Wednesday, February 12, 2025
Aramark Corporation v. Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio, Case No. 2023-1540
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO et al. v. City of Lakewood, Case No. 2024-0031
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
State of Ohio v. Daniel Staffrey, Case No. 2024-0108
Seventh District Court of Appeals (Mahoning County)
State of Ohio v. Isaiah Morris, Case No. 2023-1614
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
Is Food Services Provider Entitled to Tax Refund for Food and Supply Purchases?
Aramark Corporation v. Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio, Case No. 2023-1540
Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
ISSUE: Does a food services provider meet the definition of “agent” under the state’s commercial activity tax law when it purchases food and supplies for its client and gets reimbursed by the client?
BACKGROUND:
Aramark operates food services programs throughout the United States, including Ohio. The company enters into two types of contracts: one for management fee clients and another for profit and loss clients. Under a management fee contract, Aramark purchases food and supplies for the client and essentially operates as the food services provider for operations such as schools, universities, businesses, correctional facilities, and medical centers. The clients receive all the money paid for food services at checkout. The clients pay a management fee to Aramark to run the operation, and Aramark sends the clients monthly bills for the cost of food and other purchases. The clients then reimburse Aramark for those purchases.
Under Aramark’s profit and loss contracts, Aramark is authorized to operate the food services program for the client. Aramark receives all the profits earned at checkout and pays its own operating expenses.
Aramark pays the Ohio commercial activity tax (CAT) based on gross receipts. In a period between 2012 and 2016, Aramark paid $4.9 million in CAT to Ohio. Aramark then determined it overpaid the CAT because it included the amounts clients paid as reimbursement for food and supplies in its gross receipts. Aramark asked the Ohio tax commissioner for a $907,000 refund. The reimbursement issue only impacts Aramark’s contracts with clients who entered management fee agreements. The company doesn’t dispute the accuracy of the tax payments for its profit and loss contracts or the tax owed for receiving management fees.
Aramark maintained it met the definition of “agent” under the CAT law. It maintained that under R.C. 5751.01(N), it is an agent to management fee clients and that R.C. 5751.02(F)(2)(l) excludes reimbursements paid to agents from the amount of gross receipts a company earned.
The tax commissioner found Aramark wasn’t an agent and couldn’t exclude the reimbursement payments. The commissioner also found the company didn’t calculate what income was actually reimbursements as opposed to incentive payments or other income earned under its management fee contracts. Aramark appealed to the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), which affirmed the tax commissioner’s decision.
Aramark appealed to the Supreme Court, which must hear this type of appeal.
Cost Reimbursement Not Taxable, Service Provider Asserts
Aramark maintains that the BTA permitted the tax commissioner to use a definition of “agent” derived from common law and Ohio Supreme Court cases. However, the CAT law provides its own definition of “agent” that is looser than the traditional legal meaning of “agent.” Under what is now R.C.5751.01(N), an “agent” is “a person authorized by another person to act on its behalf to undertake a transaction for the other.” The CAT law doesn’t require any specific agreement stating Aramark is the agent of its management fee clients but rather focuses on the substance of the relationship. In this case, the company is authorized to make purchases on behalf of the client, the company maintains. Because the contracts require the client to reimburse Aramark for the purchases made on the client’s behalf, the client has authorized the transactions, which meets the CAT law definition of “agent,” the company argues.
Because Aramark is authorized to make the purchases, the CAT law exempts all receipts from purchases made when the company acts as an agent. The company submitted a document to the tax commissioner that removed the management fees paid during the four-year period. The remaining total was the reimbursements paid to the company, which indicated that Aramark paid $907,000 in taxes based on those reimbursements.
The company asserts that the BTA wrongly focused on the Supreme Court’s 2018 Willoughby Hills Development and Distribution, Inc. v. Testa decision, in which the Court examined the CAT agency exclusion. In that case, the Court concluded that for CAT purposes, an agent is one who can bind a principal to a contract. The BTA found that Aramark couldn’t prove that if it failed to pay a vendor for purchases, the client would be legally bound to pay the vendor. Because it lacked that authority, Aramark wasn’t an agent, the BTA ruled. Aramark argues that isn’t a requirement under the CAT, and the Court can’t substitute its own definition of “agency” for that established by the legislature. Aramark asserts that it doesn’t need to prove that its agreements label it as a “purchasing agent” for a client or must include that it has the power to bind its clients to a contract to be eligible for the tax exemption. Since the purchases were made to fulfill Aramark’s contracts as food services providers and the reimbursement payments went to pay suppliers, not Aramark, those payments are exempt from the CAT, the company concludes.
