Wednesday, March 12, 2025
Jose G. Camara v. Gill Dairy LLC, Case Nos. 2023-1599 and 2024-0064
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Madison County)
State of Ohio v. David A. Thompson, Case No. 2024-0164
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
Keith Ashmus v. Thomas M. Coughlin Jr. et al., Case No. 2024-0264
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
Thomas E. Sauter v. Integrity Cycles LLC et al., Case No. 2024-0370
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
Did Injured Worker Prove Dairy Deliberately Removed Safety Guard From Farm Equipment?
Jose G. Camara v. Gill Dairy LLC, Case Nos. 2023-1599 and 2024-0064
Twelfth District Court of Appeals (Madison County)
ISSUE: For purposes of a workplace accident lawsuit, does an injured worker have to prove both the deliberate removal of an equipment safety guard and an intent by the employer not to replace the guard?
BACKGROUND:
In 2019, Jose Camara was working as a farmhand at Gill Dairy in Madison County. He was an experienced farmhand and had worked at Gill for two years. Camara was operating a sand spreader, which was attached to a tractor. The sand spreader was purchased new by Gill in 2011. When purchased, the machine had two safety guards that covered portions of the spinning shaft between the tractor and the sand spreader. The manufacturer attached several warnings to the spreader that read: “Danger, entanglement hazard” and “Keep guards in place.”
One of the guards covered a hydraulic pump that allowed the tractor’s power to operate the spreader. The second guard covered the shaft. Both were intended to prevent an operator’s clothing from getting caught in the spinning shaft. The guard covering the shaft had worn and fell off. The hydraulic pump had stopped working around 2016 and the guard was removed when the pump was replaced. The guard was never replaced.
Camara had told his employers it wasn’t safe to use the spreader without the guards, but he said he was told he must use it as is. In April 2019, Camara was inspecting hoses on the spreader when it appeared oil was leaking from the pump. His clothing got caught on the shaft, and he was violently tossed to the ground. He suffered severe wounds to his arms and legs.
Worker Sues Employer
Camara received state workers’ compensation benefits for his medical care and injuries. He filed an intentional tort lawsuit in Madison County Common Pleas Court, arguing that under R.C. 2745.01 his employer intentionally injured him. Under R.C. 2745.01(C), an injured worker can argue that if a safety guard is deliberately removed by an employer, a jury can presume the employer intended to injure the worker. An employer can dispute the presumption with evidence.
Camara argued that it was a deliberate decision by Gill to remove the guard and the owners failed to reinstall it even after they were warned of the safety hazard. Gill asked the trial court for summary judgment, arguing it was unknown who actually removed the guards and the company had intentions of replacing them. The trial court denied summary judgment, and a jury awarded Camara $1.9 million in damages.
Gill Dairy appealed to the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s decision. It ruled the trial court should have granted summary judgment to Gill before proceeding to trial because Camara provided no evidence that Gill had consciously decided not to replace the guards.
Camara appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. The Twelfth District also certified its decision was in conflict with a Third District Court of Appeals decision on the interpretation of R.C. 2745.01(C). The Court agreed to hear Camara’s appeal and consider the conflict.
Proof of Missing Guard After Repairs Sufficient, Worker Asserts
Camara cites the Third District’s 2016 Thompson v. Oberlander’s Tree & Landscape Ltd. ruling. In Thompson, the court found “deliberate removal” under R.C. 2745.01(C) included “a deliberate decision not to either repair or replace an equipment safety guard that is provided by the manufacturer and/or required by law or regulation to be on the equipment.” Camara asserts the Third District’s decision is consistent with several other appeals court rulings where deliberate removal under the statute was established by acts such as intentionally bypassing safety equipment on machinery or failing to install a safety device required by the manufacturer.
Camara argues the trial court correctly found the case could proceed to trial when he demonstrated the Gill owners removed one of the safety guards to repair the sand spreader and never replaced it. He also provided evidence that Gill received a quote from a supplier on the cost of the other guard, but didn’t purchase and install it until after the accident. Camera explains the legislature adopted R.C. 2745.01(C) because it recognized employees rarely have or can obtain evidence that their employer intentionally intended to cause injury. The law allows proof of the failure to replace safety equipment to demonstrate an intent to injure.
The Twelfth District is attempting to narrow the application of R.C. 2745.01(C) by adding an element that isn’t in the law, Camera argues. Until this ruling, no other court has required the worker to prove both the removal of the safety equipment and that the employer made a conscious decision not to replace it, he argues.
