Tuesday, July 9, 2024
Claudia L. Kennedy, executrix of the estate of Donald R. Gerres v. Western Reserve Senior Care et al., Case No. 2023-0372
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Portage County)
Total Renal Care Inc. v. Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio, Case No. 2023-1056
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
State of Ohio v. Quantez Wilcox, Case No. 2023-1204
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
Disciplinary Counsel v. Carolyn Kaye Ranke, Case No. 2024-0491
Cuyahoga County
Can Deadline for Filing Lawsuit Against Doctors Be Extended if They Move Out of Ohio?
Claudia L. Kennedy, executrix of the estate of Donald R. Gerres v. Western Reserve Senior Care et al., Case No. 2023-0372
Eleventh District Court of Appeals (Portage County)
ISSUE: Is a deadline for filing lawsuits with medical claims “tolled,” or extended, when a defendant leaves the state for a legitimate business reason?
BACKGROUND:
Donald Gerres died on Oct. 17, 2013. The executor of the Gerres estate, Claudia Kennedy, filed a lawsuit in September 2014 for wrongful death and medical negligence. Kennedy argued that Dr. Satya Acharya, Western Reserve Senior Care, and other doctors and healthcare entities were negligent in their medical care of Gerres, resulting in his death.
Kennedy decided to dismiss the legal claims in January 2019, and she refiled the lawsuit on May 13, 2019. The healthcare providers asked the Portage County Common Pleas Court to dismiss the case, arguing the four-year deadline in a state law for filing medical lawsuits had expired. The trial court denied the request in October 2019. The court determined that state laws allowed the timeframe for filing the lawsuit to be extended.
In December 2020, though, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued Wilson v. Durrani, which involved a doctor who fled to Pakistan after he was indicted. The Court ruled that a medical negligence lawsuit can’t be refiled after the four-year deadline expires. This deadline for medical claims is called a “statute of repose.” It creates a time limit after which a defendant will no longer face possible liability.
In May 2021, during the first days of the trial in Kennedy’s case, the Portage County judge issued a directed verdict in favor of the healthcare providers based on the Wilson decision. The court found that the four-year deadline for Kennedy to file suit had expired.
Kennedy appealed to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, arguing that a state law “tolled,” or extended, the deadline because Acharya had moved out of state in 2014. The Eleventh District disagreed and upheld the trial court ruling.
Kennedy appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court agreed to review three legal issues but held the case for a decision in another case, Everhart v. Coshocton County Mem. Hospital. The Court released its decision in Everhart in December 2023. After the decision, the Court ordered the parties in this case to brief only one of the legal questions – whether a state law that extends the filing deadlines if a defendant “is out of the state, has absconded, or conceals self” applies in this case.
Lawsuit Deadline Extended Because Doctor Moved to Pennsylvania, Executor Argues
Kennedy’s brief explains that Acharya was employed by Western Reserve from September 2013 until January 2014. In a deposition, Acharya said she left Ohio and moved to Pennsylvania in the summer of 2014. Kennedy’s brief states that the doctor’s work history indicates she was employed by Eagle Hospitalists from September 2014 to September 2015 and later took a position at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.
R.C. 2305.15, referred to as a “savings” statute, provides that if a defendant leaves the state, the time the person is absent isn’t computed as part of a timeframe in which a lawsuit must be filed. The law applies to R.C. 2305.113, which is the statute of repose with the four-year deadline for filing medical claims after an alleged injury.
Kennedy asserts that the Eleventh District contradicted the savings statute, though, by ruling that the deadline can’t be extended if a defendant leaves the state “for a legitimate business purpose.” However, that business purpose exception doesn’t exist in the statute, she contends.
When Acharya departed from Ohio in summer 2014, the deadline for filing the lawsuit was extended, Kennedy maintains. She points to a Supreme Court of Ohio decision released after Wilson, called Elliot v. Durrani (2022), which involved the same doctor who fled to Pakistan. The Court concluded that the four-year deadline for filing lawsuits was extended because the doctor left the country inside the four-year time period.
No Extensions if Defendant Leaves State for Business Reason, Healthcare Providers Maintain
Western Reserve and Acharya argue that precedent requires the Supreme Court to make two determinations in this type of case. First, the Court must decide whether the defendant’s absence from the state was temporary or permanent. If the absence is permanent, the healthcare providers maintain that it then must be determined whether the absence was for business reasons. The Eleventh District ruled that Acharya left Ohio permanently to find new employment, which was a legitimate business purpose. Because Acharya left Ohio permanently for a legitimate business reason, the deadline for Kennedy to file her lawsuit couldn’t be extended, the healthcare providers argue.