Company Not Client’s Authorized Agent, Tax Commissioner Argues
The tax commissioner explains that the CAT law defines an “agent” as a “person authorized” to act on another’s behalf but the law doesn’t define the type of “authority” required to be considered “authorized.” When the Ohio Supreme Court considered the agency exclusion, the Court used the common law meaning of “agent” in another case as well as Willoughby Hills. To be an agent under the CAT, the agent must have “actual authority,” which the Court explained to be an agent that can make the principal itself a party to contracts when the agent makes contracts.
The tax commissioner explains that many of Aramark’s management fee contracts explicitly state that Aramark isn’t the client’s agent. Aramark witnesses who testified before the BTA failed to prove they had the authority to bind the client to any contracts Aramark made to procure food and supplies, the commissioner notes. Aramark’s purchases are part of its duties under the contract with its management fee clients, and it is paid a fee to fulfill its obligations, the commissioner maintains. Nothing in the agreements or the law makes Aramark a purchasing agent, and its purchases aren’t exempt under the CAT, the commissioner maintains.
The commissioner also argues the $907,000 is only a rough approximation of the company’s reimbursements. The office notes that in federal financial reports, Aramark indicates some of its client management agreements are based on percentages, not fixed fees, and some allow for incentive payments. The company didn’t break out any specific details as to the calculations it made to show which ones were only reimbursements, the commissioner asserts.
The commissioner notes the Court has established it will not overturn a BTA decision that is reasonable and lawful, and maintains the evidence presented by the commissioner to the BTA supported denying Aramark a refund.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting Aramark’s position was submitted by the Ohio Chamber of Commerce.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Aramark Corporation: Paul Melniczak, pmelnicazk@reedsmith.com
Representing Patricia Harris, tax commissioner of Ohio, from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Christine Mesirow, Christine.Mesirow@ohioago.gov
Can City’s Refusal To Consider Fired Employee’s Grievance Be Appealed to Court?
Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO et al. v. City of Lakewood, Case No. 2024-0031
Eighth District Court of Appeals (Cuyahoga County)
ISSUE: Can parties to a collective bargaining agreement seek enforcement of an arbitration clause in court?
BACKGROUND:
At the Department of Public Works for the City of Lakewood, a group of employees are represented by the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). One of those employees, Michael Satink, was fired in November 2020 for what the city said was insubordinate, disruptive, and intimidating actions in the workplace.
AFSCME filed a grievance, but the dispute wasn’t resolved. The collective bargaining agreement between the city and employees has a provision for resolving disputes through arbitration. Before a scheduled arbitration hearing on the Satink matter was held, the city and AFSCME negotiated a “last chance agreement” (LCA) in March 2021. Satink would return to work under certain terms and conditions.
Based on conduct later that year, Satink again faced discipline. The city fired Satink in early November for violating the LCA. AFSCME challenged the second termination by filing a grievance. Lakewood, however, declined to consider the matter, maintaining that the LCA didn’t allow challenges over the misconduct. In January 2022, AFSCME notified the city that the dispute needed to move to arbitration, citing the collective bargaining agreement. Lakewood responded again that the union and Satink gave up their arbitration rights by agreeing to the LCA.
Union Goes to Court Seeking Order for Arbitration
AFSCME filed a motion asking the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court to force the parties into arbitration under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. The city countered that the court didn’t have jurisdiction to hear the case. In January 2023, the trial court agreed with the union and ordered arbitration.
Lakewood appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court. The appeals court concluded that the disagreement over whether the second grievance must go to arbitration stems from the dispute resolution process set out in the collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargaining agreements and associated rights fall under a section of state law that require disputes to be decided by the State Employment Relations Board (SERB), not a common pleas court, the Eighth District determined.
AFSCME appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to review the issue.
Dispute Involves Contract Right That Can Be Challenged in Court, Union Maintains
AFSCME argues that R.C. 2711.03 deals with arbitration clauses and allows the union to file a request in common pleas court to enforce the clause. The law states that a party can ask a common pleas court to order arbitration if another party to the written agreement fails to arbitrate. Lakewood refused to arbitrate the grievance over Satink’s firing, in violation of the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement, AFSCME maintains.
