Tuesday, August 19, 2025
State of Ohio v. George C. Brinkman, Case No. 2023-0891
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Felix Maurent v. Keith Folley, warden, Case No. 2024-1132
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Lorain County)
Cheri S. Moore, individually and in her capacity as parent of P.C.M., a minor v. Mercy Medical Center et al., Case No. 2024-1212
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
Death Penalty Appeal in Triple Homicide Case Returns to Supreme Court
State of Ohio v. George C. Brinkman, Case No. 2023-0891
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
In July 2021, the Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously invalidated George Brinkman’s guilty plea for a 2017 triple homicide. The Supreme Court vacated his convictions and sentence, concluding that the trial court failed to fully advise Brinkman before his plea of the constitutional rights he would be waiving. The case dealt with charges for the murders of a North Royalton woman and her two daughters. It returned to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court for new proceedings.
On remand, Brinkman waived a jury trial and pled guilty before a new three-judge panel to multiple counts of aggravated murder, kidnapping, and gross abuse of a corpse, and to specifications. In November 2022, the panel found Brinkman guilty on all counts. The judges then heard from experts during the mitigation phase in 2023. The court sentenced Brinkman to death on the aggravated murder convictions, plus 47 years for the other offenses.
A sentence of death triggers an automatic appeal to the Supreme Court.
Mother and Daughters Found Murdered in North Royalton Home
On June 11, 2017, Suzanne Taylor and her daughters were found dead in Taylor’s house. Taylor had been stabbed and her throat had been cut. Her daughter Taylor Pifer, 21, died of asphyxia from being smothered with a pillow, and her daughter Kylie Pifer, 18, had been strangled with a phone-charging cord.
Brinkman had been friends with Suzanne Taylor since high school. When Brinkman didn’t have a place to stay in the winter months, she would let him live at the house. On June 10, 2017, the day before the family was found dead, Brinkman had texted Taylor and met her at the house. After the bodies were discovered, police looked for Brinkman and located him at another friend’s house on June 12. An eight-hour standoff with law enforcement ensued. Afterward, Brinkman was taken to the North Royalton Police Department and questioned regarding the deaths of Taylor and her daughters. He at first denied responsibility for the murders, but later confessed.
In his second appeal in this case to the Court, Brinkman raises 22 legal arguments contesting his sentence of death and aspects of the trial court proceedings. Among them:
Trial Court Statement Regarding Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Questioned
Following closing arguments at Brinkman’s second trial in this case, the presiding judge on the panel announced its decision, stating that “the panel finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances are not outweighed by the mitigating factors.”
Brinkman argues that to impose the death penalty, the panel must find that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, not the other way around. He contends that the panel improperly shifted the burden to him to prove that his mitigating factors outweighed the state’s aggravating circumstances. Brinkman notes that the Cuyahoga County prosecutor was concerned, too, returning to the panel for clarification that the court hadn’t improperly shifted the burden of proof to Brinkman. The court made a statement that it found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones beyond a reasonable doubt.
Brinkman contends that the panel imposed an illegal sentence and clarified its statement after the sentencing hearing – which was improper. When a court fails to make the correct determination regarding aggravating and mitigating factors, Ohio law requires that a life sentence, rather than death, be imposed, Brinkman maintains.
The prosecutor’s brief counters that “despite unorthodox phrasing,” the record was clear that the panel found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors. To ensure there was no ambiguity, the panel clarified the language the next day for the record, the prosecutor explains. Any inaccurate reference regarding the legal standard was simply a misstatement, no improper burden shifting occurred, and the death sentence was legally imposed, the prosecutor concludes.
State and Offender Debate How Expert Opinions Should Have Been Weighed
Brinkman also contests the panel’s handling of two expert witnesses who testified on his behalf during mitigation. The experts from Sweden – one licensed in clinical pharmacology and the other a neuropsychologist – submitted a 61-page report. They focused on four medications Brinkman was taking in June 2017, mainly for diabetes and related medical conditions. They concluded that Brinkman had an elevated risk of adverse drug reactions from the combination of his medications. The doctors believed those adverse reactions could include increased susceptibility to aggression and impulsive behavior, Brinkman’s brief states.
