Police officers are people, just like everyone else, says the city of Columbus. Ohioans approved a constitutional amendment that defines a crime victim as “a person against whom the criminal offense or delinquent act is committed or who is directly and proximately harmed by the commission of the offense or act.”

So, can the city’s police officers acting in the line of duty be “victims” if crimes are committed against them or they are harmed? Or do police officers occupy a special place in society because their power to use deadly force separates them from everyone else? The Ohio Supreme Court will confront the issue next week when it considers a newspaper’s quest to uncover the identities of two officers shot at during a deadly encounter on Interstate 70 near downtown Columbus.

Ohioans Enhanced Crime Victims’ Rights
In 2017, Ohio voters approved Marsy’s Law, which expanded the rights of crime victims. With its passage, the Ohio Constitution defined “victim.” In April 2023, the General Assembly enacted legislation to further implement the crime victim rights provided under Marsy’s Law. This included passing R.C. 2930.07, which requires law enforcement to redact from case documents the “name, address, or other identifying information” of a crime victim.

R.C. 2930.07 doesn’t indicate whether or not a police officer can fall under the definition of crime victim. A key sticking point in the debate before the Supreme Court is whether Ohio voters would have understood the word “victim” to include police officers when they passed the amendment, the parties note.

After Shootout, Columbus Police Redact Names of Officers
In July 2023, two Columbus police officers were in a cruiser when they were alerted to a bank robbery. The suspects in an SUV passed them, and they pursued. The vehicle abruptly stopped in the middle of I-70, and two individuals fled the vehicle and ran off the highway. As one officer chased the suspects, a third suspect emerged from the SUV and shot the officer multiple times. The second officer saw the third suspect, later identified as Abdisamad Ismail, and fired his gun at him. Other officers also fired at Ismail, who was killed.

The first officer was transported to a hospital and treated for gunshot wounds. He underwent several surgeries and survived the incident.

On the day of the shooting, the Columbus Dispatch newspaper sent an email request to the Columbus police department for video of the shooting and reports related to the incidents. Columbus police provided video, but redacted the names of the two officers who first encountered Ismail and the other suspects. The city explained that, in accordance with Marsy’s Law, the identifying information of the officers was removed because they became crime victims once shots were fired at them.

The Dispatch sought a writ of mandamus from the Ohio Supreme Court in October 2023 to compel the police to identify the officers.

Officers’ Identity Not Shielded by Marsy’s Law, Newspaper Asserts
The Dispatch argues that police officers don’t meet the definition of “victim” when performing their public duties and exercising governmental authority. The newspaper urges the Court to follow the precedent set in its 2020 City of Centerville v. Knab decision. In that case, the Court ruled that a “municipal corporation” cannot be a crime victim under Marsy’s Law. The opinion noted that voters wouldn’t have understood that a “victim” would include a city, which in its governmental capacity operates public safety agencies and responds to reported crimes.

The Dispatch maintains while police officers are human beings, they aren’t “victims” when they suffer injuries on the job. That is because they are vested with governmental powers and also receive additional safeguards for undertaking dangerous acts, the Dispatch argues.

Officers Were Crime Victims, Police Department Argues
Columbus police point directly to the definition of “victim” in Marsy’s Law and note a “person” is a human being. There is nothing in the law that excludes police officers from being a “victim” under the definition, the department asserts.

Columbus police argue the Centerville case was about a city, which sought restitution as a crime victim for the costs of responding to a fake emergency call. The police argue there is a significant difference between recovering the costs for responding to calls in an official capacity, and human beings who are shot at while wearing a badge and gun. In this case, the officers were directly assaulted by a shooter and were the victims of a crime, the police maintain. The voters approving Marsy’s Law would have understood the difference and considered the officers as victims, the police conclude.

SER Gatehouse Media Ohio Holdings v. Columbus Police Dept. is the first of four cases in which the Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on Feb. 11. The Court will hear 11 more cases over a three-day session, Feb. 11-13.

Watch Oral Arguments Online
Oral arguments begin each day at 9 a.m. They will be streamed live online at SupremeCourt.Ohio.gov and on the Ohio Channel, where they are archived. Detailed case previews from the Office of Public Information are available by clicking on the case names throughout the article or through the list of cases in the sidebar.

Tuesday, Feb. 11
Rape Offenses
A 14-year-old boy was found delinquent for rape after an incident with another teen in March 2021. The 14-year-old was committed to the Department of Youth Services in April 2022 for at least one year. In In re P.M.S., the offender notes that a rape conviction requires proof of force or the threat of force. He argues he and the victim were roommates and friends, were about the same age, and the sex was consensual. The Warren County prosecutor contends that the victim verbally resisted requests for sex that day and didn’t consent when the incident occurred. Force was established by the evidence, the prosecutor maintains.

Property Appropriation
The owner of a residential property near the Cleveland airport sued the city of Cleveland over the extension of two airport runways in the 2000s. The owner complained of excessive noise and vibrations from increased air traffic over the house, which sits in Olmsted Township. The owner wanted the city to buy the property through its eminent domain powers. In State ex rel. Boggs v. Cleveland, the owner rejects the city’s argument that it cannot purchase a property outside the Cleveland city limits. The owner asserts that an exception in state law allows Cleveland to acquire the property as part of establishing an airport, landing field, or air navigation facility. The city counters that the exception doesn’t apply because the airport doesn’t need the property for those purposes.