The union also notes that arbitration is an option, but not required, in collective bargaining agreements described in R.C. Chapter 4117. The chapter governs public employee collective bargaining rights. However, the parties in this case chose to include an arbitration clause in the agreement and that choice makes it a contractual right, which isn’t governed by R.C. Chapter 4117., the union contends. Instead, based on R.C. 2711.03, this is a dispute over a contractual right, and appeals of those types of disputes can be filed in court, the union maintains.
The union notes that the city claimed the union and Satink waived their rights in the LCA to file any grievances, which would be subject to arbitration. That claim involves a substantive arbitration issue, AFSCME asserts. It argues courts, not SERB, are tasked with deciding substantive arbitration issues – such as whether an agreement created an obligation for parties to arbitrate grievances. AFSCME’s view is that SERB’s jurisdiction is limited to allegations of unfair labor practices, which weren’t raised in this case.
AFSCME concludes that the General Assembly made it clear in R.C. 2711.03 that a common pleas court has original jurisdiction over the violation alleged in this case.
Only SERB Can Consider Case, City Contends
Lakewood notes that the LCA said if “Satink violates any City work rule or policy pertaining to professional, respectful, and workplace appropriate behavior when performing assigned work responsibilities, he shall be subject to immediate termination without recourse to the grievance or arbitration provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.” Under the LCA’s terms, Lakewood maintains, the union and Satink didn’t have the right to challenge the firing.
Lakewood also contends that AFSCME’s claim depends on grievance and arbitration rights established through the collective bargaining laws in R.C. Chapter 4117. The city notes the chapter requires collective bargaining agreements to include a grievance process. The city argues this case is about that process – specifically, whether the city violated the union’s and Satink’s rights by refusing to consider the grievance about Satink’s second termination. Under state law, if an agreement provides for the arbitration of grievances, then the parties’ disputes are handled only within that grievance procedure, Lakewood maintains. Because the dispute arose from the rights in R.C. Chapter 4117, it cannot be challenged in court, the city asserts. Only SERB has jurisdiction to hear this type of case, the city argues.
Lakewood also maintains that the union’s underlying claim alleges an unfair labor practice. The union asserted that the city interfered with employee rights guaranteed under R.C. Chapter 4117 and refused to comply with the collective bargaining agreement. Those are allegations of unfair labor practices, which must be heard by SERB, not a court, the city contends.
Additional Arguments Submitted to Court
Amicus curiae briefs supporting the union’s positions were submitted by the Ohio Attorney General’s Office and Ohio Association of Professional Fire Fighters. The attorney general represents SERB and will participate in the oral argument, sharing time with the union. The attorney general maintains that some disagreements over grievance procedures in collective bargaining agreements are contract disputes that fall under the jurisdiction of common pleas courts.
The Ohio Management Lawyers Association filed an amicus brief supporting the city.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and Local 1043, AFSCME, AFL-CIO: Kimm Massengill-Bernardin, kmassengillbernardin@afscme8.org
Representing the City of Lakewood: David Frantz, dpf@zrlaw.com
Was Offender Who Committed Crimes in 1995 Eligible for Judicial Release?
State of Ohio v. Daniel Staffrey, Case No. 2024-0108
Seventh District Court of Appeals (Mahoning County)
ISSUES:
- Is an offender serving a prison sentence for a crime committed in 1995 eligible for judicial release?
- If a prison sentence is based on crimes for using a firearm but doesn’t include prison time for a firearm specification, is it a mandatory sentence, making an offender ineligible for judicial release?
BACKGROUND:
In September 1995, Daniel Staffrey broke into the home of his ex-wife. He held her against her will at gunpoint for three hours. He physically and sexually assaulted her and threatened to kill her. She eventually persuaded him to let her go.
Staffrey was indicted in November 1995 on four first-degree felony counts of rape, attempted aggravated murder, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary. Each count carried a firearm specification. Staffrey agreed to plead guilty to the felony charges in exchange for the prosecution recommending the firearm specifications be dismissed. The sentencing judge imposed prison sentences of 10 to 25 years each for rape, kidnapping, and aggravated burglary and ran the sentences concurrently. The judge sentenced him to five to 25 years for attempted aggravated murder and ran the sentence consecutively to the other three sentences, for a total of 15 to 50 years in prison. The judge dismissed the firearm specifications.