The healthcare providers contrast Acharya’s move with someone who is out of state on vacation, retires to Florida, or moves to Nevada to get married. In none of those scenarios is the person’s departure from Ohio for a legitimate business purpose. Under the U.S. Constitution, when a person leaves the state for non-business reasons, deadlines for filing a medical lawsuit can be extended, the healthcare providers contend. However, they argue, Acharya’s move to Pennsylvania to search for employment was a business reason and means she was engaged in interstate commerce. Because the U.S. Constitution prohibits state interference with interstate commerce, extending the lawsuit deadline when interstate commerce is involved is unconstitutional, the healthcare providers conclude.
They also argue that the Elliot ruling doesn’t apply because the doctor in the case didn’t leave the state for business reasons but instead fled the country. In addition, the healthcare providers note, the General Assembly currently is considering legislation proposed in response to the Elliot decision. They explain that the legislation wouldn’t allow medical statutes of repose to be extended under R.C. 2305.15 for any reason. If the law passes, a ruling in this case will offer no important legal interpretations of state law or help guide lowers courts, they maintain. They suggest that the Court either hold the case to see whether the bill is enacted or to dismiss the appeal as improvidently accepted.
Attorney General Supports Executor, Will Argue Before Court
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office filed an amicus curiae brief supporting Kennedy’s view that the tolling statute extended the time for her to file the claim against Acharya because the doctor left the state. The attorney general will participate in oral argument, sharing the time allotted to Kennedy.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Claudia L. Kennedy, executrix of the estate of Donald R. Gerres: Paul Flowers, pwf@pwfco.com
Representing Western Reserve Senior Care and Satya Acharya, M.D.: Justin Greenfelder, jgreenfelder@bdblaw.com
Can Kidney Dialysis Provider Claim Commercial Activity Tax Refund?
Total Renal Care Inc. v. Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio, Case No. 2023-1056
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
ISSUE: For commercial activity tax purposes, did the state wrongly tax laboratory and administrative functions performed outside of Ohio to assist in the medical treatment of patients in Ohio?
BACKGROUND:
Total Renal Care (TRC) operates 2,000 outpatient kidney dialysis treatment facilities in the United States, including several in Ohio. TRC is based in Torrence, California. It is owned by its parent company, DaVita Inc.
TRC paid the state commercial activity tax (CAT) for patients who received treatment at its Ohio facilities. It then sought a refund from the state tax commissioner for a period between April 2012 to December 2014. TRC claimed that it performed three separate services for its Ohio customers, and only the dialysis treatments occurred in Ohio. Lab testing for Ohio customers was conducted by DaVita at its Florida lab, and administrative functions were performed by DaVita at four “central business offices” not located in Ohio. The CAT requires a business to pay tax based on the gross receipts for goods and services that are “sitused,” or originate, in Ohio. TRC calculated that about 14% of the tax it paid for gross receipts sitused to Ohio in the 2012-2014 time period should have been deemed to occur outside of Ohio. It sought a refund of about $394,000 for the CAT paid during that period.
The state tax commissioner denied the refund. TRC appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, which affirmed the tax commissioner’s decision. TRC appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Healthcare Services Performed Elsewhere Not Taxable in Ohio, Provider Argues
A year after Ohio instituted the CAT in 2005, the tax commissioner developed rules on how the tax applies to various industries. No specific rule was implemented for healthcare services, but a general rule covered them. The rule indicated that the CAT applies to the location where services were performed, TRC notes. The dialysis treatment occurs in Ohio, but lab testing and administrative functions occur outside of Ohio. The rule states, “[A] reasonable allocation for the services performed in Ohio must be made when services are provided partly in the state.”
TRC notes that it provides an extensive breakdown of its costs to the federal government for Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements. Those figures indicated that for each Ohio patient’s bill, about 3.5% was for lab testing, which took place in Florida, and 10.5% for administrative functions in the four non-Ohio business offices. TRC used those reports to determine that it was reasonable to allocate about 14% of all Ohio patient services to functions that occur outside of Ohio. TRC paid CAT on the gross receipts, the money collected from billing Ohio patients. It then asked for a refund of 14%, noting the lab and administrative service charges should be deducted from the CAT because those services weren’t performed in Ohio.