The prosecutor questioned the experts’ credentials, arguing neither had education, training, or experience in diagnosing or treating patients with diabetes, diabetes neuropathy, or chronic pain, or regarding the specific drugs Brinkman was taking. The research area of one expert focused on epilepsy and pharmacology, and the other expert studied epilepsy and Alzheimer’s disease, the prosecutor noted to the court.
The panel determined that the doctors had expertise in drug interactions, but they wouldn’t be recognized as qualified experts in other areas. The panel allowed the experts to testify, but found their report lacked scientific integrity and they didn’t meet with Brinkman. The panel gave the experts’ testimony no weight as a mitigating factor.
Brinkman contends that the panel’s refusal to recognize the doctors as relevant experts and to give any weight to their report and testimony violated his constitutional rights to a fair sentencing proceeding. He argues the panel constructed an arbitrary barrier blocking his mitigation evidence.
The prosecutor maintains that the experts never showed that Brinkman experienced any of the concerning possible side effects from the medications. However, the state’s expert found the claims of possible drug-induced aggression, violent behavior, and more weren’t supported by the evidence. The state’s expert also noted that Brinkman’s aggression was limited only to the victims, not directed toward others Brinkman interacted with at the time, including law enforcement. The prosecutor concludes that the court fairly evaluated the expert opinions.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing George C. Brinkman: Timothy Sweeney, tim@timsweeneylaw.com
Representing the State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Saleh Awadallah, sawadallah@prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us
Can Length of Inmate’s Sentence Be Appealed After Prisoner Has Been Released?
Felix Maurent v. Keith Folley, warden, Case No. 2024-1132
Ninth District Court of Appeals (Lorain County)
ISSUE: Can a prison warden appeal a writ of habeas corpus granted to an inmate if the inmate has been released by a common pleas court?
BACKGROUND:
Two business partners were engaged in a bitter legal dispute. One partner hired Felix Maurent to act as a “hitman” and intimidate the other business partner into dropping the lawsuit. In February 2011, Maurent went to the partner’s Delaware County home, where he threatened the man and his family at gunpoint. Maurent was arrested in 2012. He was indicted on 15 counts, including aggravated burglary, kidnapping, and extortion, with some of the sentences carrying three-year gun specifications.
In July 2012, a jury found Maurent guilty on most charges. The Delaware County trial judge sentenced Maurent to eight years for aggravated burglary. The judge merged all the gun specifications and sentenced Maurent to three years in prison for using a gun to be served consecutively to the burglary sentence. The trial court entry stated the court imposed five years in prison on one count of kidnapping and one count of extortion. The entry noted those sentences would be served concurrently with the eight-year prison sentence. The entry finally indicated that Maurent was sentenced to one year each for two more counts of extortion, and stated “the terms as to Counts 14 and 15 are to be served consecutively.”
The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (DRC) initially computed Maurent’s sentence as 11 years. Maurent’s final years in DRC were spent at the Grafton Correctional Institution in Lorain County. The DRC’s computation date listed Maurent’s release date as July 2023. But as the day neared, the department recalculated his sentence to be 13 years in prison.
Having received nearly five months of jail-time credit before his sentencing, Maurent filed for a writ of habeas corpus in Lorain County Common Pleas Court in March 2023. He argued he had served his 11-year sentence. Through Grafton Warden Keith Folley, the state of Ohio objected to the release and maintained that Maurent must serve his full 13-year sentence.
Trial Court Considers Change to Sentence Calculation
The Lorain County trial court examined Maurent’s 2012 sentencing entry. The court observed that “the terms as to Counts 14 and 15 are to be served consecutively” doesn’t say whether those were meant to be served consecutively to the 11-year sentence or consecutively to each other and concurrently to the 11-year sentence. Because of the ambiguity and the DRC’s long-standing position that Maurent’s total sentence was 11 years, the court granted the writ. Maurent was released from prison in July 2023 and completed postrelease control in July 2024.
Folley appealed Maurent’s release to the Ninth District Court of Appeals. Folley also filed for an emergency stay of judgment of the trial court ruling to prevent Maurent’s release. The stay was denied. The warden filed a similar emergency stay with the Ninth District, which was denied because the warden didn’t comply with local court rules when filing. The warden didn’t refile for the emergency stay.
The Ninth District dismissed the warden’s case as moot because Maurent had been released from prison.