At the time Staffrey’s case was pending, the General Assembly enacted sweeping criminal justice reforms in Senate Bill 2. The bill set new sentencing provisions for all crimes committed on or after July 1, 1996. Staffrey was considered a pre-S.B. 2 offender because his crimes occurred in 1995. S.B. 2 also introduced judicial release in Ohio, granting sentencing judges the right to release offenders under certain conditions. Pre-S.B. 2 offenders remained under the supervision of the Ohio Parole Board. Staffrey has unsuccessfully sought to be released and paroled by the board several times, most recently in 2021.
In 2011, state lawmakers approved another major criminal sentencing reform. House Bill 86 included a provision, R.C. 2929.20, allowing judges to release prisoners who met the law’s definition of “eligible offender.” In 2021, Staffrey asked the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court for judicial release after serving 25 years of his sentence. The Mahoning County Prosecutor’s Office opposed the request, arguing Staffrey wasn’t an eligible offender under the 2011 law. After a 2023 hearing, the court released Staffrey from prison and placed him on community control.
The prosecutor appealed the decision to the Seventh District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The prosecutor appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case.
Offender Not Eligible for Release, Prosecutor Argues
R.C. 2929.20(A)(1)(a) states that an “eligible offender” for judicial release is “any person who, on or after April 7, 2009, is serving a stated prison term that includes one or more nonmandatory prison terms.” The prosecutor argues that judicial release in H.B. 86 for eligible offenders applies only to offenders sentenced for crimes after S.B. 2 passed in 1996, except in a few rare cases. The office asserts that lawmakers clearly stated in S.B. 2 that the sentencing reforms applied only to those whose crimes occurred after the July 1996 effective date. Staffrey’s crimes happened before that date, and he isn’t eligible for any sentencing reforms, including judicial release, the office maintains.
Only a few offenders who committed crimes before July 1996 can apply for judicial release, the prosecutor asserts. The office cites the Ohio Supreme Court’s 2016 State v. Thomas decision, which explained that S.B. 2 limited its application to only those whose crimes occurred after the July 1996 effective date. H.B. 86 isn’t limited by when the crimes occurred, but under Thomas, it only provides a reduction to those who had not yet been sentenced when R.C. 2929.20 took effect in 2011, the prosecutor notes. Staffrey was sentenced before 2011, so he doesn’t qualify for judicial release, the office asserts.
The prosecutor argues the 2014 enactment of R.C. 2929.201 bolsters their argument that the judicial release provisions of R.C. 2929.20 didn’t apply to most offenders who committed their crimes before 1996. The office maintains the Seventh District didn’t even consider R.C. 2929.201. Before the creation of judicial release, a judge had the option to release an inmate through “shock probation.” In 2014, R.C. 2929.201 was adopted to clarify that shock probation was still available to offenders who committed crimes before July 1996. The prosecutor argues there would be no reason to enact the law if R.C. 2929.20 applied to every offender, including those who committed crimes before 1996. The office notes that Staffrey applied for shock probation in 2001 and was denied.
Prison Term Makes Offender Ineligible, Prosecutor Adds
The prosecutor also argues that Staffrey isn’t an eligible offender because he isn’t serving a “stated prison term” that includes one or more “nonmandatory” prison terms. The prosecutor asserts that all four sentences Staffrey received are mandatory prison terms. The office notes that the sentencing law at the time stated that prison terms “shall be imposed” for the first-degree felonies Staffrey committed. Because he committed the offenses with firearms, he wasn’t eligible for probation or a suspended sentence, making his sentences mandatory, the office asserts. Even though the judge didn’t impose additional mandatory sentences for using a firearm, the felony sentences he received are still mandatory because he used a firearm, the prosecutor concludes.
Judge Able To Grant Release, Offender Maintains
Staffrey notes that none of the cases the prosecutor relies on to demonstrate that judicial release doesn’t apply to pre-S.B. 2 offenders were decided before the law changed in 2011. The Seventh District wrote that R.C. 2929.20 made an exception to the S.B. 2 limits, Staffrey notes. It changed the definition of who is eligible for judicial release and applies to any offender serving one or more nonmandatory sentences after April 2009, he explains.