TRC argues the tax commissioner defies the rule by denying the refunds and claiming the tax is applied to where the benefit is received, not where the service is performed. Since Ohio dialysis patients received the benefit of TRC services while in Ohio, the company must pay CAT for all the amounts paid by patients for services received in Ohio, the tax commissioner concluded in the denial. TRC argues the Board of Tax Appeals sides with the tax commissioner without examining the rule. The company maintains that Ohio patients did “benefit” from the services it provided outside Ohio, but the location where the patient benefits from the services doesn’t dictate how the CAT is assessed. The company argues that the place where the tasks are performed determines if the service is taxed, even if the recipients benefit solely in Ohio.
Patient Services Occurred Soley in Ohio, Commissioner Maintains
The tax commissioner notes that TRC provides one service, dialysis treatment, and that is what it bills patients for. Those services were provided solely by TRC. While TRC’s parent company, DaVita, provided business functions such as lab testing and administrative services elsewhere, it doesn’t mean TRC “performed” them. The CAT requires companies to pay tax on the receipts from customers where the purchaser received the benefit of the service, not where the costs of performing those services were located, the commissioner explains. TRC must pay CAT on the services Ohioans paid the company to receive, the commissioner asserts.
The commissioner explains that the healthcare provider tax rule was adopted to comply with R.C. 5751.033(I). The CAT law specifically expressed how goods and services are taxed for several industries, but healthcare services weren’t one of them. R.C. 5751.033(I) covers all unspecified services and notes that the “physical location where the purchaser ultimately uses or receives the benefit of what was purchased shall be paramount” in determining the tax to be paid. TRC provides a single healthcare service, the commissioner argues, and patients are billed a single fee for their treatment, even if some lab testing and administrative functions occur elsewhere. Additionally, the commissioner argues that DaVita is a separate corporate entity, not tied to TRC for CAT purposes, and the parent company’s expenses cannot be deducted from the CAT. TRC disputes the claim and argues that TRC and DaVita are consolidated companies subject to the same CAT.
The commissioner also argues that TRC’s allocation of costs for administrative functions is unworkable and has no “limiting principle.” Under TRC’s theory, numerous overhead costs could be deducted, including hiring and firing staff, procurement of office supplies, and building repairs. The commissioner concludes that the state appropriately taxed TRC for the services that benefitted the Ohio purchasers, and that the company wasn’t entitled to any refunds.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Total Renal Care: Paul Melniczak, pmelniczak@reedsmith.com
Representing Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio, from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Raina Boulos, Raina.NahraBoulos@OhioAGO.gov
Can Jury View Video of Crime Scene Witness Interview Without Witness Testifying?
State of Ohio v. Quantez Wilcox, Case No. 2023-1204
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUE: During a murder trial, did playing a video of a witness speaking to a police officer at the crime scene violate the accused’s constitutional right to confront witnesses when the witness in the video didn’t testify at the trial?
BACKGROUND:
Quantez Wilcox and Doneisha Monroe had previously dated. Monroe began dating Keshawn Turner, and on an evening in August 2020, Monroe and Turner were walking together near the downtown Cincinnati library. Wilcox was parked in a car near the library with a loaded pistol on the seat of the vehicle. Turner approached Wilcox’s car, and the two men began to argue. Wilcox fired a single shot from his gun, which hit Turner in the chest.
Monroe witnessed the incident. Turner fell to the ground multiple times as he tried to flee the scene with Monroe. A man working as a downtown ambassador for the city heard the shot and saw Turner walking down an alley. The ambassador radioed the police and knelt beside Turner. Haneen Maghathe, who lived nearby, heard the gunshot, and saw Monroe and Turner going into the alley. Maghathe followed the pair to offer help. She used her cellphone to record the scene and spoke with Monroe, who identified Wilcox as the shooter.
Police officers quickly arrived. They cut off Turner’s clothing to find the bullet hole and to render first aid. They discovered he had a loaded gun in a black holster behind his back. As the officers assisted Turner, other officers were looking for Wilcox. After Wilcox ran a red light, he was pulled over by police. He told the officers he was driving through town on his way home from Kentucky. Another downtown resident had seen Turner driving fast just before he was pulled over and saw Turner throw something out of the window. The man investigated and discovered a gun, which he gave to police.