The warden appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Appeal Should Be Heard, Warden Argues
In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth District stated it followed other appeals courts in finding that when a prisoner is released from custody, an appeal of a decision discharging the inmate is moot. The warden maintains the case isn’t moot because the state is entitled to argue that Maurent can be returned to prison. The warden explains the Ninth District rejected the argument because the state didn’t secure a stay that would have kept Maurent in prison until the issue was resolved.
The warden notes the dissenting opinion, in which one of the appeals court judges observed it isn’t necessary or fair to require the decision to release an inmate to be stayed pending appeal. If the appeal is wrong and the stay was issued, the result would be that the inmate would be wrongfully in prison longer than permitted, which the dissent described as a grave injustice. Without a stay, Maurent would suffer no harm being free until an appeal by the state was resolved, Folley maintains. Returning Maurent to prison to serve the remaining two years if the appeal were successful wouldn’t be an injustice to Maurent, Folley asserts.
Folley argues the Ninth District should consider the wording of Maurent’s 2012 sentencing entry and determine if the Lorain County trial court correctly interpreted the entry.
Release Should Stand, Former Inmate Maintains
Maurent explains that initially, and for 11 years, DRC calculated his sentence to be 11 years. Maurent said it is unclear why the warden took it upon himself to contest the length of the sentence. The Delaware County trial court that sentenced him, and the Lorain County trial court that released him, are the only bodies that can determine his sentence, Maurent argues, not the DRC.
Maurent cites decisions from Ohio appeals courts and federal courts, which have declared that once a prisoner has been released, any appeals of the case are moot. Maurent also notes he had already completed postrelease control, and there is nothing left for a court to decide, so the case is moot.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Felix Maurent: Margaret Lieux, maggielieux@gmail.com
Representing Keith Folley, warden: Mathura Sridharan, mathura.sridharan@ohioago.gov
Can Trial Court Strike Affidavit That Contradicts Expert’s Earlier Report?
Cheri S. Moore, individually and in her capacity as parent of P.C.M., a minor v. Mercy Medical Center et al., Case No. 2024-1212
Fifth District Court of Appeals (Stark County)
ISSUES:
- Does the “sham affidavit rule” apply when the testimony in an affidavit contradicts prior statements that weren’t made under oath?
- Does an inconsistency or contradiction within an affidavit justify a court order striking the affidavit?
BACKGROUND:
In January 2022, Cheri Moore filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in Stark County Common Pleas Court. She alleged medical negligence related to the labor and delivery of her child, P.C.M., on May 29, 2015.
Two days before P.C.M. was born, an ambulance transported Moore to a medical facility operated by Mercy Medical Center. Moore was about 37 weeks pregnant, and her water had broken. Dr. Godwin Meniru, an obstetrician, managed Moore’s care after she arrived at the hospital at about 7 p.m. on May 27. Meniru prescribed medication to induce labor.
Meniru’s shift ended on May 28 at 7 a.m., and Moore’s care transferred to Dr. Albert Domingo. During the afternoon, Domingo ordered an increase in the labor-inducing medication if needed. In the evening, there were indications of fetal distress with the excessive uterine activity. P.C.M.’s heart rate also dropped for prolonged periods.
Domingo’s shift ended on May 29 in the morning, and Meniru began his shift at 7 a.m. The nursing staff called Meniru, reporting the decelerating heart rate and only partial progress in the delivery. Meniru performed an emergency cesarean section and delivered P.C.M. a few minutes before 9 a.m. The infant was intubated and diagnosed with medical complications.
Medical Expert for Mother’s Side Submits Report
In her lawsuit, Moore named both doctors, other staff, and Mercy Medical Center. She alleged that the doctors were negligent in not ordering the C-section earlier, causing permanent and substantial injuries to the child. One of Moore’s experts on the medical standard of care was Dr. Martin Gubernick, an obstetrician/gynecologist. Gubernick’s expert report was submitted in November 2022. It stated that the standard of care required that the child should have been delivered on the evening of May 28 when there were signs of fetal intolerance and excessive uterine activity.
In March 2023, Meniru was deposed. The same day, Meniru also requested summary judgment from the court, asserting that Gubernick failed to show that Meniru had breached the standard of care. Meniru stated that he wasn’t handling Moore’s care on May 28, when Gubernick’s report claimed the C-section should have been ordered.
