Wednesday, September 17, 2025
State of Ohio v. Patrick Heffley, Case No. 2024-1304
Third District Court of Appeals (Allen County)
The estate of Harold G. Price, by and through its administrator Cynthia Price, et al. v. Kidney Care Specialists LLC et al., Case No. 2024-1373
Second District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
In re Commission’s Investigation into RPA Energy Inc., Case No. 2024-0236
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
James D. Coykendall et al. v. Lima Refining Company, Case No. 2024-1256
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
Can State Court Restore Gun Rights of Individual With Federal Firearms Restriction?
State of Ohio v. Patrick Heffley, Case No. 2024-1304
Third District Court of Appeals (Allen County)
ISSUE: Is a person who is subject to a federal firearms restriction eligible to have a state trial court restore the person’s firearms rights under R.C. 2923.14?
BACKGROUND:
In 2006, Patrick Heffley was convicted of a fourth-degree felony count of domestic violence. He had two prior convictions for domestic violence, in 2000 and 2004, both fourth-degree misdemeanors. For the 2006 felony, the Allen County Common Pleas Court sentenced him to 12 months in prison.
Because Heffley was convicted of a felony offense of violence, he was barred by state law from acquiring, having, carrying, or using a firearm. Based on his conviction for a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a year, federal law also prohibited Heffley from possessing a firearm or ammunition.
In August 2023, Heffley filed an application with the trial court for “relief from weapons disability” citing R.C. 2923.14. He had completed his prison term, paid his fines and court costs, and fulfilled all other court requirements related to his convictions. Heffley, who was honorably discharged from his service in the military, testified that he wanted to show his son how to properly use weapons.
The court denied the request, stating that one of the requirements in R.C. 2923.14(D) for lifting the firearms restriction is that “[t]he applicant is not otherwise prohibited by law from acquiring, having, or using firearms.” The court stated that Heffley cannot have his firearms restriction removed because he is prohibited by federal law from possessing firearms. The court also noted that the statute is permissive, meaning the court ultimately has discretion to decide whether to grant the application.
Appeals Court Overturns Trial Court Decision To Retain Gun Restrictions
Heffley appealed to the Third District Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court decision. The Third District noted that federal law presents certain exceptions to firearms restrictions stemming from felony domestic violence convictions. In one, a person isn’t considered convicted of the offense for purposes of the federal restrictions if the person “has had civil rights restored (if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense).”
The Third District pointed to an uncodified section of 2011 legislation (House Bill 54). The uncodified law stated, “The General Assembly is explicitly making this amendment to clarify that relief from a weapons disability granted under section 2923.14 of the Revised Code restores a person’s civil firearm rights to such an extent that the uniform federal ban on possessing any firearms at all, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(l), does not apply to that person ….” The Third District returned the case to the trial court, determining that the judge incorrectly interpreted state law when finding that Heffley was ineligible to have his firearms rights restored.
The Allen County prosecutor appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to review the issue.
State Contends That Applicant’s Gun Rights Can’t Be Restored
The Allen County Prosecutor’s Office notes that for an Ohio court to remove a firearms disability, Ohio law requires the applicant to not be “otherwise prohibited by law from acquiring, having, or using firearms.” Citing the Supreme Court of Ohio decision in State ex rel. Suwalski v. Peeler (2021), the prosecutor explains that the Court ruled the applicant was “otherwise prohibited by law” from acquiring, having, or using firearms under the federal firearms disability imposed on the applicant by 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9). The Court determined that the federal restriction meant Ohio law prevented the state trial court from lifting the restriction. The prosecutor asserts that Heffley also remains subject to a federal law prohibition on firearms that can’t be removed by the state trial court.
The prosecutor notes that Heffley’s federal firearms disability is based on a different section of federal law, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). However, the prosecutor maintains, the logic is the same. Heffley is subject to a federal firearms restriction, so he is “otherwise prohibited by law” from acquiring, having, or using firearms, the prosecutor contends.
