the Ohio Attorney General’s Office. The Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge #9, and the Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio also filed a joint amicus brief supporting the Columbus police.
Oral Argument Time Shared
The Court also granted a request from the attorney general’s office to share oral argument time with the police department.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Gatehouse Media Ohio Holdings: John Greiner, jgreiner@ficlaw.com
Representing the City of Columbus Police Department: Aaron Epstein, adepstein@columbus.gov
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: T. Elliot Gaiser, thomas.gaiser@ohioago.gov
What Constitutes Force in Rape Case?
In re P.M.S., Case No. 2023-1531
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Warren County)
ISSUE: Was the evidence of force sufficient to find a juvenile delinquent for rape?
BACKGROUND:
In November 2021, a magistrate in the Hamilton County Juvenile Court found a 14-year-old, identified as P.S., delinquent for two acts of rape. The magistrate dismissed six other allegations of rape and two allegations of gross sexual imposition because of insufficient evidence.
The offenses stemmed from P.S.’s conduct while living at a Hamilton County group home for boys. His roommate, 15-year-old C.T., testified that he and P.S. played together, took walks, and rode bikes. In March 2021, a youth monitor at the home saw the teens talking on a video feed from a doorbell camera. The monitor heard C.T. tell P.S., “No, I’m not gonna do it, because I gave you oral sex twice already.” P.S. responded that he wanted C.T. and offered to kiss him.
The monitor went downstairs, and the teens were no longer at the door. He walked outside behind a shed and found P.S. behind C.T. engaged in a sexual act. The monitor testified that P.S. had both hands gripped around C.T.’s waist and was pulling C.T. toward him. The monitor asked what they were doing. He said P.S. sounded angry, saying C.T. wanted him to do it. The monitor testified that he was told by C.T. that he hadn’t wanted to have sex and C.T.’s voice was trembling and upset. In C.T.’s testimony, he said he didn’t want to have sex with P.S., but P.S. kept asking him to. The magistrate found P.S. delinquent for oral rape and anal rape.
Juvenile Court Dismisses One of Two Offenses
P.S. filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. The juvenile court judge dismissed the adjudication for oral rape, finding the evidence was insufficient. The court upheld the anal rape adjudication.
P.S.’s regular residence was in Warren County, so the case was transferred to the Warren County Juvenile Court for disposition, which is sentencing in a juvenile court case. In April 2022, the court committed P.S. to the Department of Youth Services for a minimum of one year and a maximum period not beyond P.S. reaching the age of 21.
P.S. appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision. P.S. appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted the case.
Meaning of ‘Rape’ and ‘Force’ in State Law
R.C. 2907.02, the criminal law regarding rape, states, “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force.” “Force” means “any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means or upon or against a person or thing.”
Force Wasn’t Established, Offender Maintains
P.S. argues the prosecutor had to show physical violence, compulsion, or constraint that overcame C.T.’s will and was beyond the physical exertion inherent in the sexual act itself. The standard wasn’t met, P.S. maintains. He states that he and C.T. were friends on equal footing. No evidence supported the conclusion that he took advantage of C.T., dominated or controlled C.T., or that C.T. was afraid of him, P.S. contends. He adds that the only fear C.T. expressed was a fear of getting caught and blamed.
P.S. asserts that being asked to have sex isn’t the same as being forced. He contends that without evidence of violence, compulsion, or constraint, no reasonable person could find that C.T. was forced to engage in sex only because he was asked to have sex. P.S. maintains that thrusting against another person during sex cannot constitute the “force” necessary for the criminal act of rape.
P.S. notes that Ohio law takes the victim’s and offender’s relationship into account when determining the type and amount of force necessary to be rape. The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled, for example, that a lesser amount of force constitutes rape when two people have a parent-child relationship because of the coercion inherent in the authority of a parental role, he states. However, P.S. notes, he and C.T. were both teens, he was one year younger than C.T., and they were friends. They didn’t have a relationship that would lessen how much force would be rape, P.S. maintains. He rejects the Warren County prosecutor’s citations to case law involving parental relationships with a juvenile.
Restraint and Lack of Consent Show Force, State Responds
The Warren County Prosecutor’s Office counters that the Court has ruled the force element of rape can be established if the defendant created the belief that physical force would be used if the victim didn’t submit. And the Court has stated that forcible rape is shown if the rape victim’s will was overcome by fear or duress, the prosecutor notes. The prosecutor also maintains that case law has established that holding a victim in place is also sufficient evidence of force.
