Wednesday, March 27, 2019
State of Ohio v. Cedric N. Jeffries, Case no. 2018-0338
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
State of Ohio v. John M. Howard, Case no. 2018-0376
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
Gloria Wesolowski v. Planning Commission, City of Broadview Heights et al., Case no. 2018-0711
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
State of Ohio v. Steven Allen Craig, Case no. 2018-0146
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
Does Rape Shield Law Allow Evidence of Victim’s Earlier Sexual Abuse?
State of Ohio v. Cedric N. Jeffries, Case no. 2018-0338
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Does the Ohio rape shield law’s prohibition on admitting specific instances of the victim’s sexual activity apply to questions related to prior sexual abuse?
BACKGROUND:
A Cuyahoga County grand jury indicted Cedric Jeffries in May 2016 on two counts of rape and two counts of kidnapping. The charges involved sexual abuse alleged by a minor girl identified as D.S. in court documents.
Jeffries isn’t D.S.’s father, but Jeffries and the girl’s mother had been in a relationship. After the child lived in three foster-care homes, Jeffries’ mother obtained custody of D.S. when she was 6 years old. The girl moved in with Jeffries’ mother in the home where Jeffries also lived.
Defense Wants to Discuss Earlier Report of Sexual Abuse
Before trial, the court considered Jeffries’ request to ask D.S. about a report she made a decade earlier that a foster brother sexually assaulted her when she was about 5 years old. The trial court denied the request, concluding that questioning on this issue was barred by Ohio’s rape shield statute.
At the trial before a jury, D.S., then 16, testified that Jeffries began touching her sexually after she moved into the home when she was 6 and that he continued to sexually abuse her for the next 10 years. She said she didn’t tell anyone for years because she feared she wouldn’t be believed and would be sent back to foster care.
In March 2016, though, D.S. told her high school principal about the sexual abuse. A few weeks earlier, she said, Jeffries had sexual intercourse with her, and she decided to run away from home. The Cuyahoga County prosecutor indicated that Jeffries called the teenager more than 30 times that night and texted her, in part asking her not to “tell on” him. Jeffries also testified, denying any inappropriate sexual activities with D.S. and explaining that the text wasn’t what he had typed but instead resulted from the phone’s autocorrection feature.
The jury found Jeffries guilty on all counts. The court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently, resulting in a prison term of 15 years to life, and he was classified as a sex offender.
Appeals Court Rejects Arguments
Jeffries raised several arguments in an appeal to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, but the court affirmed his convictions. Jeffries appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, raising three issues. The Court agreed only to consider his argument about whether the rape shield law applies to questions about a victim’s earlier sexual abuse.
Statute Doesn’t Prohibit Scrutiny of Prior Sexual Abuse, Jeffries Argues
Quoting a 1979 Ohio Supreme Court decision (State v. Gardner), Jeffries’ brief notes that the legislature enacted the rape shield law to protect the accuser’s privacy by “discourag[ing] the tendency in rape cases to try the victim rather than the defendant,” and by excluding inflammatory and harmful evidence.
Jeffries maintains, however, that the statute applies only to consensual sexual activity, not to earlier sexual abuse. He points to a 2011 ruling from the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which concluded that the reference in the law to “specific instances of the victim’s sexual activity” must refer to only the victim’s consensual sexual activity because the statute prohibits the admission of evidence as to reputation or that is opinion. When the General Assembly decided to protect a victim from opinion and reputation evidence, its intention was to describe evidence of character, over which the victim has control, the appeals court stated.
In Jeffries’ case, the Eighth District relied on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Boggs (1992). The question in that case was whether a defendant can cross-examine someone alleging rape about an earlier false accusation of sexual assault. The Court stated that, based on state law, information about other sexual activity, whether consensual or nonconsensual, cannot be admitted at trial. Even so, Jeffries argues, that conclusion wasn’t central to the Court’s direction to the trial court to hold an in camera hearing to determine whether sexual activity of any kind took place. Boggs isn’t on point with the issue in this case, Jeffries asserts. He also contends that the Court in Boggs didn’t analyze the statute to determine whether the interpretation produced unreasonable or absurd results, led to violations of constitutional rights, or properly favored the accused.