Proof of Intentional Actions Required, Dairy Asserts
Gill argues “deliberate removal” under the law requires proof of actions by the employer, not omissions or acts not taken. The trial court should have granted summary judgment because, at most, Camara provided evidence that the dairy owners were aware of the safety guard being removed. To constitute deliberate removal, the employee also must prove there was a deliberate decision to not repair or replace the safety guards, the owners argue.
The dairy maintains the workers’ compensation system is designed to compensate the vast majority of workplace injuries and that lawsuits against employers for intentional torts cover only very rare and dangerous situations. Under the standard Camara advocates, only proof of the lack of an operational safety guard would constitute deliberate removal and would open the door for many more lawsuits than lawmakers contemplated when they crafted R.C. 2745.01(C), Gill argues. Camara may have provided evidence of negligence, which can include the failure to take action, but intentional torts require a higher level of proof that the company deliberately chose to never repair or replace the safety guards, Gill maintains.
The dairy argues that Camara provided no evidence at the summary judgment stage that a Gill owner removed or directed the removal of the safety guard, and the Twelfth District accurately determined that Camara failed to prove deliberate removal, the dairy concludes.
Company Wrongly Interprets Law, Attorney General Maintains
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Camara and received Court approval to share oral argument time with him. The attorney general notes that the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation paid benefits to cover Camara’s injuries and is entitled to recover those funds from any judgment Camara obtained.
The attorney general argues Gill and the Twelfth District applied the wrong standard for determining deliberate removal, particularly at the summary judgment phase. All Camara needed to prove was that Gill deliberately removed the safety guard, which he did when he documented the company had removed the guard to repair the pump. Under R.C. 2745.01(C), that evidence is enough to move the case to the trial phase, where a court can further consider whether that action alone should be presumed to indicate an intent to injure the employee, the attorney general explains. At the trial level, Gill had the ability to present evidence that it intended to repair or replace the safety guards, the office argues. Gill didn’t convince the jury that it intended to repair the sand spreader, and the verdict in favor of Camara should stand, the attorney general concludes.
Friend-of-Court Briefs Submitted
In addition to the attorney general, the Ohio Association for Justice submitted a brief supporting Camara’s position. The Ohio Chamber of Commerce and Ohio Alliance for Civil Justice submitted a joint amicus brief supporting Gill Dairy. The Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys also filed an amicus brief supporting Gill.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket (2023-1599 and 2024-0064).
Contacts
Representing Jose G. Camara: Angela Lavin, amlavin@wegmanlaw.com
Representing Gill Dairy LLC: Lisa Haase, lhaase@curryroby.com
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: T. Elliot Gaiser, thomas.gaiser@ohioago.gov
Is Maximum Period of Community Control for Offender Limited to Five Years?
State of Ohio v. David A. Thompson, Case No. 2024-0164
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUE: Is the maximum period of community control under Ohio law five years?
BACKGROUND:
From 1998 to 2007, David Thompson was the pastor of World of Pentecost Church in Columbus. He admitted he drained the church’s accounts for his personal benefit and left the church in substantial debt. At a 2010 trial, he was convicted of 21 felonies, including engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity, theft, and forgery. The trial judge imposed a “split sentence,” which would later be determined to violate state criminal sentencing law.
For 19 counts, the trial judge imposed a total of five years in prison. For two counts, Thompson was placed on community control for five years. The sentences were set to run consecutively, with the community control sentence running after the prison sentence. He was also ordered to pay the church $733,048 in restitution.
Thompson appealed his sentence in 2011 but only challenged his theft conviction and the amount of restitution. The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction but remanded the case to the trial court to adjust the restitution.
Trial Court Commits Series of Sentencing Errors
In January 2015, Thompson applied for and received judicial release from his prison sentence after serving about four years. The trial judge required that he continue to pay restitution and ordered him to serve five years of community control as part of the terms of his judicial release.
In 2019, Thompson was found to have violated the terms of his judicial release. The trial court found he would have to return to prison and finish the remaining 11 months of prison time that was imposed as part of his original sentence on the 19 counts. The trial court ruled that once he finished his prison time, he would have to serve the original five years of community control imposed for the two-count conviction.
A series of appeals regarding the sentencing ensued, with the matter going to the Tenth District four times. In his last appeal, Thompson argued state law caps the total amount of community control a judge can give an offender to five years. Since he served five years of community control following his judicial release in 2015, he can’t be forced to serve another five-year term of community control, he argued.
In a 2-1 decision, the Tenth District affirmed Thompson’s latest sentence, which included the second five-year community control sanction.