The prosecutor states that C.T. verbally resisted P.S.’s requests for sex, as confirmed by the youth monitor who heard the conversation. C.T. maintains he didn’t consent to sex. The prosecutor argues force was used when P.S. made C.T. pull down his pants and physically restrained him by holding his legs and gripping him around his waist. The force was more than required for the sexual act, the prosecutor asserts.
The prosecutor contends that most of the cases cited in its brief involve adult victims or victims close to C.T.’s age and with no parental relationship to the defendant. The element of force was established by the evidence in this case, the prosecutor concludes.– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing P.M.S.: John Fischer, john@dfm-law.com
Representing the State of Ohio from the Warren County Prosecutor’s Office: Kirsten Brandt, kirsten.brandt@warrencountyprosecutor.com
Must City Purchase Property Affected by Airport Runway Expansion?
State ex rel. Susan Boggs et al. v. City of Cleveland, Case No. 2023-1557
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Do the definitions of “airport,” “landing field,” and “air navigation facility” include land adjacent to an airport that is in the airport’s approach plan?
BACKGROUND:
In July 1995, Ohio company Fouad purchased a residential property on Barrett Road in Olmsted Township. The company is owned by Fouad Rachid. He and his wife, Susan Boggs, moved into the residence with their daughter.
The property sits southwest of Cleveland Hopkins International Airport – which is in Cleveland but isn’t in Olmsted Township.
In the 2000s, the airport expanded two runways. The extension of one runway was completed in August 2004, and the other was finished in December 2008. In August 2008, Fouad filed a case in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court. Fouad complained that the expansions increased air traffic above the residence, causing excessive noise and vibrations and interfering with the use and enjoyment of the property.
The case was transferred to federal court to determine whether the airspace over the Fouad property was airport property under federal law. Federal courts concluded the airspace wasn’t airport property, and the case returned to the state court. In July 2021, the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court reopened the case on the remaining claim, which requested a writ of mandamus ordering Cleveland to acquire the property and compensate the owner.
The trial court ruled that to approve the writ, there must be a remedy that is based in statute. The court explained that state law prohibits Cleveland from using its power of eminent domain to take property outside of its boundaries, and none of the exceptions applied. The court noted specifically that no evidence in the record established that the city needed the property to construct facilities to aid the navigation of aircraft, or that planes flying over a property required the city to purchase the property. Because a remedy couldn’t be delivered through the writ, Fouad lacked standing, or the right to sue, the court concluded.
Fouad appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court ruling. Fouad appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted the case.
Owner Points to Flight Frequency and Proximity to House
The Fouad brief describes the activity above the residence as a “constant barrage of low flying, eardrum-crushing commercial flights.” Between 2009 and 2020, more than 240,000 flights flew within 200 feet of the residence when descending to one of the expanded runways. In the first four months of 2020, 3,690 flight arrivals came within 101 feet to 200 feet of the house, and one flew within 100 feet of the house, according to FAA flight data.
R.C. 719.02 permits a municipal corporation to acquire property outside of its boundaries, when necessary, for specific reasons. One of the reasons is “[f]or establishing airports, landing fields, or other air navigation facilities, either within or without the limits of a municipal corporation for aircraft and transportation terminals ….” As defined in R.C. 4561.01, “airport” means “any location either on land or water” used for aircraft to take off or touch down, and “landing fields” refers to “any location on land or water” that permits the safe landings or takeoffs of aircraft.
Pointing to airport zoning laws, Fouad argues any area that’s included in an airport approach plan and within the zones for takeoffs and landings is part of the airport’s land. Four above-ground aerial zones “adjacent to an airport and within an airport hazard area” are identified for zoning purposes in each airport’s approach plan. At the Cleveland airport, these zones all extend outside of the city limits into Olmsted Township, and Fouad’s residence sits inside the zones. Under the definitions of “airport” or “landing fields,” the residence’s location in the zones makes the property part of the airport’s land – allowing the city to acquire the residence, Fouad maintains.
Fouad also cites the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State ex rel. Royal v. Columbus (1965), which stated:
“There exists a ‘taking’ in a constitutional sense of private property for public use under Section 19, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, whenever airflights are so low and so frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with enjoyment and use of the land. And we think that a person’s residence is a use for which he is entitled to compensation whenever he can prove a direct and immediate interference with that use.”
City Maintains Laws Don’t Permit It To Take House
Cleveland reiterates the lower court rulings that Fouad has no standing to pursue the lawsuit. The city maintains there is no way to provide relief in the case because the city has no authority to appropriate property outside city boundaries.