Oil and Gas Rights
In 1935, several landowners sold 161 acres of property in Belmont County. The deeds stated that the sellers reserved all oil and gas rights under the property for themselves and their heirs. The surface property changed hands several times over the years. In 1996, heirs to one of the original 1935 sellers recorded a will that attempted to confirm the family members still owned the oil and gas rights. In 2014, the heirs attempted to invoke their mineral rights. The landowners argued the rights to the minerals expired long ago, and recording the will didn’t preserve the family’s claim. In Crozier v. Pipe Creek Conservancy, the Court will consider whether the Ohio Marketable Title Act eliminated the heirs’ mineral rights.

Wednesday, Feb. 12
Tax Exemption
A food services provider operates cafeterias and similar operations in several Ohio schools, universities, businesses, and other facilities. Under a management fee contract, the company purchases food and supplies for the client, and the client reimburses the company for those purchases. Over a four-year period, the food services provider paid $4.9 million in Ohio commercial activity tax (CAT). It then claimed it was owed a $907,000 refund because it paid CAT on reimbursements for food and supplies, which should have been exempted because the company was acting as an agent to its clients. In Aramark v. Harris,the company argues the state misinterpreted the CAT law’s definition of “agent” and wrongly denied the refund.

Arbitration Clauses
After being fired by the City of Lakewood a second time, an employee filed a grievance through his union. The union argued the dispute should go to arbitration based on the collective bargaining agreement between the city and employees. The city disagreed, stating the employee gave up that right under the terms agreed on when he was rehired after the first termination. The union filed a request in common pleas court to order arbitration. In Ohio Council 8, AFSCME, AFL-CIO et al. v. Lakewood, the union maintains that state law allows it to ask a court to order the enforcement of the arbitration clause. The city argues the collective bargaining agreement requires the dispute over arbitration must be handled by the State Employment Relations Board.

Judicial Release
In 1995, a Mahoning County man committed four felonies, including rape. In 1996, he pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to 10 to 50 years in prison. That same year, state lawmakers enacted sweeping criminal justice reforms. The reforms introduced judicial release to Ohio, giving sentencing judges the right to release offenders under certain conditions. In 2021, the offender sought judicial release, and the county prosecutor opposed it, arguing the man wasn’t eligible because the 1996 reforms only applied to crimes committed on or after July 1996. Citing a second wave of sentencing reform in 2011, the judge ruled the man was eligible and released him in 2023. In State v. Staffrey, the Court will consider whether the 2011 change in law applied and allowed for the man’s release.

Right to Attorney
A man appeared in municipal court after being arrested. At the initial appearance in court, he was appointed an attorney, and bond was set. Police detectives questioned the man later that day without his attorney, and the man signed a Miranda rights notification form. He was indicted on 14 counts the next week. In State v. Morris, the Hamilton County prosecutor maintains that the man’s right to counsel wasn’t violated under the U.S. Constitution or the Ohio Constitution when he was questioned by police. The man argues the Ohio Constitution provides a more expansive right to counsel that required his attorney to be present at the interrogation. His statements to police should be suppressed, he asserts.

Thursday, Feb. 13
Rape Case Testimony
After her ex-husband was indicted on three counts of raping her, a Wood County woman took the stand at his trial. The prosecutor asked her to define what she meant by “having sex,” and she provided an explicit definition of “sexual conduct,” which was required for a rape conviction. The charges covered three specified time periods. When discussing each time span, the wife used terms such as “having sex,” “sexual encounters,” and other terms, but not explicit words describing the sex acts. The ex-husband was convicted, but an appeals court vacated the ruling. In State v. Coker, the Court will consider whether the woman’s testimony had to specify what acts constituted sexual conduct for each rape count.

Mental Distress
In 2021, a Richland County father going through a divorce requested a civil stalking protection order against his wife’s boyfriend. The two men had a contentious relationship. The court found the boyfriend instigated trouble and started verbal altercations. The order was granted based on the father’s belief that the boyfriend would continue to cause mental distress. Ohio appellate courts disagree on whether these protection orders can be issued when there is a belief that the stalker will cause mental distress. In Z.J. v. R.M., the boyfriend contends that state law only prohibits knowingly causing someone mental distress. The attorney general counters that a belief that someone will cause either mental or physical distress is encompassed by the law.

Judicial Misconduct
A Geauga County judge faces a suspension from practicing law based on his handling of a juvenile court case, his interactions with the county auditor’s staff and law enforcement, and his testimony before the state legislature. During the juvenile court case, the judge ordered that two teenage brothers be placed in detention because they refused to visit their father. In Disciplinary Counsel v. Judge Grendell, the Board of Professional Conduct found the judge committed 11 ethics rule violations. The judge maintains that the juvenile court case was an exceedingly difficult one transferred to him and points to his lack of any disciplinary sanctions over his decades-long career. He also defends his actions related to the conflict with the auditor and maintains it was his First Amendment right to testify in support of proposed legislation.

New Trial Appeal
A Hamilton County man on death row since 1996 received a new trial in 2022 from a common pleas court. The county prosecutor requested from the court of appeals “leave to appeal”, a step required by law when a prosecutor wants to contest the granting of a new criminal trial. The appeals court denied the request, finding the prosecutor didn’t challenge all the reasons the trial judge cited for granting a new trial. In State v. Jones, the Court will consider whether the appeals court short-circuited the process and should have allowed the prosecutor to appeal before considering the merits of the appeal.