In the prosecutor’s view, the 2011 uncodified law doesn’t change the analysis. Uncodified law, sometimes called temporary law, isn’t given a permanent Revised Code section number and has a limited duration or operation. It is, however, binding law. Noting that the provisions in R.C. 2923.14(D) weren’t amended in that 2011 bill, the prosecutor argues the uncodified section’s reference to the intent of the amendments applied to other parts of R.C. 2923.14 that were amended. The prosecutor also notes that the statute was later amended in 2016, but the bill didn’t restate the uncodified intent again – potentially making it no longer applicable.
Applicant Argues That Lifting Ohio Firearms Restriction Removes Federal Prohibition
Heffley counters that Suwalski involved a defendant who was convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence. Under Ohio law, no state firearms restrictions applied to the defendant. Under federal law, though, division (g)(9) prohibited the defendant from possessing firearms based on the misdemeanor offense. The Court ruled that the defendant couldn’t have his firearms rights restored under Ohio law because he never lost his firearms rights under Ohio law, and the state judge therefore wasn’t authorized to restore his gun rights.
Heffley notes that his felony offense resulted in both a weapons disability under Ohio law, R.C. 2923.13, as well as a restriction under federal law, in division (g)(1). Heffley adds that his federal firearms restriction and his Ohio firearms disability under state law are based on the same conviction. He argues that if a state judge restores his rights under Ohio law, then his civil rights have been restored under state law, and the federal restriction is lifted and no longer applies.
The uncodified law enacted in 2011 supports this view, Heffley maintains. He maintains that the law clearly explains that when a trial court restores firearms rights under R.C. 2923.14, the applicant’s civil rights are restored. The federal exception then applies, and the applicant no longer has a conviction for purposes of the federal ban on firearms possession, he argues.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing the State of Ohio from the Allen County Prosecutor’s Office: John Willamowski Jr, jwillamowski@allencountyohio.com
Representing Patrick Heffley: Andrea Henning, ah@540westmarket.com
Should Four Jurors Have Been Disqualified in Medical Malpractice Lawsuit?
The estate of Harold G. Price, by and through its administrator Cynthia Price, et al. v. Kidney Care Specialists LLC et al., Case No. 2024-1373
Second District Court of Appeals (Montgomery County)
ISSUE: Must a potential juror be disqualified if the juror discloses that he or she cannot be fair and impartial or will not follow the law as presented by the court?
BACKGROUND:
Cynthia Price filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death after her husband, Harold, died of metastatic kidney cancer. She was named administrator of her husband’s estate. The defendants in the lawsuit included Latha Venkatesh, Harold’s primary care doctor, and Kettering Physician Network; urologist Sharat Kalvakota; and kidney specialist Shachi Lovekar and Nephrology Associations of Dayton.
Harold had a history of chronic kidney disease. A kidney lesion was identified on an MRI in 2017, and the radiologist noted that Harold should have additional imaging in six months. The lawsuit alleged that Harold’s physicians, however, didn’t order the follow-up imaging or ensure it was done. Harold also was in acute chronic renal failure and was evaluated for a possible kidney transplant. In February 2020, a significant mass was found on Harold’s kidney, and he was diagnosed with cancer, which had metastasized, the lawsuit stated. He died in July 2020.
The case was scheduled for trial in Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, and jury selection began in September 2023. The court told the prospective jurors that the civil case required proof by a preponderance of the evidence, which the court explained.
Estate Argues Four Potential Jurors Should Be Removed
Price’s attorneys made motions to excuse four of the possible jurors for cause. The attorneys raised concerns that the individuals indicated when responding to questions about the burden of proof that they wouldn’t follow the law. The trial court denied the requests. The attorneys then used their peremptory challenge to remove two of the jurors.
Following the trial, the jury found in favor of the physicians and medical facilities.
Price appealed the trial court decisions not to remove jurors for cause to the Second District Court of Appeals. The appeal pointed to R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), which states that a “good cause for challenge” to a prospective juror is if the person’s answers disclose “that the person cannot be a fair and impartial juror or will not follow the law as given to the person by the court.” Division (C) of the statute also states, “Each challenge listed in division (B) of this section shall be considered as a principal challenge, and its validity tried by the court.”