Thompson appealed the decision to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Community Control Sanction Capped at Five Years, Offender Argues
Community control is defined in state law as a “sanction that is not a prison term” and is described in sections R.C. 2929.15 through R.C. 2929.18. Thompson notes the laws permit judges to impose three types of community control sanctions: residential and nonresidential restrictions, and financial penalties. A community control sanction is imposed at sentencing as a substitute for a prison term, he notes. No matter the combination selected, Thompson observes that R.C. 2929.15(A)(1) states that the duration of all community control sanctions “shall not exceed five years.”
Judicial release is permitted under R.C. 2929.20. The law allows certain offenders to have their prison terms reduced and transitioned to community control before completing their full prison term. The law states a judge “shall place the offender under an appropriate community control sanction.” Unlike R.C. 2929.15, the judicial release law doesn’t provide any other guidance as to how community control operates, Thompson argues. It doesn’t because judicial release community control is supposed to be treated as a community control sanction imposed at sentencing, using the guidelines in R.C. 2929.15, he asserts. Since R.C. 2929.15 indicates community control can’t exceed five years, the trial court couldn’t sentence Thompson to serve five years of community control as part of his judicial release, followed by five years of community control based on his original sentence. The combination would lead to him serving 10 years of community control, which exceeds the maximum allowed under R.C. 2929.15, Thompson asserts.
The Tenth District majority determined that judicial release community control was separate and distinct from community control issued at sentencing, Thompson explains. However, that interpretation misses the requirement under R.C. 2929.15 that “all” community control sanctions not exceed five years, he argues. While judicial release community control will be imposed at a later time than the community control issued at sentencing, the five-year limit applies to them collectively so that an offender remains under supervision for up to five years after release from prison or after sentencing, but for no longer, Thompson concludes.
Control Sanctions Separate and Distinct, Prosecutor Asserts
The Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office argues that community control sanctions imposed under R.C. 2929.15 and R.C. 2929.20 are separate and distinct, and the law doesn’t provide for a postconviction “merger,” as Thompson suggests.
Despite the mistakes made by the trial court in sentencing, the prosecutor maintains the trial court correctly determined it had the authority to implement both community control periods. The first community control sanction was instituted as a criminal sentence and allows an offender to be free of incarceration as long as the terms of community control are met, the prosecutor explains. Judicial release community control serves a separate purpose — it is provided to an offender serving prison time who can be released but must remain under the court’s supervision, the office adds. The two have different purposes and procedural requirements, and nothing in state law indicates the total amount of time must be limited to five years, the prosecutor maintains. The time Thompson served under judicial release community control can’t be substituted for the time he must serve under his direct sentence of community control for committing two felonies, the prosecutor concludes.
Attorney General Shares Oral Argument Time
An amicus curiae brief supporting the prosecutor’s position was submitted by the Ohio Attorney General’s Office. The Court also approved a request by the attorney general to share oral argument time with the prosecutor.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing David A. Thompson: Leon Sinoff, ljsinoff@franklincountyohio.gov
Representing the State of Ohio from the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office: Kimberly Bond, kbond@franklincountyohio.gov
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: T. Elliot Gaiser, thomas.gaiser@ohioago.gov
Did Seller Need To Disclose Sewer Line and Easement Before Property Sale?
Keith Ashmus v. Thomas M. Coughlin Jr. et al., Case No. 2024-0264
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUES:
- Is a recorded sewer easement or a sewer line located within the easement a defect that must be disclosed by a seller of residential real estate?
- Are property sellers obligated to disclose hidden physical conditions based only on the property’s current use that could inhibit a person’s use of property?
BACKGROUND:
Keith Ashmus decided to sell his house and lakefront property located in Bay Village, near Cleveland. He contacted a realtor, who began marketing the property and created a drone video. In August 2021, Thomas and Melissa Coughlin offered $1.01 million in cash to buy the property. They intended to tear down the existing house and build a new home.
The purchase agreement included a 14-day due diligence period for the Coughlins “to evaluate land and feasibility for new construction.” In October 2021, after the 14-day due diligence period had expired, the Coughlins requested a release from the purchase agreement and the return of approximately $100,000 in earnest money they had paid. The Coughlins said they found in public records a recorded easement on the property for a city sanitary sewer line that Ashmus hadn’t disclosed. The sewer line ran under the area of the property where the Coughlins wanted to build their new home. They claimed the easement was a title defect that adversely affected the property’s use or value.