As police searched for Wilcox, Officer David Price spoke to Monroe and recorded the conversation on his body camera. Monroe talked to Price for more than 11 minutes. In the background, multiple police officers gathering information and medics treating Turner can be seen. Monroe explained to Price that the victim was her boyfriend. Monroe, who was frantic, began to describe previous incidents of violence Wilcox committed against her. About six minutes into the recorded conversation, Monroe was able to focus and provide a description of Wilcox and the car he was driving. As the two spoke, other officers alerted Price that they believed they had Wilcox in custody. Price asked Monroe what Wilcox was so mad about, and she explained that he was stalking her.
After Wilcox was arrested, he was questioned at the police station. After denying his presence at the crime scene, Wilcox eventually explained that Monroe called him and asked him to bring some food to the library near her home. Wilcox said he parked, handed her the food, and spoke to her. Then Turner, who he did not know, rushed over to the car, Wilcox stated. Wilcox said he felt threatened by comments Turner made and saw Turner reach for the gun in his holster. Wilcox said he then grabbed the gun on the car seat and shot Turner. He admitted driving away and throwing the gun out of the car. He told the officers he initially lied because he didn’t trust the police.
Videos Presented at Trial
Wilcox was tried for two counts of murder, felonious assault, and other charges. Before and during the trial, Hamilton County prosecutors and Wilcox’s defense attorneys argued over the admission of the videos of Monroe captured on Maghathe’s phone and Officer Price’s body camera. The trial court ruled the videos could be admitted. Monroe didn’t testify at Wilcox’s trial.
Wilcox testified that he shot Turner in self-defense. The jury convicted Wilcox of all charges, and he was sentenced to 26 years to life in prison.
Wilcox appealed to the First District Court of Appeals. In a split decision, the First District ruled that Wilcox’s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him was violated when the body camera video of Monroe was played without Monroe appearing in court to testify. The First District ordered a new trial for Wilcox.
The Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to hear the case.
Ex-Girlfriend’s Recorded Testimony Appropriately Admitted, Prosecutor Asserts
The prosecutor explains that under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, criminal defendants have the right to confront witnesses against them.
Out of-of-court statements are typically considered hearsay and are generally inadmissible. However, there are exceptions, and the prosecutor argues that Monroe’s statements to Maghathe and the officer are admissible under the “excited utterances” exception. The prosecutor further explains that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that admissible hearsay evidence has to be further analyzed to avoid violating a defendant’s right to confront witnesses.
The U.S. Supreme Court has divided statements to police into two categories — those that are “testimonial” and those that are “nontestimonial.” Statements that are testimonial include those made during police interrogations, and the “primary purpose” of the police questioning is to gather information about past events to potentially use for a criminal prosecution, the prosecutor notes.
Nontestimonial statements include those whose primary purpose is to assist police in an ongoing emergency, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled. The prosecutor notes Wilcox doesn’t dispute that Monroe’s statements captured on Maghathe’s phone are admissible because they weren’t part of a police interrogation. The prosecutor maintains that all statements made to the police officer were nontestimonial because they were primarily made to assist with an ongoing emergency.
The prosecutor objects to the First District’s ruling that once Price was alerted that Wilcox was caught, the emergency ended, and any statements Monroe made after that point were testimonial statements gathered by police to prosecute Wilcox. The prosecutor argues that Price and Monroe weren’t certain as they conversed that the man in custody was Wilcox and the prosecutor maintains that Price’s questions were presented to assist with the emergency.
The prosecutor argues that Monroe’s more focused statements made after Wilcox was caught also should still be considered admissible nontestimonial statements. Monroe only confirmed what she had said earlier to Maghathe and Price, the prosecutor maintains.
Additionally, the prosecutor argues that even if the trial court improperly allowed the jury to hear all of Monroe’s statements, it would be harmless error. The prosecutor asserts the vast amount of evidence contradicts Wilcox’s claim of self-defense. Video footage from the library’s surveillance cameras, the evidence collected on the scene by police, and the testimony of the other witnesses point to Wilcox not acting in self-defense, and his conviction should stand, the prosecutor concludes.
Witness Statements Must Be Excluded or Limited, Accused Maintains
Wilcox argues that the prosecutor wants all recorded statements of a witness to a shooting admitted if the statements meet the exceptions to the hearsay rule without considering if the statements violate a defendant’s right to confront a witness. He maintains that the trial court failed to consider the confrontation requirements and allowed all of Monroe’s statements to be admitted even though she didn’t appear in court and wasn’t subjected to cross-examination.