In its August 2024 decision, the Second District ruled that trial courts have discretion under the law to decide whether to accept or reject challenges to jurors for cause.
Specifically, the appeals court noted that one of the four jurors challenged was later replaced so there was no prejudice to Price. Another juror had raised his hand when asked twice if he would require the plaintiffs to prove their case by more than a preponderance of the evidence. However, the appeals court determined that the juror answered other questions saying he would apply the law. The same was true of a third juror, the Second District found. The plaintiffs also alleged that a fourth juror indicated he wouldn’t award millions of dollars for mental anguish and said a $30 million verdict could “decimate” the medical practices and destroy the livelihoods of people who work there, adding, “There is no way.” However, the appeals court noted that he also said, “I think so, sure.” when asked if he could set aside those feelings, listen to the law as explained by the court, and decide damages objectively and impartially.
Price appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which accepted the case.
Jurors Challenged for ‘Good Cause’ Must Be Removed, Estate Maintains
Price notes the vital constitutional right to a trial by a jury made up of unbiased jurors. She contends that the “good cause” listed in R.C. 2313.17(B)(9) for challenging jurors are considered principal challenges. Courts have long recognized that a principal challenge, or challenge for cause, that is valid requires the prospective juror to be removed, Price maintains. Such jurors can’t be rehabilitated, even if the juror subsequently pledges to be fair, because the risk of an unfair trial is too great, she argues. She contends that courts do not have discretion to decide whether to remove these jurors.
She acknowledges that the Supreme Court of Ohio in Berk v. Matthews (1990) ruled that trial courts have discretion to decide whether a potential juror should be disqualified for cause when the person’s answers disclose “that the person cannot be a fair and impartial juror or will not follow the law as given to the person by the court.” She asserts that Berk must be revisited and overturned.
Price also suggests that the Supreme Court clarify its decision in Hall v. Banc One Mgt. Corp. (2007). The case involved a different type of principal challenge, and the Court ruled the trial court should have immediately disqualified a juror based on that challenge. Price maintains that the Court then tried to reconcile its decision with Berk, where the Court held that the trial court had discretion to accept or reject a principal challenge. The Court stated that the legislature’s incorporation of what’s now the (B)(9) division appeared to be misplaced because it wasn’t part of common law or in an earlier version of state laws. Price argues the Court should reject the Hall rationale because it contradicts the Court’s deference to the General Assembly when a statute is plain and unequivocal.
Courts Evaluate Whether Jurors Must Be Removed for This Challenge, Doctors Counter
The doctors and medical facilities submitted three separate briefs. They argue that none of the four jurors in question said they would ignore the trial court’s instructions about the burden of proof or the applicable laws. The jurors demonstrated through the full scope of their answers that they would keep an open mind, listen to the evidence, and apply the law, the doctors maintain.
The doctors also point to R.C. 2313.17(C): “Each challenge listed in division (B) of this section shall be considered as a principal challenge, and its validity tried by the court.” They emphasize the second part, which explains that the trial court determines the validity of each challenge. They note that challenges based on divisions (B)(1) to (B)(8) in R.C. 2313.17 are factual determinations. If the court verifies the challenge as fact, then the juror must be removed. However, division (B)(9) requires the trial court to assess the juror’s answers to all questions, they contend. They argue a juror subject to a principal challenge based on (B)(9) isn’t removed immediately and automatically. The removal is at the trial court’s discretion, they maintain.
A trial court’s subjective discretion in determining whether a juror should be removed based on (B)(9) was recognized in Berk, the doctors assert. And the distinction between the principal challenges in (B)(1) through (B)(8) versus (B)(9) was upheld in Hall, the doctors argue. They ask the Supreme Court to reaffirm both decisions.
Trial Attorney Association Submits Brief Supporting Doctors
An amicus curiae brief supporting the positions of Venkatesh and Kettering Physician Network was filed by the Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.