Had the trial court in his case decided the rape shield law permitted information about earlier sexual abuse, Jeffries maintains that he could have raised issues about D.S.’s credibility by comparing her quick reporting of the foster brother’s abuse with her delay of years before she, as a teenager, accused him of rape. He believes the truth-finding process was hindered in his case and asks the Court to overrule the Eighth District’s decision.
Law Doesn’t Distinguish Between Types of Sexual Activity, Prosecutor Maintains
The Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office points to the definitions in state law of “sexual activity,” “sexual conduct,” and “sexual contact” that apply to sex offenses. When the General Assembly wanted to describe a sexual offense as activity that is nonconsensual, it included language to make that clear, the office notes. The prosecutor cites the phrase “purposely compels” in 2907.02(A) as an example. However, in the rape shield law, 2907.02(D), there are no qualifications. If the legislature intended to qualify the definitions to apply only to consensual sex, it would have done so explicitly, the prosecutor argues.
The prosecutor maintains that the Seventh District didn’t consider these statutory definitions. The Seventh District instead decided that testimony in the form of an opinion or as to reputation are presented to prove character, which reflects qualities that are under a person’s control. The prosecutor counters that character and character traits aren’t only those qualities over which an individual has control, but can include inherited traits, such as intelligence. Jeffries argument doesn’t hold up on this point, the prosecutor reasons.
“The potential psychological harm victims, especially child victims, could suffer for having to recount the intimate details of their past traumas and using that information to discredit them – like what Jeffries sought to do in this matter – will discourage some victims (and parents of child victims) from reporting a subsequent sexual assault,” the prosecutor’s brief states.
The prosecutor maintains that the Court in Boggs directly addressed whether nonconsensual sex was included within the scope of R.C. 2907.02(D):
“[T]he trial court must ascertain whether any sexual activity took place, i.e., an actual rape or consensual sex. If it is established that either type of activity took place, the rape shield statute prohibits any further inquiry into this area,” the Court’s opinion stated. “Only if it is determined that the prior accusations were false because no sexual activity took place would the rape shield law not bar further cross-examination.”
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Cedric N. Jeffries from the Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s Office: John Martin, 216.443.3675
Representing State of Ohio from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office: Mary Frey, 216.443.5074
Must Trial Courts Repeat Notice of Possible Prison Sentence at Community-Control Revocation Hearings?
State of Ohio v. John M. Howard, Case no. 2018-0376
Tenth District Court of Appeals (Franklin County)
ISSUES:
- Is a trial court hearing to revoke community control and impose a prison sentence a sentencing hearing, at which the court must comply again with all relevant sentencing statutes?
- Is a trial court hearing to continue a community-control sanction a sentencing hearing, at which the court again must notify the offender that the court may impose a prison term if the community-control conditions are violated and at which the court must indicate the specific prison term that may be imposed if community-control conditions are violated?
BACKGROUND:
In 2013, John Howard posted an advertisement on a website seeking a sexual encounter. A police detective in Franklin County responded, posing as a 14-year-old boy. Howard eventually arranged to meet the boy, and police arrested Howard when he arrived for the meeting.
A Franklin County judge found Howard guilty of importuning and attempted unlawful sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court sentenced Howard in February 2014 to three years of community control and classified him as a sex offender. At the sentencing hearing, the judge told Howard that if he violated any of the conditions of his community control and the sanction was revoked, he would be sentenced to 11 months in prison on one count and 17 months on the other, for a total of 28 months.
Man Doesn’t Adhere to Conditions of His Community-Control Sentence
The probation department requested that the trial court revoke Howard’s community-control sentence because he left Madison County, where he resides, without permission and he was convicted of a traffic violation. The original trial judge had retired, so a different judge presided over the October 2016 revocation hearing. The new judge chose to extend Howard’s community control for one year, rather than revoke it, and ordered Howard to complete mental health treatment through a specific program. The judge said, “And if I see you again, Mr. Howard, plan on going to the penitentiary.”