Wilcox explains that past U.S. Supreme Court cases on the matter have dealt mainly with two different types of scenarios where witness statements were more clearly testimonial or nontestimonial. In one case, a witness was far from the crime scene after the suspect was arrested, and statements made at the police station were deemed testimonial. In another, the high court dealt with a 911 call where there was an ongoing emergency, and the statements were admissible as nontestimonial. In this case, Monroe made a mix of testimonial and nontestimonial statements as the scene changed from an emergency to a nonemergency, Wilcox argues.
Wilcox maintains the case should be remanded to the First District, which should do a line-by-line review of a transcript of the statements Monroe made. The appeals court should then allow prosecutors to admit the nontestimonial statements used to address the emergency, and bar the use of testimonial statements, Wilcox suggests. He explains that the nontestimonial statements Monroe made to identify him as the shooter didn’t influence the outcome of the case. But her unchallenged statements that he was stalking her and was previously violent did, he asserts.
Wilcox argues that the admission of Monroe’s unchallenged statements of their past was the only evidence that contradicted his claim of self-defense. Had Monroe testified, he would have been able to question her about his claim that she asked him to drive to the library and talked with her for about 15 minutes before Turner burst onto the scene. Wilcox also argues that allowing the statements wasn’t a harmless error. Without her statements, the prosecutor’s case against his self-defense claims is significantly weaker, he asserts, and a jury might have found in his favor.
Oral Argument Time Divided
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office submitted an amicus curiae brief supporting the prosecutor’s position. The Court granted the attorney general’s request to share oral argument time with the prosecutor’s office.
Friend-of-the-Court Briefs Submitted
In addition to the attorney general’s brief, the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office filed an amicus brief supporting the Hamilton County prosecutor. The Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers submitted an amicus brief supporting Wilcox.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office: Paula Adams, paula.adams@hcpros.org
Representing Quantez Wilcox from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: Mallorie Thomas, mallorie.thomas@opd.ohio.gov
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: T. Elliot Gaiser, thomas.gaiser@ohioago.gov
Court Considers Disbarring Previously Suspended Attorney
Disciplinary Counsel v. Carolyn Kaye Ranke, Case No. 2024-0491
Cuyahoga County
A solo practice lawyer, previously suspended for neglecting client matters, faces permanent disbarment for dishonesty, neglecting more client matters, and failing to cooperate with the disciplinary process.
Carolyn Kaye Ranke of Cleveland Heights opposes a Board of Professional Conduct recommendation that she be disbarred, arguing that an indefinite suspension is an appropriate sanction.
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel maintains that, at minimum, Ranke should receive an indefinite suspension. The office, which investigated the matter, argues that disbarment is justified for her pattern of accepting payment without completing work for clients and displaying a pattern of dishonest conduct while offering minimal explanations for why she violated numerous professional conduct rules.
Ranke’s objections to the board’s recommendation triggered oral arguments before the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Attorney Faces New Round of Client Complaints
Ranke was admitted to practice law in Ohio in 1989 and had been a solo practitioner, primarily focused on criminal defense. In 2010, the Supreme Court publicly reprimanded her for neglecting a client’s legal matter. In 2011, the Court indefinitely suspended Ranke for improperly handling her client trust account, neglecting a client matter, and failing to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation. Ranke then began working as a courtroom bailiff, and when her license was reinstated in 2015, she worked as a court magistrate. She returned to private practice in 2019.
The board wrote that within months of returning to private, solo practice, Ranke returned to her past pattern of neglecting client matters.
In June 2019, Shelda Brantley hired Ranke to represent her in a civil lawsuit against Brantley’s business by three former employees seeking damages for unpaid wages. Brantley began making $500 payments to Ranke and, after six months, had paid her $8,100. Within weeks of being hired, Ranke notified the trial court that she was representing Brantley and told Brantley that she would file a motion to dismiss the case. Ranke didn’t file the motion.
Brantley complained that she had texted Ranke for updates for months but hadn’t received substantive responses. The attorney for the former workers told the court that Ranke wasn’t complying with court orders or responding to court motions. In May 2020, the court awarded the workers $268,802 in damages and $37,873 in attorney fees and court costs for a total judgment against Brantley for $306,326.