– Kathleen Maloney
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing Cynthia Price, administrator, and the estate of Harold G. Price: Charles Cooper Jr., chipc@cooperelliott.com
Representing Kettering Physician Network and Latha Venkatesh, M.D.: Shannon Kemp Bockelman, sbockelman@reminger.com
Representing Nephrology Associates of Dayton Inc. and Shachi Lovekar, M.D.: Brian Sullivan, bsullivan@reminger.com
Representing Sharat Kalvakota, M.D.: John Welch, jwelch@arnoldlaw.net
Was $1.44 Million Penalty Assessed to Electric Supplier Excessive?
In re Commission’s Investigation into RPA Energy Inc., Case No. 2024-0236
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
ISSUE: Did the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio properly evaluate each of 159 violations alleged by its staff investigating an electric supplier when it imposed a $1.44 million forfeiture on the supplier and ordered it to pay restitution to electric utility customers?
BACKGROUND:
RPA Energy was certified by the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) in 2016 to be an electricity and natural gas supplier in the state’s deregulated utility industry. Doing business as Green Choice Energy, RPA enrolled consumers into variable-rate service contracts that proposed to supply them with 100% renewable energy. Doing so required consumers to pay a $5 monthly fee. The electricity rate, reportedly from only renewable sources, was often higher than the standard rates for electricity charged by the regulated utilities serving Ohio customers.
In 2021, the PUCO began receiving increased complaints about RPA sales tactics. The PUCO staff accused RPA of using “spoof numbers” to call customers, making it appear that the traditional regulated utility was calling the customer. The staff also claimed RPA refused to provide vital information concerning sales calls made by vendors that RPA hired to solicit potential customers. And RPA was accused of forging sales contracts, changing customers’ suppliers to RPA without the customers’ consent, and other violations of rules imposed to govern the deregulated electric generation market.
In October 2021, the PUCO staff issued a notice of probable noncompliance (PNC) to RPA, requesting the company take five corrective actions and pay a $300,00 forfeiture. The forfeiture was based on 30 rule violations and included the maximum $10,000 per violation. RPA refused to pay the penalty and also rejected the staff's request to “re-rate” customers, which would require lowering rates for customers and returning portions of the money already paid to RPA. The company agreed to all other changes requested by the PUCO and stopped doing business in Ohio.
After RPA contested the staff findings, the staff requested that the PUCO commissioners open a formal investigation into RPA. The commission agreed, and the staff amended its complaint against RPA. It claimed that RPA committed 159 distinct violations and should pay a $1.5 million forfeiture.
An evidentiary hearing was conducted in late 2022. Before the hearing, the staff provided RPA with 1,400 pages of documents, mostly call records from the PUCO call center that takes complaints about utility services. About three weeks before the hearing, the staff provided RPA with a confidential computer flash drive that contained more evidence of the alleged violations. PUCO staff witnesses testified about their investigation, and RPA presented its case. RPA maintained that most of the information the staff sought about RPA violations was records kept by the vendor RPA hired to solicit customers. The bulk of the new violations centered on when RPA vendors began door-to-door solicitation during the COVID-19 pandemic lockdown. Solicitors needed prior authorization from the PUCO staff before returning to in-person sales, and RPA began sales before receiving approval.
A hearing officer adopted the staff’s findings and sanctions. The commission then considered the report and RPA’s objections. The commission found that six alleged violations related to the claims of providing 100% renewable energy were unfounded and determined that RPA committed 144 violations. The commission agreed to impose the $10,000 maximum recommended by the staff and ordered a $1.44 million forfeiture.
Although it no longer does business in the state, RPA appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, noting that it has not paid the forfeiture or refunded any customers. The Supreme Court is required to hear this type of appeal.
Penalties Imposed Without Evidence of Violations, Supplier Asserts
RPA raises several objections to the PUCO ruling, including that the proposed forfeiture is excessive and that the commission has violated Supreme Court precedent and its own standards when accepting the staff report.