Howard again failed to follow the conditions of his community control, and the probation department asked the new judge to revoke Howard’s community-control sentence. At Howard’s second revocation hearing in March 2017, the judge revoked community control and imposed consecutive sentences for the two offenses, resulting in a 28-month prison term. The judge stated that he believed the original judge had made the necessary finding at the 2014 sentencing hearing to impose consecutive sentences to punish Howard or to protect the public from future crime.
Man Challenges Sentence of Prison and Consecutive Terms
Howard appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court was required to tell him at the first revocation hearing in October 2016 the specific prison term he was facing if he again didn’t follow the community-control conditions. Howard also argued the judge didn’t make the finding that is mandated by state law in order to impose consecutive sentences.
Upholding the trial court’s sentence, the Tenth District determined that because the trial court gave the required notification to Howard at the original sentencing hearing in 2014, the court didn’t have to give the same notification again at the first revocation hearing. The appeals court also concluded that Howard waited too long to challenge whether the court followed state law when it imposed consecutive sentences.
Howard filed an appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted the case.
Parties Agree Prison Sentence Wasn’t Suspended, Timing of Appeal OK
Howard’s brief states that the Tenth District ruled the trial court “did not literally sentence” Howard at the second revocation hearing. Instead, the appeals court wrote, the trial court imposed the prison sentences at the original sentencing hearing, held them “in abeyance,” and simply enforced the sentences at the second revocation hearing.
Both Howard and the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office maintain that the Tenth District was wrong on this issue. A trial court that revokes community control and imposes consecutive prison terms – as happened at Howard’s second revocation hearing – must comply with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the revocation hearing, and the defendant may allege that a court didn’t comply with that statute in an appeal from that revocation hearing. (The statute requires that a court make certain findings before imposing sentences consecutively.) An appeal on this issue doesn’t have to be made from the original sentencing hearing, as the Tenth District concluded, Howard and the prosecutor state.
Differences Between Probation and Community-Control Sentence
Howard and the prosecutor indicate that the appeals court was following an understanding of “probation” in place before the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 2 in 1995. In S.B. 2, community control replaced probation in Ohio’s felony sentencing law. Before S.B. 2, courts would impose a prison sentence, then suspend the prison sentence and grant probation under certain conditions, Howard notes. Post-S.B. 2, courts impose either a prison sentence or community control.
“The former practice involving probation cannot be applied to the current sentencing laws which involve community control as a sanction,” Howard’s brief states. “Probation was, in essence, an arrangement (a contract) between the court and the offender designed to keep the offender from having to serve the prison sentence that had been imposed upon him or her, whereas community control is a sanction, a punishment, in and of itself, in lieu of a prison sentence.”
Both briefs point to Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Heinz (2016), which states, “Unlike probation, which is a period of time served during suspension of a sentence, community control sanctions are imposed as the punishment for an offense at a sentencing hearing.”
Prosecutor, Man Debate Consecutive-Sentence Finding
Howard and the prosecutor also agree that a prison term imposed at a revocation hearing is a new sentence, and courts must comply with all relevant sentencing statutes, including the R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requirement that a court make certain findings before imposing prison sentences consecutively.
Howard’s position is that the judge at the second revocation hearing didn’t explicitly make the necessary finding that consecutive sentences were needed to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender. The judge who handled both revocation hearings mistakenly thought that the original sentencing judge made the findings required to impose consecutive sentences. The prosecutor and Howard agree that the original judge didn’t make, and wasn’t required to make, all those findings because that judge didn’t impose a prison sentence at that time.
The prosecutor suggests that the Supreme Court remand this case to the Tenth District to determine whether the judge who oversaw the revocation hearings did make the necessary findings under state law. But if the Court reviews the merits of this issue, the prosecutor argues that the judge did make the needed finding to impose consecutive sentences. By stating what he thought the original judge said regarding consecutive sentences, the revocation hearing judge demonstrated he had considered the requirements of 2929.14(C)(4) when deciding to impose consecutive sentences, the prosecutor maintains.