Ranke didn’t inform Brantley of the judgment, and Brantley later testified that she didn’t know about it until she contacted another attorney. Brantley said she was “shocked,” “nervous,” and “afraid.” Brantley’s new lawyer filed a malpractice case against Ranke. Ranke didn’t respond to the request or to any efforts by the new attorney to cooperate in the case. She later testified, “I just put it off and buried it, and I didn’t respond.”
Ranke’s inaction led to the court ordering her to pay Brantley the same amount she had lost to the former workers.
Inmate’s Appeal Not Filed
The disciplinary counsel filed a complaint against Ranke with the Board of Professional Conduct in December 2022 based on Ranke’s handling of Brantley’s case and her handling of three other client matters, including her representation of Raphelle Winegarner.
In June 2021, Winegarner was convicted of multiple felonies and sentenced to 33 years in prison. Winegarner was represented by another attorney during his trial, but Ranke was appointed by the court to represent him in his appeal. Ranke received notice of her appointment in September 2021 and had until early October to file a notice of appeal with the Eighth District Court of Appeals. She didn’t file the notice.
In November 2021, Winegarner’s mother, Paulette Winegarner, texted Ranke to ask about the appeal. Ranke texted back that she would send a copy to her. Ranke said she was in court on another matter. Later that evening, Paulette texted again that she hadn’t received anything from Ranke, and Ranke responded that she would send it. The next day, Paulette asked again for the appeal, and Ranke answered that she had emailed the appeal even though she hadn’t. Paulette contacted the court and learned Ranke hadn’t filed a notice of appeal, and the deadline had passed. Paulette hired another attorney to represent her son, and the Eighth District granted the attorney the request to allow for a delayed appeal.
Attorney Violated Multiple Rules, Board Asserts
The board found Ranke committed 21 professional conduct rule violations in the four cases, including making false statements to the trial courts and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
In urging the Supreme Court to disbar Ranke, the board noted that at her disciplinary hearing, she was asked,” Do you acknowledge that the sanction of an indefinite suspension wasn’t enough to have – to force you to change your behavior?” Ranke responded, “Apparently not.”
The board notes that Ranke persistently provided limited cooperation after four clients filed grievances against her, and the board argues that she deserves to be disbarred for her actions.
Errors Don’t Justify Disbarment, Attorney Maintains
Among her objections, Ranke disagrees with the board’s conclusion that she acted with a dishonest or selfish motive. She denies any dishonesty and points out that no evidence reveals that her rule violations were related to monetary gain or to benefit herself. She argues that neglect isn’t equivalent to selfishness or dishonesty and that her mistakes result from being “overburdened and having no discipline at saying no.” She asserts the board failed to credit her for acknowledging her mistakes and taking accountability for her actions.
Ranke maintains that an indefinite suspension is appropriate. She notes that the Supreme Court has rarely disbarred an attorney without evidence of theft, engaging in inappropriate conduct with a client, or gross mismanagement of a client’s affairs. Ranke argues that the board fails to acknowledge her 30 years of practice and serving client needs and that she made efforts to repay clients who were negatively affected by her misconduct.
Attorney Minimizes Role in Clients’ Misfortunes, Investigator Argues
The disciplinary counsel notes that in at least five instances, the board found Ranke made false and misleading statements to her clients, opposing attorneys, judges, and disciplinary investigators. Ranke engaged in a pattern of telling others she had sent requested information when she hadn’t, and those statements were made to cover up her mishandling of the cases. The office notes that Ranke told Paulette Winegarner repeatedly that she had sent or would send a copy of the notice of appeal she filed for Winegarner’s son. Ranke ultimately had to admit she wasn’t honest with Paulette because she didn’t tell her she didn’t file the appeal.
The pattern of misleading her clients was a selfish attempt to conceal the negative consequences of her acts from her clients, the disciplinary counsel argues, and Ranke fails to acknowledge that she didn’t comply with the rules that apply to all Ohio attorneys. The Court has already given Ranke a second chance when it indefinitely suspended her in 2011, the disciplinary counsel argues. Disbarment may be necessary to protect the public, given that she continues to engage in dishonest conduct, the disciplinary counsel concludes.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing herself: Carolyn Kaye Ranke, kaye.ranke@gmail.com
Representing the Office of Disciplinary Counsel: Joseph Caligiuri, joseph.caligiuri@sc.ohio.gov