RPA notes that in 2020, the PUCO received more than 1,000 complaints regarding two energy suppliers. In those complaint cases, the commission adopted a standard that to prove a rule violation, the staff must specify the rule broken and provide evidence supporting the violation, RPA explains. RPA argues that the PUCO didn’t follow that process in its case. It maintains that the staff provided some evidence regarding the initial 30 violations, but for the remaining claims, the staff just filed voluminous records and call center recordings, RPA asserts. The staff didn’t attempt to present the commission with specifics about which evidence in its report supports each rule violation alleged, RPA argues. The company maintains that the staff failed to prove the company's violations, and it violated the company’s right to due process. RPA argues that under PUCO rules, the company needed to be notified of all rule violations when the PNC was issued, so that the company can work with the staff to address noncompliance issues. Until three weeks before the hearing on the matter, RPA only had notice of the 30 initial violations, and not the entire 159, the company notes. The staff's failure to link the information in its reports to specific rule violations and releasing the whole file only weeks before the hearing didn’t provide RPA adequate time and information to defend itself, the company asserts.
The company also maintains the PUCO defied the Court’s ruling in its 2021 In re Application of FirstEnergy Advisors decision. In that case, the Court ruled the commission cannot summarily adopt a staff report, but must make its own findings and legal conclusions before issuing a ruling, RPA explains. The company argues the commission did not assess the allegations against RPA and adopted the staff report without pointing to which specific information in its report is used to support each rule violation.
Procedures to Sanction Supplier Were Proper, Commission Maintains
The PUCO argues that it followed all the correct rules and procedures when proposing that RPA lose its license to operate in Ohio and that it pay a penalty and make restitution to its customers. The commission denies the RPA’s due process rights were violated because of a failure to provide enough information on its reasons for issuing the PNC. The commission argues that staff provided more than 1,400 pages of reports and records a full year before the hearing date. The staff’s supplemental report was given to the company three months before the hearing, and any extensions requested by parties to prepare for the hearing were granted, the commission notes. RPA had the opportunity to present witnesses and cross-examine witnesses, the PUCO notes.
The commission maintains that all the charges against RPA were supported by evidence provided in sufficient detail to assess the penalties. The commission did conduct its own assessment of the evidence, which is indicated by the fact that the PUCO dropped six charges presented by the staff, the commission maintains. The commission found the investigation proved the company violated several rules by engaging in unlawful practices. The commission also notes that RPA is responsible for holding its vendors accountable to abide by commission rules, and it isn’t the commission’s responsibility to gather evidence from the vendors. Instead, RPA is responsible for gathering and providing evidence when complaints about sales vendors are made to the PUCO by consumers, the commission asserts.
The commission also maintains that its sanctions are appropriate, considering that the company placed citizens at risk by engaging in in-person sales during pandemic restrictions without state authorization to begin.
Consumer Advocate Supports Sanction
The PUCO allowed the Ohio Office of the Consumers’ Counsel to intervene in the case over the objections of RPA. The consumers’ counsel argues the legislature granted it broad authority to intervene in any utility matter that adversely affects customers. The consumers’ counsel notes that RPA claims to be the victim of the PUCO process rather than admitting that it victimized customers by its illegal sales practices. RPA argued that the consumers' counsel couldn’t participate in the case because the only entity “adversely affected” by the PUCO investigation is RPA, not its customers. The consumers’ counsel counters that it can participate in cases where consumers have raised complaints about RPA. The consumers’ counsel argues that it is appropriate to join the case because the PUCO staff investigation of RPA is based on consumer complaints.
The consumers’ counsel notes the state of Ohio created a privilege for companies to be competitive energy suppliers in the state, and it is not a right. RPA’s rights weren’t violated when the PUCO established rules for handling complaints against suppliers, including the hearing process. RPA was granted the right to be heard, obtained the evidence presented against it, and was given the right to challenge the evidence, the consumers’ counsel notes. The PUCO correctly sanctioned RPA by examining the company's sales practices and finding the numerous violations, the consumer counsel concludes.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing RPA Energy Inc.: Mark Whitt, whitt@whitt-sturtevant.com
Representing the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio from the Ohio Attorney General’s Office: Rhiannon Howard, rhiannon.howard@ohioago.gov
Representing the Office of the Consumers’ Counsel: Angela O’Brien, angela.obrien@occ.ohio.gov
Did Trial Court Correctly Assess Damages for Refinery Accident?