Parties Disagree on Notification Requirements at Revocation Hearings
Under 2929.19(B)(4), when a court imposes a community-control sanction, the court must notify the offender that it may impose a prison term if the community-control conditions are violated and must inform the offender of the specific prison term that may be imposed.
Howard notes that at the first revocation hearing, the judge didn’t notify him of the specific prison sentence he would face if he again violated the conditions of his community control. The judge only said, “If I see you again, Mr. Howard, plan on going to the penitentiary.” Because Howard didn’t receive adequate, specific notification as required by state law at that hearing, the court had no authority to sentence him to prison for any length of time at the second revocation hearing, he argues. He suggests that his case be sent back to the appeals court for resentencing with the condition that the trial court cannot impose prison, and that he must be released immediately from prison.
According to Howard, five of the state’s appeals courts have misconstrued the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in State v. Fraley to mean that a trial court that provides the statutory notification about prison at sentencing has no obligation to repeat that notification at hearings considering the revocation of community control. But Howard contends the situation was the reverse in Fraley –a trial court that fails to give the notification at the original sentencing can correct that error by providing the notification at a later revocation hearing.
The prosecutor counters that Howard’s situation wasn’t addressed by Fraley and that the appeals court correctly ruled that repeated notifications are unnecessary. While Howard and the prosecutor agree that a revocation hearing is a sentencing hearing and that trial courts must comply at each hearing with all relevant sentencing statutes, the prosecutor maintains that nothing in state law requires trial courts to repeat the statutory notifications at revocation hearings after the original sentencing. The prosecutor argues that the relevant statute’s use of the word “the” means that the legislature required only one notice at one hearing.
The prosecutor adds that after the judge’s penitentiary comment at the first revocation hearing, Howard couldn’t have been surprised when he was sentenced to prison after he again violated his community-control conditions.
- Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing John M. Howard: Charles Koenig, 614.454.5010
Representing State of Ohio from the Franklin County Prosecutor’s Office: Seth Gilbert, 614.525.3555
Must City Property Subdivision Rules Comply with State Law?
Gloria Wesolowski v. Planning Commission, City of Broadview Heights et al., Case no. 2018-0711
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUES:
- Are local subdivision regulations “police powers,” which can’t conflict with a state law?
- Does the 30-day property subdivision approval decision timeline in R.C. 711.09(C) apply to a city planning commission or only to village government bodies?
BACKGROUND:
The city of Broadview Heights maintains that the home-rule authority in Section 3, Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution gives it the right to adopt planning and subdivision regulations that differ from state law. In February 2016, Gloria Wesolowski submitted an application to the Broadview Heights Planning Commission to subdivide her property into lots to build additional homes. Changes in the plans and technical issues led to a revised plan being submitted in late March. In April, the planning commission engaged in a lengthy discussion with Wesolowski’s attorney, explaining that her plan didn’t meet the city planning code and rejected it. Under the code, the commission was required to prepare a list of conditions, which if complied with by the property owner, would lead to a plan’s approval.
The commission concluded Wesolowski’s plan had too many issues to create a list, and instead directed the city law director to send her a letter. The letter generally explained the rejection and concluded that she simply didn’t have enough property to divide into lots that would meet the code.
Wesolowski responded with two legal actions. She filed an administrative appeal with the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court challenging the planning commission’s action. She also filed a petition for a declaratory judgment with the same court that claimed Broadview Heights is subject to R.C. 711.09(C), which requires city planners to accept or reject a property subdivision plan within 30 days. If planners don’t respond within 30 days, the plan is deemed approved. Wesolowski argued the letter from the city attorney was sent 33 days after the planning commission meeting, and missed the deadline.
Broadview Heights countered that under home rule, it’s not subject to R.C. 711.09(C) and doesn’t have to abide by the timeline. The trial court stayed the administrative appeal and granted Wesolowski the declaratory judgment, ordering the city to approve her plan.