The prosecutor’s argument that judicial release is limited to a small set of offenders who committed crimes before 1996 but were sentenced after 2011 is inconsistent with the stated purpose of H.B. 86, Staffrey asserts. He cites the Supreme Court’s 2014 State v. Taylor decision, which stated that H.B. 86 was enacted to “reduce the state’s prison population and to save the associated costs of incarceration by diverting certain offenders from prison and shortening the terms of other offenders sentenced to prison.”
Staffrey argues that he was sentenced to one mandatory sentence, 10 to 25 years for rape, and his other sentences were nonmandatory. Because he was serving nonmandatory sentences, he was eligible for judicial release when the trial court granted it in 2023, he concludes. He also argues the law isn’t limited only to prison terms imposed after July 1996. He maintains the law applies broadly to any prison sentence that includes a nonmandatory term, and the lower courts correctly found he had completed his mandatory prison term when he applied for release.
Friend-of-the-Court Brief Submitted
An amicus curiae brief supporting Staffrey’s position was submitted by the Ohio Public Defender’s Office.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Trumbull County Prosecutor’s Office: Chris Becker, psbecker@co.trumbull.oh.us
Representing Daniel Staffrey from the Ohio Public Defender’s Office: Peter Galyardt, peter.galyardt@opd.ohio.gov
Is Right to Attorney in Ohio Constitution More Expansive Than in U.S. Constitution?
State of Ohio v. Isaiah Morris, Case No. 2023-1614
First District Court of Appeals (Hamilton County)
ISSUES:
- Does the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) regarding the right to an attorney under the U.S. Constitution’s Sixth Amendment apply to right-to-counsel claims made under the Ohio Constitution?
- Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attach at the initial appearance when a complaint has been filed against a defendant, but the defendant hasn’t been indicted?
- Did the suspect in this case unambiguously request an attorney during a police interrogation?
BACKGROUND:
The Cincinnati Police Department made multiple criminal complaints against Isaiah Morris for alleged offenses committed between January 2021 and April 2022. Morris was arrested in May 2022. His first court appearance after his arrest was conducted on May 16 in the Hamilton County Municipal Court. His bond was set, and an attorney from the Hamilton County Public Defender’s Office was appointed to represent him.
That afternoon, Morris was brought from the Hamilton County jail to the justice center, and Cincinnati police detectives interviewed him. One of the detectives read Morris his Miranda rights out loud. Morris said he understood the rights and signed the Miranda notification form.
Approximately 45 minutes into the two-hour interview, the detectives indicated that Morris had been involved in a separate shooting at a pizza restaurant. Morris responded that they were trying to pin something on him that had nothing to do with him. The briefs in the case state that he said, “I can’t see a lawyer?” and “Like, I can’t talk to a lawyer?” One detective responded twice that “[a]nybody can talk to a lawyer.” Morris replied, “Yeah, cause that’s – you know, we goin’ to do that cause I don’t know what you’re talking about.” The police continued questioning Morris.
About a week later, a Hamilton County grand jury issued a 14-count indictment against Morris. The charges included aggravated robbery, robbery, felonious assault, carrying concealed weapons, and having weapons illegally. Morris was arraigned in the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court on June 2, and he pled not guilty.
Defendant Asks Court To Suppress Comments From Police Interrogation
Morris subsequently filed a motion asking the court to suppress the statements he made during the May interview with detectives. He argued he shouldn’t have been questioned without his attorney present, based on the right to counsel for criminal defendants in the U.S. Constitution and the Ohio Constitution. He also maintained that he invoked his right to an attorney during the interview.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” The Ohio Constitution, in Article I, Section 10, states, “In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel; ….”
The trial court found that the Ohio Constitution offers broader protections on the right to counsel than the U.S. Constitution. Based on the Ohio Constitution, the court concluded that Morris’ right to counsel was violated because he had an attorney and the detectives questioned him without his attorney present. The court granted the request to suppress his statements made during the police interview.
The Hamilton County prosecutor appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, which upheld the decision. The prosecutor appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted the case.
State Argues U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Allows Questioning
The Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office argues that Morris could be questioned without his attorney, even after one was appointed for him at his initial appearance in court. In Montejo v. Louisiana (2009), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a defendant who didn’t request, but was appointed, an attorney by a court hasn’t triggered the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for a police interrogation. Based on Montejo, a defendant in that circumstance can be questioned by law enforcement if the defendant voluntarily waives Miranda rights before an interrogation, the prosecutor maintains. Morris didn’t request an attorney, he was appointed one under Ohio court rules, and he waived his Miranda rights by signing the notification form, the prosecutor asserts.