Nor does the exception for establishing airports, landing fields, or other air navigation facilities apply to allow the purchase of the property outside city limits, Cleveland contends. Its brief maintains that “airport” means “a position on the solid part of the surface of the earth that is used by aircraft for the safe landing or taking off.” The landing fields are runways, and air navigation facilities are terminals, towers, airplane hangars, and related radar infrastructure. Those terms don’t include the airspace above the Fouad residence, the city argues. The city maintains it has no need to obtain the property in order to establish an airport, landing field, or air navigation facility.
The city also notes that the airport-related exceptions in the appropriations law, R.C. 719.02, refer only to definitions in R.C. 4561.01. There is no support for the argument that the zoning law definitions cited by Fouad should apply to the appropriations law or this case, Cleveland argues. Analyzing unrelated statutes when there is no ambiguity within R.C. 719.02 and R.C. 4561.01 is unnecessary, the city maintains.
Cleveland adds that this case was refiled in 2008, but the initial complaint was filed in 2002 after construction began to extend one of the runways. According to the city, the statutes of limitations imposed either a two-year or four-year deadline for the lawsuit. This type of claim against a political subdivision must be filed within two years, and claims of a physical taking of real property must be made within four years. Under either scenario, Fouad’s claim was filed after the deadline, the city concludes.– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Susan Boggs, Fouad Rachid, and Fouad Inc.: Daniel Lindner, daniel@justuslawyers.com
Representing the City of Cleveland: James Russell Jr., jrussell2@clevelandohio.gov
Did Attempt To Preserve Oil and Gas Rights Occur After Law Removed Them?
Darrell Crozier et al. v. Pipe Creek Conservancy LLC et al., Case No. 2024-0034
Seventh District Court of Appeals (Belmont County)
ISSUES:
- Under the Marketable Title Act, does the “time when marketability is being determined” start with the date a lawsuit is filed to declare the title has been cleared of all prior reservations of oil and gas rights?
- Does the repetition of an oil and gas reservation in a deed constitute a “specific reference” when it uses the same language as in the original deed transferring the land rights years earlier?
OVERVIEW:
The parties dispute whether a family properly preserved its rights to oil and gas underlying two properties in rural Belmont County. The family maintains the Seventh District Court of Appeals made two errors in interpreting a provision of the Ohio Marketable Title Act, R.C. 5301.47(E).
1. The appeals court should have recognized two deed transfers from the 1970s as valid “roots of title” and concluded that a 1996 estate recording preserved their mineral rights.
2. If the appeals court insisted that a 1949 deed was the root of title, not the 1970 deeds, then the appeals court should have ruled the family properly reserved its mineral rights with the wording they used in the 1949 deed.
BACKGROUND:
In 1935, several landowners, including Paul and Estella Crozier, sold 161 acres of property in Belmont County’s Mead Township to Mont and Melissa Cook. In all deeds, the sellers wrote, “EXCEPTED AND RESERVED, all of the oil & gas rights and privileges on and underlying the above described tract of land.”
Paul died, followed by Estella. In 1996, Darrell Crozier probated Estella’s will in Belmont County Probate Court. The will documented she conveyed to her heirs all of her oil and gas rights underlying 136 acres, which was her part of the 161 acres.
In 2017, Darrell Crozier and the other Estella Crozier heirs filed an action in Belmont County Common Pleas Court for a declaratory judgment, stating they held the title to the oil and gas rights that were reserved when the Croziers sold the land to the Cooks in 1935. Pipe Creek Conservancy and Melissa Karkowski now own some of that land. Pipe Creek and Karkowski contested the Croziers’ action, arguing that when they acquired the property, the Croziers’ oil and gas rights were extinguished and no longer valid.
Pipe Creek Conservancy purchased 72 acres in 2014 from Cory Miller. Karkowski owns 6 acres of land that she acquired from her parents in 2016. In the deed transferring the land to Karkowski, her mother reserved the mineral rights.
One of the legal arguments by Pipe Creek and Karkowski was that the Ohio Marketable Title Act extinguished the Croziers’ oil and gas rights. Under the act, the trial court had to determine the “root of title” for each property owner and then consider if any action taken by the Croziers retained their mineral rights.
Trial Court Determines Mineral Rights Ownership
While the surface property ownership changed hands several times before Pipe Creek and Karkowski owned it, the trial court determined a 1974 deed served as the “root of title,” which is defined in R.C. 5301.47(E), for Pipe Creek’s land. A 1973 deed was the root of title for Karkowski. Those deeds don’t mention the Croziers’ oil and gas reservation. The trial court next had to examine if any action was taken in the 40 years following the establishment of those deeds that would act as a “savings event” that retained the Croziers’ rights. The trial court found the 1996 will, which was recorded in Belmont County, was a savings event. The court ruled the Croziers preserved their mineral rights.