Broadview Heights appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision, and the city appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Wesolowski failed to file a brief with the Supreme Court, so she waived her right to participate in oral argument. The Ohio Home Builders Association filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Wesolowski’s position. The association was granted the right to orally argue Wesolowski’s position before the Court.
Home-Rule Trumps State Law in Subdivision Regulation, City Argues
Broadview Heights explains that under the home-rule provisions of the state constitution there are two general forms of local powers — powers of local self-government, and police powers. Police powers are “substantive regulations” that deal with health, safety, and sanitation, the city notes. Police powers can’t conflict with state law. Local self-government rules aren’t specified in the constitution or state law, but the Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that they are general powers to operate that are “local and municipal in character.” Broadview Heights argues the subdivision rules are local self-government rules that are “administrative regulations,” which can conflict with state laws.
The city notes that while the Broadview Heights law didn’t have a specific timeline for approval of a subdivision plan, it does have an obligation to act promptly because it must honor the general due process rights of property owners. The city argues if Wesolowski doesn’t like the commission’s decision or believes it is stalling, she has the right to file an administrative appeal, which she did. The city argues that is the process that should be followed to resolve the conflict.
The city faults the Eighth District for relying on the Ohio Supreme Court’s 1955 Kearns v. Ohio Power Co. decision, which ruled that city subdivision regulations are police powers. The city maintains that opinion solely relied on a little-known legal reference book, “Yokely’s Zoning Law and Practice.” Broadview Heights argues Yokely’s and the Kearns decision fail to recognize that planning laws contain both substantive regulations that are police powers, and administrative regulations that are self-government powers. Specifications in planning laws that regulate water and sewer service, for example, would be police powers, while the process for reviewing and approving plans would be administrative self-government powers, the city states. The city argues that the Court should recognize the distinction and rule that it isn’t obligated to abide by the timeline in R.C. 711.09(C).
Broadview Heights also maintains that the trial court wrongly applied R.C. 711.09(C) to the actions of a city planning commission. The city argues that R.C. 711.09(A) specifically applies to city planning commissions and R.C. 711.09(B) governs only village planning commissions. The opening line of R.C. 711.09(C) states: “The approval of the planning commission, the platting commissioner, or the legislative authority of a village required by this section, or the refusal to approve, shall be endorsed on the plat within thirty days after the submission of the plat for approval or within such further time as the applying party may agree to...”
Broadview Heights argues the plain language of the law indicates the 30-day time limit only applies to village planning commissions, platting commissioners or the legislative authorities of a village. It doesn’t apply to cities, it concludes.
Homebuilders Side with Lower Courts
The homebuilders argue that the lower courts correctly interpreted that R.C. 711.09(C) does apply to both city and village planning commissions. The group, which is the statewide trade association representing homebuilders, remodelers and land developers, argues that local planning provisions are police powers that must conform to state law.
The group explains that land development and housing construction require predictability and a lack of predictability leads to rising costs. The homebuilders indicate the legislature understood the need for a comprehensive statewide plan for the approval and recording of subdivision plats and that the 30-day timeline was imposed to bring certainty to the process. The organization argues Broadview Heights’ approval process is more than a mere rule of local government and has a ripple effect on those inside and outside the city who are involved in the construction and development of property.
Friend-of-the -Court Brief
An amicus curiae brief supporting Broadview Heights’ position has been jointly submitted by the American Planning Association, Ohio Chapter, and the Northeast Ohio Law Directors Association.
- Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the Broadview Heights Planning Commission: R. Todd Hunt, 216.928.2935
Representing Ohio Home Builders Association: Kristen Sours, 614.228.6647
Can Conviction on Assault Charge Be Appealed While Rape Charge Remains Pending?
State of Ohio v. Steven Allen Craig, Case no. 2018-0146
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUE: When a trial court convicts a defendant on some counts but fails to reach a verdict on others, can the defendant appeal the convictions while a decision on how to proceed with the other counts is being considered?