James D. Coykendall et al. v. Lima Refining Company, Case No. 2024-1256
Sixth District Court of Appeals (Lucas County)
ISSUE: In a negligence lawsuit, does a trial court first apply the required cap on noneconomic damages, then apportion the percentage of negligence of each person involved in the case to determine the amount each person at fault is required to pay?
BACKGROUND:
Lima Refining Company operates a petroleum refinery in Lima, often called the “Husky” refinery. Many petroleum companies operate at the sprawling facility, transporting refined fuels through pipelines throughout North America. Energy Transfer is one of the companies operating a pipeline connected to the refinery. In January 2018, James Coykendall worked for Energy Transfer and was called to perform repair work on a pipeline at the refinery. An accident occurred, resulting in thousands of gallons of jet fuel pouring over Coykendall.
Days following the incident, Coykendall displayed an extreme change in his behavior. Once an outgoing person, he spoke in a quiet whisper, had difficulty forming sentences, and had trouble maintaining his balance.
In December 2019, Coykendall and his wife filed a lawsuit against Lima Refinery, Energy Transfer, and five other defendants, which were companies also operating at the Husky refinery. After extensive discovery, Coykendall dismissed his lawsuit against Energy Transfer and the other operators, leaving only Lima Refinery as the sole defendant. He then refiled his lawsuit against Lima Refinery in 2022.
The couple claimed Lima Refinery’s negligence led to the injuries, and they sought damages for bodily injuries, economic losses, and loss of consortium, which is generally the loss of quality time spent with loved ones. Before the trial, Lima Refinery requested that Energy Transfer be included as a defendant. The judge added Energy Transfer to the case as Lima Refinery sought to demonstrate that Energy Transfer, and Coykendall himself, shared responsibility for the accident. Coykendall’s attorneys noted that as his employer, Energy Transfer paid workers’ compensation benefits to Coykendall and was immune from any negligence claims under state law. Energy Transfer indicated its role in the lawsuit would be to recoup compensation it paid to Coykendall from any damages awarded from Lima Refinery.
Jury Awards Damages to Couple
The jury awarded the Coykendalls $5.3 million. The amount consisted of $3.3 million in economic losses. It awarded Coykendall $1.6 million for noneconomic losses, and his wife $452,000 in noneconomic damages for her loss of consortium claim., The court combined the couple’s damages resulting in a total of about $2 million in noneconomic damages.
The jury also apportioned the negligence, finding each party contributed to the accident. The Court found Energy Transfer was 50% at fault for Coykendall’s injuries. Lima Refinery was found to be 35% at fault, and Coykendall was 15% at fault.
The trial court first applied R.C. 2307.22(B) to assess the division of the noneconomic damages. It found Energy Transfer was responsible for $1 million for being 50% at fault. Lima Refinery was responsible for $720,000. The trial court then applied R.C. 2315.18(B)(2), which capped the amount of noneconomic damages the couple could receive at $500,000. Because Lima Refinery was the only party Coykendall sued, the court ordered Lima Refinery to pay $500,000 in noneconomic damages.
Lima Refinery appealed the verdict to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, making several arguments to overturn the entire decision. Included in its arguments was that the trial court imposed the two laws reducing the damages in the wrong order. The refinery argued the court should have first capped the noneconomic damages at $500,000 and then apportioned 35% to Lima Refinery for a total of $175,000 in payment to Coykendall.
The Sixth District affirmed the trial court’s decision. Lima Refinery appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, which agreed to consider the issue of the payment of noneconomic damages.