The prosecutor also contends that the right to counsel in the Ohio Constitution doesn’t help Morris because it is more restrictive, not more expansive, than the U.S. Constitution. The prosecutor maintains that the Ohio Constitution guarantees counsel only for court trials, while the U.S. Constitution ensures the right throughout the criminal prosecution. The First District opinion invented a more expansive right under the Ohio Constitution, in the prosecutor’s view.
Under the U.S. Constitution’s Sixth Amendment, the right to counsel doesn’t apply until a defendant is formally charged, the prosecutor argues. Morris’ right to counsel couldn’t “attach” at his initial appearance because he hadn’t yet been indicted on charges, the prosecutor contends. The prosecutor also maintains that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies only during “critical stages” of the prosecution and the police interrogation of Morris by police wasn’t a critical stage.
The prosecutor also asserts that Morris waived his right to counsel after he received the Miranda warnings. In addition, his comments during the interview weren’t an unambiguous request for an attorney, the prosecutor argues. The prosecutor states that after Morris mentioned a lawyer, he kept answering police questions and didn’t end the interview.
Man Asserts Ohio Constitution Provides More Extensive Right to Counsel
Morris counters that the right to an attorney in the Ohio Constitution is broader, not narrower, than the right in the U.S. Constitution. He notes that the 1802 Ohio Constitution guaranteed the right to an attorney “in all criminal prosecutions.” The 1851 Constitution changed the expression of the right to its current language: “In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel.” The Ohio Supreme Court considered the current provision in Decker v. State (1925). Morris’ brief maintains that the Supreme Court found the change “was not to limit the right but rather to expand it to every trial and every court” and ensure that people charged with misdemeanor crimes had the right to counsel.
Morris contends that no Ohio court, except the First District in his case, has addressed the issue of whether the state constitution offers more expansive protections for the right to counsel than the U.S. Constitution. Although the Ohio Supreme Court decided a case in 2024 (State v. Taylor) about the ability to waive the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment and referenced Montejo “with approval,” the Court didn’t discuss how the Ohio Constitution applies to the right, Morris’ brief states.
Morris agrees with the trial court, which found the Ohio Constitution “prohibits the State from introducing at trial the State’s interrogation of a Defendant who was represented by counsel, when the interrogation proceeded without counsel present.” Morris’ attorney didn’t know about the police interview, and Morris had to defend himself without his attorney present, the trial court noted.
Morris disputes the prosecutor’s view that the right to an attorney under the Sixth Amendment didn’t attach at his initial appearance in court. He notes that at the initial appearance, criminal complaints were pending against him, an attorney was appointed, and his bond was set. The setting of bond meant his liberty was at stake, even though he hadn’t yet been indicted, Morris maintains. He argues his right to counsel attached at that proceeding. Once adversarial proceedings are initiated in a court, the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to have counsel present for all critical stages of the criminal proceedings, which included the police interrogation, he asserts. Either way, the Court shouldn’t rule on this Sixth Amendment argument because the lower court rulings involved the Ohio Constitution, not the U.S. Constitution, Morris maintains.
The Court also should decline to consider whether he invoked his right in the interrogation to have his attorney present, Morris argues. The First District didn’t rule on this issue, so it would be inappropriate for the Court to analyze those facts, he maintains.
Groups Submit Additional Briefs on Each Side
The Ohio Attorney General’s Office and Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association filed amicus curiae briefs supporting the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office. The Supreme Court approved the attorney general’s request to participate in the oral argument, sharing the time allotted for the prosecutor’s office.
Amicus curiae briefs supporting Morris’ positions were submitted by the:
- American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio.
- Cuyahoga County Public Defender’s Office and Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
- Ohio Innocence Project and Innocence Project.
- Ohio Public Defender’s Office.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office: Ronald Springman Jr., ron.springman@hcpros.org
Representing Isaiah Morris from the Hamilton County Public Defender’s Office: Lora Peters, lpeters@hamiltoncountypd.org
Representing the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: T. Elliot Gaiser, thomas.gaiser@ohioago.gov