BACKGROUND:
In this atypical appeal, both the defendant and the prosecutor urge the Ohio Supreme Court to reverse the opinion of the First District Court of Appeals.
Steven Craig was named in an August 2015 three-count indictment in which he was charged with forcible rape and two counts of felonious assault. In 2016, a jury found Craig guilty of the two assault charges, and the trial court imposed two seven-year prison terms to be served concurrently. The jury failed to reach a verdict on the rape charge, and the judge declared a mistrial on that charge.
Craig appealed his convictions to the First District Court of Appeals. The First District dismissed the appeal, finding it had no jurisdiction to consider the case. The appellate court stated that Craig would have no final, appealable order until after the state decided to either retry or dismiss the rape charge.
Craig appealed the First District’s dismissal to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Recent Precedent Permits Appeal, Offender Argues
Craig cites the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2017 State v. Jackson decision, in which the Court found that to appeal a final judgment of a conviction requires a resolution for all counts for which there was a conviction. It doesn’t require the offender wait for the “other ways” the other counts in the indictment are resolved in order to appeal the counts for which there are convictions, he maintains. The First District refused the appeal because the trial court’s judgment entry noted the unresolved rape charge. In its opinion, it didn’t consider Craig’s order to be appealable until the rape charge was resolved.
Craig argues that neither he nor the prosecution is attempting to appeal the jury’s decision on the rape charge and that makes it irrelevant to his appeal of his assault convictions. He argues for his conviction to be a final order, he only has to comply with Criminal Rule 32(C), which requires producing a judgment entry that includes the facts of the conviction, the sentence, the judge’s signature, and a time stamp indicating when it was entered with the clerk of court. He states he complied with the rule. He maintains the consequence of having to wait until all the charges are resolved might leave him in prison for years before he can appeal. He notes the statute of limitations on a rape charge was 20 years when he was convicted, and under the First District’s interpretation, he could potentially be blocked from filing an appeal on the assault charges until after he serves his full amount of time for the convictions.
Craig maintains the First District assumed his “speedy trial rights” guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution’s Sixth Amendment would require a retrial within a reasonable time and that his appeal for all charges wouldn’t be unduly delayed. One of the faults of that reasoning, Craig argues, is that the courts have ruled the speedy trial clause allows for substantial delays for retrials, which is what Craig faces. He notes the Ohio Supreme Court ruled in State v. Anderson (2016) that a 14-year delay in a retrial because of a series of mistrials didn’t violate the offender’s speedy trial rights.
State Concerned with Delays Too
The Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office also expresses concern about the potential harm that could arise from delaying the appeal of Craig’s assault convictions. The prosecutor argues the convictions are eligible for appeal while the office considers whether to retry Craig on the rape charge.
The prosecutor notes the delay could potentially harm the state if the convictions are reversed on appeal. The delay could lead to evidence growing stale and difficulty in locating witnesses.
The office notes in this case, Craig has been declared incompetent to stand trial and his case has been continued repeatedly. The First District’s decision included a concurring opinion with one judge warning that the delay could lead to a waste of judicial resources, the prosecutor notes. The concurrence stated that if the rape charge resulted in another hung jury, the cycle of delaying the appeal could repeat itself. The concurrence suggested the issue could be resolved through a change in Ohio court rules, but the prosecutor argues a change isn’t necessary and the appeal can go forward under the existing rules.
The prosecutor also notes that the First District declared it followed a long list of other Ohio courts that haven’t considered the partial resolution of the charges to be a final, appealable order. The prosecutor asserts that all the cases cited by the First District included incidents where there were clerical errors or oversights by the trial court that made the appeal defective. The prosecutor concludes that Craig’s appeal meets all the requirements of the criminal rule, and the inclusion of the fact that the official entry of the case indicates a mistrial doesn’t affect the entry on the assault convictions.
- Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Steven Allen Craig from the Hamilton County Public Defender’s Office: David Hoffman, 513.946.3876
Representing the State of Ohio from the Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office: Judith Lapp, 513.946.3009
These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court's Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews are not part of the case record, and are not considered by the Court during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.