Pipe Creek and Karkowski appealed to the Seventh District. The Seventh District ruled that the root of title for both property owners was a 1949 deed. That deed did include the Croziers’ oil and gas reservation, with a slight revision of the original 1935 wording. However, the Seventh District ruled the wording of the Crozier reservation wasn’t specific enough to preserve the oil and gas rights. The appeals court ruled that the Croziers would have had to file something within 40 years of 1949 to preserve their rights. Since recording the will happened in 1996, it occurred after the 1989 deadline and didn’t qualify as a savings event that could maintain the Croziers’ mineral rights, the Seventh District ruled.
The Croziers appealed the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Starting Point of Title Search Begins With Lawsuit, Heirs Argue
The Croziers argue the key provision of the Marketable Title Act is determining which property transfer is considered the “root of title.” From there, researchers can determine from records the ownership of certain property rights for a piece of land. The Croziers argue the key provision of R.C. 5301.467(E) is that the “root of title” is defined as “that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title… which was the most recent to be recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being determined.”
The law doesn’t further define the meaning of “the time when marketability is determined.” The Croziers argue that phrase means the time is fixed at the date when a lawsuit is filed to claim title to a property. In their case, the date is 2017, when they sought a declaratory judgment to claim title to the oil and gas rights, they maintain. From there, the court looks to the most recent title transfer that is at least 40 years earlier than the date the lawsuit was filed. In this case, the applicable title transfers occurred in 1973 and 1974. Once those transfers are set as the roots of title, the court looks to determine whether the property owners can use those deeds to establish marketable titles, which indicates no one else owns the land.
Since the 1973 and 1974 deeds didn’t include any mention of the Crozier reservation, they qualify as a marketable title, the Croziers note. But the process continues. Under R.C. 5301.49, the title needs to be further researched to see if any action has taken place within 40 years of the root of title being established that would save any previously noted reservations in older deeds. In this case, the 1996 will recording was within 40 years of the 1973 and 1974 deeds. The will indicates the Croziers reserved the oil and gas rights underneath the land owned by Pipe Creek and Karkowski.
Because the law uses the words “that conveyance,” the trial court doesn’t go any further back in time to look for any previous period to establish the time marketability is determined, they argue. The Croziers note the Seventh District relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2022 Senterra Ltd. v. Winland decision to justify going back further in time to examine another deed as the root of title. However, the method suggested in Senterra isn’t consistent with the wording of state law, they assert.
Prior Deed Clearly Stated Oil and Gas Rights, Family Maintains
While the Croziers believe the trial court used the correct deeds as the root of title, they conceded that the 1949 deed used by the Seventh District could be a root of title. However, the Seventh District wrongly concluded that the Croziers’ reservation listed in the 1949 title was too general to preserve the mineral rights. The language in the deed made it identifiable as to what rights the Croziers had in the land and should have declared the rights preserved, the heirs conclude.
Heirs Can’t Revive Extinguished Interests, Landowners Assert
Pipe Creek and Karkowski argue that R.C. 5301.467(E) doesn’t limit the examination to a 40-year period starting with the time a lawsuit is filed. Instead, the purpose of the act is to extinguish any rights that haven’t been preserved within a 40-year period. Citing Senterra, the property owners note the law acts as a “40-year statute of limitations for bringing claims against a title of record.” The root of title has to be a title in which no actions are taken within 40 years to preserve a right, which is explained in Senterra.
The landowners note the Ohio Supreme Court reached its conclusions by citing a legal scholar interpreting the Model Marketable Title Act and point out that Ohio and several other states used the model act to craft their state laws. In this case, the trial court ended its analysis with the 1970s deeds without looking for the potential existence of a 40-year period prior to the 1996 will recording when no actions were taken to preserve an interest in the land. The appeals court noted the 1996 will recording and found that, under Senterra, it needed to look back 40 years from that event. The Seventh District determined the 1949 deed was the root of title and the deed necessary to establish ownership of the property, the landowners note.
The Seventh District cited the Supreme Court’s 2021 Erickson v. Morrison decision to determine whether the provision “excepting and reserving all of the oil & gas rights and privileges on and underlying the above described tract of land” was specific enough for the Croziers to preserve the rights. The Court ruled it wasn’t specific enough and that the rights would expire unless the Croziers took additional action by 1989, which they didn’t. The landowners argue the appeals court followed the proper procedures and found the Croziers no longer have any mineral rights on the property.– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Darrell Crozier et al.: John Finnucan, jfinnucan@gmail.com
Representing Pipe Creek Conservancy LLC et al.: Kyle Bickford, info@ohiovalleylaw.com