They also said Ashmus failed to disclose the sewer line as a physical defect on Ohio’s Residential Property Disclosure Form, developed by the Department of Commerce. That form states that a seller must disclose any known “non-observable physical condition that could inhibit a person’s use of the property.”
Seller Sues Couple That Made Offer
When the Coughlins backed out of the purchase, Ashmus sold the property to another buyer a few months later. In March 2022, Ashmus filed a lawsuit against the Coughlins in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court, arguing they breached the contract. He requested $93,500 in damages, based on the difference between the Coughlins’ offer and the price at which he eventually sold the property. The Coughlins filed counterclaims alleging negligent, reckless, or intentional misrepresentation or failure to disclose.
Both Ashmus and the Coughlins asked the trial court for summary judgment. In May 2023, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Ashmus. The court found the Coughlins had notice of the sewer easement because it was recorded in public records. The court also determined that the Coughlins offered no evidence that the sewer adversely impacted the property value or use. The court didn’t agree that the sewer easement was a defect that had to be disclosed on the Ohio disclosure form. The couple was ordered to pay $93,500, statutory interest, and court costs.
The Coughlins appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which in February 2024 reversed the trial court. The Eighth District concluded there were factual issues that need to be determined at trial about whether the sewer line had adverse effects on the property use and value, and whether Ashmus had to disclose the existence of the sewer line. The court rejected the summary judgment requests from both sides.
Ashmus appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted the case.
Seller Argues Sewer Line Wasn’t Defect That Required Disclosure
Ashmus contends that the sewer easement is a public record and appeared on the title documents obtained by the Coughlins. The public record was constructive notice to the couple of the existence of the easement and the sewer line, Ashmus maintains.
He also argues easements aren’t a defect that a seller must disclose on the Ohio Residential Property Disclosure Form in Section N, which is titled, “Other Known Material Defects.” A separate section of the form does require the seller to disclose the property’s physical condition, including the nature of the sewer system servicing the property. Ashmus notes that he listed “public sewer” in that section. He contends, however, that neither the recorded sewer easement nor the sewer line had to be included in Section N, which requires sellers to list any “non-observable physical condition that could inhibit a person’s use of the property.” Nothing in state law or on the form indicates that a sewer easement or sewer line is something that must be listed, Ashmus argues.
Ashmus also maintains that the form’s purpose is for sellers to disclose physical defects based on how the property is currently used. He points out that sellers fill out the form when listing a property for sale – before knowing any potential buyer’s intended use of the property. Sellers don’t have a duty to anticipate a future buyer’s possible changes to the property’s current use or configuration, he contends. The purchase agreement wasn’t based on the Coughlins’ ability to build in a particular location on the lot, and they offered no proof that they told him where they intended to build their house until after the contract was entered and the due diligence period expired, Ashmus argues. He also maintains that the property’s value isn’t adversely impacted by the sewer line.
Buyers Counter Seller’s Nondisclosure Was in Bad Faith
The Coughlins maintain that Ashmus knew of the primary sewer line that ran diagonally under his property, linking his neighborhood with the city’s main sewer system. They also note the property was marketed as ideal for new construction.
They argue there is a factual question whether Ashmus completed the property disclosure form in good faith. The form requires sellers to answer all questions, including noting if a question isn’t applicable or if the answer is unknown, the Coughlins state. They maintain that Ashmus left Section N, regarding other known material defects, blank. Ashmus was required to disclose the existence of the sewer easement on the form because he knew the sewer line was buried under the land and could inhibit the use of the property, they argue. They note it wasn’t possible to build their house where they wanted because relocating the sewer line was too impractical and costly.
The Coughlins argue reasonable jurors in a trial could find that the sewer easement and line impaired the property’s use or value. They note that they notified Ashmus of the defects well before the closing date, and he had 30 days to remove them, but he declined. The couple contends that, as a result, they were entitled to terminate the agreement, which they did.
They also question how easy it supposedly was for buyers to find the sewer line easement in public records. And although an easement existed, that reality didn’t mean there was actually a sewer line under the property that was connected to neighboring properties, they maintain. Even if the Ohio disclosure form didn’t require listing the sewer line, Ashmus was still obligated to inform buyers of the condition under state law, the Coughlins argue. A seller who in good faith discloses all that the seller knows about a property doesn’t have to worry about how a future property owner might use it, they conclude.