Moore was given time to review Meniru’s deposition and respond to his motion. In her April 2023 response, Moore asserted that Meniru was in the hospital on May 28 and signed an order regarding the dose of the labor-inducing medication. The response included an affidavit from Gubernick along with his earlier expert report. Gubernick’s affidavit stated that Meniru should have cut the medication after signs of fetal distress began on the evening of May 28. Meniru also should have ordered a C-section the morning of May 29 within 30 minutes of being notified that P.C.M. was in distress, according to the affidavit.
Obstetrician Asks Court To Strike Expert’s Affidavit
Meniru filed a motion to strike Gubernick’s affidavit. Meniru argued it was a “sham affidavit” because it contradicted Gubernick’s initial report, with the goal to prevent a summary judgment decision that would remove Meniru from the lawsuit. The trial court struck the affidavit and granted summary judgment to Meniru. Moore voluntarily dismissed the claims against the other defendants.
Moore appealed to the Fifth District Court of Appeals, which upheld the trial court’s summary judgment decision. The Fifth District determined that Gubernick’s affidavit presented a new opinion that contradicted his earlier opinion about the standard of care provided by Meniru.
Moore appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to review the issues.
Parent Argues Sham Affidavit Rule Isn’t Applicable
Moore contends that the “sham affidavit rule” historically has been applied when there are inconsistencies in testimony and typically when one party is trying to avoid damaging statements made in an earlier deposition. This is the first case where the rule has been applied to strike an affidavit based on unsworn statements in an earlier expert report that seem to contradict the affidavit, Moore asserts. She argues, though, that the sham affidavit rule doesn’t apply to these circumstances, and the lower courts incorrectly interpreted the scope of the rule.
She contends that inconsistencies between the report and the affidavit aren’t relevant because Gubernick’s report wasn’t testimony made under oath. If there are inconsistencies within an affidavit, that is an issue of credibility, not one that determines whether the information can be presented in court, Moore maintains. Credibility issues can only be decided by the jury as the factfinder, she argues.
In addition, Moore asserts that Meniru ordered a change in the dose of the labor-inducing medication on May 28, a date he said he wasn’t handling her care. She contends that Meniru also revealed new information in his deposition by stating he was notified of the ongoing fetal distress twice between 7 and 8 a.m. on May 29 after his shift started. Key factual issues are in dispute about when Meniru was involved in her care, and the court shouldn’t have granted summary judgment in his favor, Moore concludes.
Obstetrician Asserts That Expert’s New Claims Weren’t Based on New Information
Meniru counters that he wasn’t involved in Moore’s care on May 28 and wasn’t informed about her condition during Domingo’s shift. The order he signed on May 28 was a required written sign-off in the electronic medical records regarding his previous verbal order during his first shift, Meniru maintains. He notes that the nursing staff followed Domingo’s orders on May 28, when Domingo was handling Moore’s care.
Meniru contends that when the affidavit, made under oath, incorporated Gubernick’s earlier expert report, that addition converted the report into statements made under oath. The affidavit was a sham because it introduced new and contradictory claims that weren’t based on new information, Meniru argues. He asserts that the new evidence Gubernick cited in his affidavit was available to him when he compiled his initial report. Gubernick raised additional concerns in the affidavit in an attempt to keep him as a defendant in the case, Meniru contends.
Meniru also argues the sham affidavit rule doesn’t depend on the type of statements made under oath. Instead, the rule’s prohibition encompasses an affidavit containing contradictory information that is submitted with the goal of avoiding summary judgment, the doctor asserts. He also contends that an inconsistency in an affidavit speaks to the admissibility of the information in court, allowing a trial court to strike the affidavit if the plaintiffs don’t offer an adequate explanation for the changes presented.
Additional Briefs Filed on Both Sides
The Ohio Association for Justice filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Moore. An amicus brief supporting Meniru’s position was submitted by the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.
Other Parties Won’t Argue Before Court
Because Mercy Medical Center, Domingo, and other parties named in the lawsuit didn’t file briefs in the case, they have waived participation during oral arguments before the Supreme Court.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Cheri S. Moore: Louis Grube, leg@pwfco.com
Representing Godwin I. Meniru, M.D.: Jeanne Mullin, jmullin@perez-morris.com
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