Damages Should Be Capped First Before Being Divided, Refinery Argues
State lawmakers reformed Ohio’s tort laws to limit the damages plaintiffs could receive, the refinery explains. When the laws are read in context, it is clear that the damage caps apply before the amount each party is required to pay is assessed, the refinery argues. Lima Refinery notes that R.C. 2315.18 caps the amount of noneconomic damages for things such as pain and suffering based on the circumstances of the case. The law places a maximum cap of $500,000 per occurrence, not per defendant. The statute also states that the damages are paid by the persons responsible for causing the injury, and doesn’t limit it to defendants. Just because Coykendall didn’t choose to sue Energy Transfer doesn’t mean it isn’t responsible for paying for the injuries, the refinery asserts.
When the law is viewed as such, Energy Transfer was 50% responsible and the refinery was 35% responsible for the injuries to Coykendall. In reality, Coykendall could receive $250,000 from Energy Transfer in noneconomic damages for the injuries and $175,000 from the refinery, Lima Refinery argues. The law shouldn’t change the amount received because Coykendall elected to use a legal strategy that didn’t involve suing his employer, which a jury found to be the most responsible for the accident, Lima Refinery argues.
By electing first to divide the damages, assigning $1 million to Energy Transfer and $720,000 to the refinery, the trial court created the possibility that Coykendall could receive $500,000 from both companies, which would be contrary to the law, the refinery argues. While Coykendall didn’t seek $500,000 from Energy Transfer in this instance, the logic of dividing responsibility first, then capping the amounts, could occur in other cases if the Supreme Court were to uphold the verdict, the refinery asserts. That could lead to scenarios where plaintiffs receive more for pain and suffering and similar claims than the $500,000 cap envisioned by lawmakers, the refinery concludes.
Damage Award Properly Assessed, Worker Asserts
Coykendall maintains the trial court followed the same procedures in assessing the economic damages that several other courts have used to reduce jury verdicts. Key to determining the damage amounts is recognizing the role of juries in determining damages in negligence cases, he notes. While the trial court is required by law to cap damages, the judge only begins the reduction process after the jury rules on the amount of compensation owed, Coykendall explains. The jury isn’t told that the damages amount will be capped, he explains, and is just instructed to determine how much money it will award to the injured person. The jury also gets to determine what percentage of the responsibility is apportioned to each party.
R.C. 2307.22 specifies the division of responsibility is based on the “total” noneconomic damages determined by the jury, Coykendall notes. The trial judge stated that the jury found the refinery was responsible for 35% of the $2 million in noneconomic damages, with no awareness that the amount could be capped, he explains. So, Lima Refinery received a reduction from $720,000 to $500,000, he asserts, and the lower courts recognized that Lima Refinery was the only defendant in the case. Because the couple only sued Lima Refinery and because of the caps, the refinery was responsible for paying $500,000, Coykendall asserts.
Coykendall argues the Supreme Court only addresses actual controversies, not the hypotheticals raised by Lima Refinery, including the possibility that Coykendall could have attempted to sue both Energy Transfer and the refinery. The trial court followed the law by dividing the percentage of responsibility for the injuries first, and then capping the award, and then charging the amount to the only defendant in the case, the refinery, Coykendall explains. He points to the appeals court decision, rejecting Lima Refinery’s contention that it is possible Coykendall could have received more than $500,000 in noneconomic damages had he used another legal strategy. He notes the appeals court found the law doesn’t allow a trial judge to impose more than $500,000 except under very limited circumstances.
– Dan Trevas
Docket entries, memoranda, briefs (including amicus briefs), and other information about this case may be accessed through the case docket.
Contacts
Representing James D. Coykendall et al.: Marc Williams-Young, mwilliams-young@spitlerwilliams-young.law
Representing Lima Refinery Company: Mark Wagoner, mwagoner@shumaker.com
These informal previews are prepared by the Supreme Court's Office of Public Information to provide the news media and other interested persons with a brief overview of the legal issues and arguments advanced by the parties in upcoming cases scheduled for oral argument. The previews are not part of the case record, and are not considered by the Court during its deliberations.
Parties interested in receiving additional information are encouraged to review the case file available in the Supreme Court Clerk's Office (614.387.9530), or to contact counsel of record.