State Realtors Group Files Brief
The Ohio Realtors submitted an amicus curiae brief supporting Ashmus’ position that underground utilities, such as sewer lines, that can be found through a recorded easement don’t need to be disclosed on the property disclosure form.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Keith Ashmus: Mark Rodio, mrodio@frantzward.com
Representing Thomas Coughlin Jr. and Melissa Coughlin: Kendra Davitt, knd@pwfco.com
Does One Year Deadline to Refile Case Fall on Anniversary Date of Dismissal?
Thomas E. Sauter v. Integrity Cycles LLC et al., Case No. 2024-0370
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUE: When refiling a lawsuit, does the deadline for filing within a one-year period fall on the anniversary date of when the case was voluntarily dismissed or the day after?
BACKGROUND:
In June 2018, Thomas Sauter test-drove a motorcycle at Integrity Cycles. He suffered an injury from an accident in the company’s parking lot. Sauter filed a bodily injury lawsuit against Integrity Cycles and owner Frank Ferri on March 25, 2020. Sauter voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit on Jan. 5, 2022, giving notice to the other parties that he was reserving his right to refile his claims within one year. Citing the Ohio Savings Statute, R.C. 2305.19, Sauter refiled his lawsuit against Ferri and Integrity Cycles on Jan. 6, 2023.
Integrity Cycles asked the Franklin County Common Pleas Court to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing Sauter missed the deadline to refile by one day. The trial judge agreed and dismissed the case. The judge cited the Tenth District Court of Appeals 2017 decision in Shue v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab & Corr., which found the filing deadline is the “anniversary date” of the day of dismissal, and Sauter needed to file by Jan. 5, 2023, to move forward with his case.
Sauter appealed to the Tenth District. In its 2024 opinion in Sauter’s case, the Tenth District cited the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2016 Cox v. Dayton Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. decision. In Cox, the Supreme Court stated that when a filing deadline is “12 months from a particular day,” the deadline falls on the same numerical day of the month from the date the computation begins. The Tenth District indicated it was overruling its Shue decision and found Sauter had until Jan. 6, 2023, to file.
Ferri and Integrity Cycles appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Laws, Court Rule Points to Anniversary Date, Business Asserts
Integrity Cycles explains the parties disagree on the two ways to calculate the date for a year. The favored way, the business asserts, is to use the “anniversary date” method. The company notes that R.C. 1.14 and Rule 6(A) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure call for the anniversary date method by stating one year starts from the day following the dismissal of the lawsuit and closes on the first anniversary of the day of the day the case was dismissed. In this case, Sauter dismissed his case on Jan. 5, 2022. The start of the one-year period began on Jan 6. 2022, and ended on the first anniversary, Jan. 5. 2023, Integrity Cycles asserts. The anniversary date method is chosen because lawmakers are aware that most years are 365 days long, while leap years are 366. To adjust for the differences, the anniversary date method makes it clear when the year has concluded, and citizens, just like they celebrate a birthday or wedding anniversary, know the date always falls on the same date.
The savings statute states that “the plaintiff's representative may commence a new action within one year after the date of the reversal of the judgment or the plaintiff's failure otherwise than upon the merits or within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later.” Integrity Cycles argues nothing in the law indicates the filing deadline starts one year after the day after the case is dismissed. The Court should read the savings statute consistently with the Civ.R. 6(A), R.C. 1.14, R.C. 1.44, and R.C. 1.45, and determine the deadline falls on the date the case was dismissed.
Deadline Is Day After, Buyer Argues
Sauter argues Integrity Cycles misinterprets the civil rule and state laws. He asserts the Supreme Court correctly noted in its Cox decision that the savings statute means a case must be refiled “within one year after” the case is dismissed. Sauter notes that R.C. 2305.19 doesn’t define “year,” and the Revised Code sections generally define a year as “12 consecutive months.” When the number of months is computed from a “particular day,” Sauter notes, “the period ends on the same numerical day in the concluding month as the day of the month from which the computation begins.”
In his case, the calculation begins on Jan. 6, 2022, the day after he dismissed the case. The refiled case deadline would be the same numerical day 12 months later, Jan. 6, 2023. The Tenth District correctly followed the Supreme Court when ruling that he refiled his case on time. He notes in other Revised Code sections, the General Assembly uses the term “calendar year” to distinguish when a date should be 365 days later or 366 days in a leap year. Because R.C. 2305.19 must follow the general 12 consecutive month method, the deadline must fall one year from the day after the deadline, he concludes.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Integrity Cycles LLC et al.: Joseph Butauski, jbutauski@sbcglobal.net
Representing Thomas E. Sauter: Gregory Wetzel, gwetzel@hrabcaklaw.com